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Abstract 
 
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Finance. 
Impact of Venture Capital Financing on SMEs’ Growth and Development 
in Ghana. 
By 
Christian Opoku Biney 
SMEs’ contributions to economic development both in developing and developed countries 
have been well documented in the economic literature. SMEs have been acknowledged as a 
catalyst for economic development. Furthermore, SMEs are the main engine for employment 
creation, economic growth, innovation, poverty alleviation and income distribution in both 
developed and developing countries.  
Most economic and management literature has documented empirical studies on the impact 
and drivers of venture capital financing in developed countries such as the US and Europe, but 
few empirical studies exist on developing countries, especially Ghana. This is because the 
industry is new and also due to the lack of data.  Thus, this study investigates the impact of 
venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth and development in Ghana. The study also 
examines the factors that drive venture capital investments activity in Ghana, and identifies the 
factors which influence SME owners’ accessibility to venture capital financing in Ghana. 
The study applied  both propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-difference (DiD) 
estimation techniques to determine the effects of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth 
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and development in Ghana. The, result shows a positive and significant correlation between 
venture capital financing and SMEs’ growth in the context of employment and sales in Ghana. 
The study used panel data analysis to examine the factors, which drive venture capital 
investments activity in Ghana. The results suggest that GDP growth rate, labour market 
rigidities, capital gains taxes and institutional quality are the key drivers of the venture capital 
industry in Ghana.  Next, we also applied a logit regression model to identify and analyse the 
factors which influence SME owners’ accessibility to venture capital financing in Ghana. Our 
findings show that SME owner/managers’ socio-demographic factors and macroeconomic 
variables such as gender, education, geographical location, business plan, social networks and 
interest rate charges influence SME owner/managers’ ability to obtain venture capital 
financing. 
Key Words: Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Venture Capital Financing, Accessibility, 
Entrepreneurs, Financing. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background  
  Most governments have acknowledged the significant effect of small-sized enterprises on 
economic development. It has been well documented in the economic literature that SMEs are 
a catalyst for economic development (Sanusi, 2003). SMEs’ growth has attracted considerable 
interest among policymakers, development experts, entrepreneurs, financial institutions, 
venture capital firms, and NGOs (Baker, 1992).  Tambunan (2008) states that SMEs perform a 
vital role in national development in the area of employment generation and GDP growth, in 
both developed and developing countries. Similarly, Qureshi (2011) states that SMEs make 
considerable contributions toward GDP, income generation, tax contributions, fostering 
innovations, job creation, increasing revenue, enhancing human capital, alleviating poverty, 
and improving the living standards and quality of life in a nation.  
Tucker and Lean (2003) have documented that small businesses often have difficulties in 
obtaining funding from financial institutions to expand on their fixed assets and working 
capital. As pointed out by Blanton and Dorman (1994), SMEs are often undercapitalized. In 
other words, requirements for loans approval for SMEs are not met, and even when SMEs do 
receive loans, usually they are short-term. Hence, SMEs have no alternative but to depend on 
credit from friends as well as family members to finance their long-term requirements, for 
example, the procurement of new equipment (Riding and Short, 1987). Using data from ten 
thousand firms in eighty countries, Beck et al., (2006) show that the likelihood that a business 
has financial constraints is 39 percent for small enterprises, 38 percent for medium-scale 
enterprises and 29 percent for large enterprises. Also, small enterprises spend on average less 
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than 13 percent of their investments using external finance compared to large enterprises. Beck 
et al. (2005) show that small enterprises’ inability to obtain external finance is a significant 
obstacle to their growth. 
Aryeteey (2008) argues that in Ghana, notwithstanding the significant role SMEs perform in 
the social development of the country, the sector continues to be afflicted with countless  
challenges. These include harsh government policies, inadequate financial support, high 
operational costs, lack of explicit government assistance, and the problem of obtaining credit 
from banks and formal financial institutions. The primary challenge which SMEs face that 
impedes many entrepreneurs from success is the issue of finance (UNCTAD, 1995, 2001; SBA, 
2000). 
The existing literature recognizes a gap in financial support for SMEs in Ghana. For instance, 
Abor and Biekpe (2006) assert that obtaining finance is a significant obstacle facing Ghanaian 
SMEs. Furthermore, according to a study conducted by Aryeetey et al. (1994) 38% of Ghanaian 
SMEs listed credit as a critical impediment to their development. Aryeetey (1998) claims that 
in Ghana over half of the micro-enterprises which apply for loans are likely to be rejected and 
only half of the small enterprises which apply for formal finance such as loans from banks are 
likely to be considered.  In Ghana, it has often been acknowledged that high risk linked with 
lending to SMEs, high-interest rates, guarantee requirements and burdensome procedures are  
impediments to SMEs obtaining loans from banks (Aryeetey et al. 1994, Bigsten et al. 2000, 
Buatsi 2000 Sowa et al. 1992).  
 1.1.1 SME Definitions 
There is no single universally accepted definition of a small firm (Storey1994). There are 
differences in the levels of firms' capitalization, sales, and employment. Consequently, 
establishing classification gauges on size, i.e., the number of employees, profit, revenue or 
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the net value that may be pertinent to a sector, may result in every firm being categorized 
as small, whereas the similar size description once used for a different sector might not 
result in the same outcome.  The Bolton Committee (1971) made an effort to propose a 
working definition based on an “economic” and a “statistical” classification.  A firm is 
considered to be small under the “economic condition” provided it meets the following 
three conditions: 
  The market place share is relatively small. 
 The owners or partial owners must manage it informally, and not through a formal 
management structure. 
 It should not be part of a larger enterprise, managed independently. 
The following guidelines were delineated by the Bolton Committee (1971) under the 
“statistical” definition: 
  The small firms’ size and their impact on export, employment, and economic growth. 
 The level at which small firms’ economic contributions has altered over a period. 
 The statistical definition is adopted cross-country in contrast to the economic 
contribution of the small firms.  
 
There were shortcomings in the Bolton Committee’s (1971) report over the definitions 
given to small firms. Various meanings were used by the Bolton Committee to differentiate 
small firms in different sectors and while the staff number is used as a yardstick to describe 
manufacturing firms and the construction and mining sector, businesses such as the road 
transport sector are characterized as small provided they consist of five or fewer vehicles. 
However, there were objections to the Bolton Committee definitions because of the 
discrepancies in defining small firm characteristics.   
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An SME is defined as a firm with an upper limit of 300 staff, $15 million annual revenue 
and an assets value of $15 million. On the other hand, SMEs, as defined by the Inter-
American Development Bank, are firms which have a maximum of 100 workers and 
revenue of less than $3 million (World Bank, 2009).  SMEs in Japan are described as 
manufacturing firms with ¥100 million paid-up capital and a labour force of 300, along 
with retail firms and those in the services sector with ¥10 million paid-up capital and a 
labour force of 50 (Grey et al., 2006). Natarajan & Wyrick (2011) state SMEs in Canada 
and the US are defined as enterprises with employees numbering fewer than 500. The US 
Small Business Administration (SBA, 2004) states that an SME employs fewer than 500 
persons. According to the European Commission definition, SMEs are firms with 250 
employees or fewer, yearly revenue not higher than €50 million and a yearly overall balance 
sheet not more significant than €43 million (EC, 2009).  Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate 
the different definitions of SMEs by various institutions. 
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Table 1.1: Small firm definitions by the Bolton Committee (1971)   
Sector             Definition   
Manufacturing 200 personnel/ less 
Construction 25 personnel/ less 
Mining & Quarrying 25 personnel/ less 
Retailing Turnover of £50,000 or less 
Miscellaneous Turnover of £50,000 or less 
Services Turnover of £50,000 or less 
Motor Trade Turnover of £100,000 or less 
Wholesale Trade £200,000 or less 
Road Transport Five vehicles or fewer 
Catering All excluding multiples and brewery-managed houses 
Source: The Bolton Committee (1971, p.3) 
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Table 1.2: SME definition by the European Commission. 
Enterprise 
Classification 
     Staff Headcount Turnover Balance Sheet 
Total 
Medium-Sized       < 250    ≤ €50 million ≤ €43 million 
Small       < 50    ≤ €10 million ≤ €10 million 
Micro       < 10    ≤ €2million ≤ €2   million 
  (Source: European Commission, 2009)       
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Table 1.3: SME definitions by Multilateral Institutions. 
Institution Maximum 
number of 
employees 
Maximum Revenue or 
Turnover ($) 
Maximum 
Assets ($) 
World Bank 300 $15,000 $15,000 
IMF-IADB 100 $3,000,000 None 
African Development Bank 50 None None 
Asian Development Bank No Official definition. Uses only individual definitions by 
national governments. 
UNDP 200 None None 
 Source: Gibson, & van der Vaart (2008, p.5 
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1.1.2 Contribution of SMEs to Developed and Developing Countries 
SMEs are regarded as the foundation of the growth of large companies and vital for commerce 
and industry (Storey and Westhead, 1994). Also, small businesses are acknowledged as central 
hubs for large-scale industries (Fabayo, 2009). The promotion of the SME sector is a 
fundamental element to promote employment, economic growth, and poverty alleviation 
(Ayyagari et al., 2007).  SMEs are vital in most developed and developing countries’ 
economies. It is acknowledged that they significantly account for the development of the 
Ghanaian economy through GDP growth, and employment generation, efficiency, and 
innovation (Mahmoud, 2011; Abor & Quartey, 2010; Kayanula &Quartey 2000; Aryeetey et 
al. 1994).  SMEs contribute to 95% of all enterprises in the world and constitute 66% of overall 
employment as well as 55% of aggregate production (OECD, 2004).  OECD statistics show 
that in advanced countries SMEs are the primary job providers in the private sector. Previous 
studies indicate that SMEs make a 55% contribution to GDP and more than 65% of aggregate 
jobs to high-income countries. SMEs, which are unorganized firms, contribute 60% of 
economic growth and more than 70% of the aggregate workforce to low-income countries, and 
an approximately 70% of the economic growth and 75% of the aggregate workforce of middle 
income countries (Fida, 2008).  
In the developed economies, Japan has the highest share of SMEs, accounting for 99% of all 
total enterprises (EIU, 2010). According to the US International Trade Commission (2012), the 
US economy is based on the presence of SMEs, which contribute 50-70% to the country’s GDP 
through employment creation and self-dependency. The Annual Report on EU SMEs 
(2012/2013) shows that in 2012 European SMEs accounted for 66.5% of employment and over 
€3.4 trillion value added to the current price, compared to the €5.9 trillion that is the total value 
added generated by the private non-financial sector.  
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Mead and Liedholm (1998) show that SMEs in the US contributed 80 percent to the creation 
of all new jobs. In Northern Ireland and the UK, the private sector constitutes 56% of SMEs 
and 48% of jobs, respectively (Buckland and Greer, 1997). SMEs constitute 98% of all private 
sector businesses in the Netherlands, accounting for 31.6 % of GDP and employing 55% of the 
total workforce (Indarti & Langenberg, 2004; EIM Business & Policy Research, 1999). Small 
businesses create almost 97% of all businesses in the private sector and 51% of private sector 
jobs in Australia (ABS, 1996; Wijewardena &Tibbits, 1999). SMEs in Italy contribute $35 
million to exports and employ 2.2 million of the country’s labour force (Indarti & Langenberg, 
2004; Patrianila, 2003).  
The role of SMEs has become more crucial in developing countries as they have the prospect 
of improving the distribution of incomes, creating jobs, alleviating poverty and promoting 
export growth. They have also led to entrepreneurship development as well as industry, and 
rural development. Beck et al., (2005) found a significant share or percentage of SMEs 
contributes to the creation of jobs, and Liedholm and Mead (1999) and the World Bank (2004) 
state that the contribution has been rising especially in less-developed countries.  Stein et al. 
(2010) emphasized that SMEs in less-developed countries account for 45% of employment and 
33% of GDP. Theoretically, the labour force engaged in small businesses (excluding medium-
sized enterprises) is 25% in less-developed countries (Elkam, 1998).  
 Ayyagari et al. (2011) showed that, across developing countries, the most significant 
contributors to the total workforce are SMEs and they account for 71% of the workforce in the 
region which represents the most significant share of the labour force. Not only do SMEs 
contribute to the employment of a dominant number of people, but they also create most new 
jobs. China’s increasing economic growth is attributed to SMEs (Liu, 2008).  The author claims 
that SMEs account for over 99% of all enterprises in China. At least 60% of the country’s GDP 
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is from SMEs, which create more than 82% of jobs in China. The backbone of the Indian 
economy has been SMEs which hire nearly 40% of the Indian labour force and contribute 45% 
to the Indian manufacturing output (Raju and Gopal, 2006). SMEs contribute significantly to 
the creation of millions of jobs, mainly those requiring low-level skills. Almost 1.3 million 
small businesses in India account for 40% of total exports and contribute 17% to the GDP (The 
Economic Times, 2013). In Malaysia SMEs contribute 56.4% to job opportunities, 32% to 
GDP, and 19% to exports (Omar, Arokiasamy & Ismail, 2009). An OECD report (2004-2005) 
indicates that in Bangladesh, 99% of firms are enterprises with fewer than 100 employees and 
create 58% of jobs. Furthermore, 99% of wholly private businesses in Ecuador have no more 
than 50 employees and contribute 55% of jobs.  
In Africa, the informal and private sector which is essential for economic growth is dominated 
by SMEs. For example, they constitute about 90% of businesses and account for more than 
60% of employment on the Continent (OECD, 2004). In the private sector, SMEs account for 
90% of commerce and provide over 50% of the labour force and economic growth in several 
countries in Africa (UNIDO, 1999).  
For instance, in Morocco, SMEs constitute about 93% of industrial firms, which contribute 
38% to production, 33% to investment and 30% to exports. The contribution of SMEs in South 
Africa is significantly higher as they constitute approximately 91% of formal businesses, and 
contribute 52–57% to economic growth as well as providing 61% of jobs (Hassbroeck, 1996; 
Berry et al., 2002).  
1.1.3 SMEs in Ghana 
In rural and urban areas in Ghana, SMEs are the catalyst for economic development. The 
impact of the SME sector on the country’s development regarding job creation, wealth creation 
as well as mitigation of poverty cannot be overlooked. Most businesses in Ghana are in the 
SME sector. According to Mensah (2004), Registrar General Department records showed that 
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about 90% of businesses registered in Ghana are SMEs. There are various definitions for 
Ghanaian SMEs, but generally, the standard used is the number of persons hired by an 
enterprise (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000). Misunderstanding frequently arises when these 
definitions are applied, based on the uncertainty and limits used by officialdom.  
Small-Scale Enterprises are defined by the Statistical Service of Ghana (GSS) as businesses 
with fewer than ten workers and medium-scale businesses as firms with more than ten workers 
and large-scale enterprises are firms with hundred or more workers. Another measure to 
describe SMEs is the firm’s fixed assets value.  NBSSI (1999) describes SMEs as firms that 
hire between 1-5 workers and with fixed assets of not more than $10,000, excluding land and 
buildings, as a micro-enterprise. Small enterprises are firms that hire about 6-29 workers and 
with fixed assets of not more than $100,000, with land and buildings excluded. NBSSI 
categorizes SMEs as follows: firms that employ a workforce of fewer than five are described 
as a micro-enterprise; firms with a 6 - 29 workforce as small enterprises and firms with 30-99 
workers as medium enterprises, while large enterprises are firms with a workforce of 100 and 
more. However, using fixed assets to define SMEs has been criticized (Kayanula and Quartey, 
2000) since the continuing decline of the Cedi currency against the main foreign currencies in 
Ghana usually renders SME descriptions obsolete. Osei et al. (1993) and Steel and Webster 
(1991) used an upper-limit of 30 employees to describe SMEs. Osei et al. (1993) classified 
SMEs into three different groups: (a) micro-enterprises as firms employing fewer than six 
persons, (b) very-small enterprises as firms employing between six and nine people and (c) 
small enterprises as firms employing between ten and twenty-nine people (Teal, 2002).  
Venture Capital Fund Law (Act 680, 2004) defined an SME as an industry, project, undertaking 
or economic activity, that hires not more than 100 people with a total asset base, excluding land 
and buildings of not more than the equivalent of $1million in value.   Boon (1989) argues that 
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the size of an enterprise’s employment is the most significant criterion used to define SMEs in 
Ghana. 
1.1.4 SMEs’ Characteristics in Ghana 
SMEs in Ghana are grouped into rural and urban enterprises. The urban enterprises are sub-
grouped into formal (organized) and informal (unorganized) enterprises. The formal sector has 
employees who are paid and with a registered office, while the informal sector comprises 
craftspersons who operate in open spaces, in provisional wooden edifices, or at home 
(Kayanula and Quartey 2000).  They hire few people, or in some circumstances, the staff do 
not earn salaries. SMEs depend on relatives or trainees as the staff. Rural enterprises usually 
comprise family groups, individual craftspersons, and women who deal with local food crop 
production. The principal activities they undertake in this sector are fabrics, textiles, clothing, 
and tailoring, the making of soaps and detergents. Others include ceramics, timber, and mining, 
village blacksmithing, tin-smithing, blocks and cement making, processing of food, bakeries, 
beverages, wood-furniture, assembling of electronics, agro-processing, chemical products and 
mechanics (Osei et al., 1993; Kayanula, 2000; UNECA,2010). 
Several of the SMEs are feminine-oriented businesses that are home-based compared to the 
masculine-oriented businesses. They operate from homes and are mostly not considered in 
official records. This kind of business influences their chances of obtaining funding from credit 
schemes that are planned with minor attention to the requirements of female-owned businesses. 
Thus, female entrepreneurs often feel that they are not bankable with these credit arrangements, 
as the managerial costs connected with the arrangements always offset the benefits. Women 
are commonly engaged in sole-ownership trades, which are mostly micro-enterprises, and for 
that reason, they do not have the required collateral to be eligible for credits (Aryeetey et al., 
1994; Abor and Quartey 2006). 
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As in any developing country, SMEs in Ghana are located in both the formal and informal 
sectors, and the majority are in the informal sector. SMEs in the formal sector in Ghana are 
registered officially with the Registrar General Division and hence pay taxes, whereas small 
businesses in the informal sector are unregistered and evade taxes.  The informal sector 
comprises proprietary micro and small businesses which include producers, wholesalers, 
retailers, and consumers (Abor and Quartey, 2006). 
SMEs in Ghana usually have fewer employees who are usually the owners’ relations; hence, 
there is usually no distinction between ownership and control. Most of the small businesses are 
independent of public funds; hence, there is no accountability and no rules and compliance 
(Gockel and Akonea, 2002).  
Another characteristic of the SME sector in Ghana is that participants have a low level of 
education and training and the sector is mostly made up of people who are self-employed. They 
are mainly family-oriented businesses, and there is no distinction between business finances 
and those in the personal accounts of owners. A distinctive feature of SMEs in Ghana is defined 
as follows: 
 The majority of SMEs are managed by individuals, with the owner/manager taking all the 
most important decisions 
 SMEs have weak managerial skills, with inadequate financial and legal systems, thereby 
impeding businesses because of lack of formalized structures. 
 SMEs usually lack working capital and are vulnerable to all kinds of shocks (Frempong et 
al., 2007). 
1.1.5 Contribution of SMEs to Ghana’s Economic Development  
SMEs are critical contributors to Ghana’s economy and play a significant role in economic 
growth.  They contribute largely to the industrial output and exports of goods and services. 
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Abor and Quartey (2010) and Aryeetey (2001) revealed that the SME sector makes up about 
92% of businesses registered in Ghana, accounting for about 70% of GDP, and contributing 
85% to manufacturing employment and 75% to general employment.    
 The World Bank (2006) reports show that the informal sector in Ghana, which is mostly SMEs 
contributes substantially to employment, approximately 70% of the total workforce (Fredua 
2007). Keskin, (2006) and Abor & Quartey (2010) contended that SMEs support the creation 
of the more significant part of jobs and also contribute to national revenue through tax revenue, 
and improved national income.  
Kayanula & Quartey (2000) and Aryettey (2001) established that SMEs among others are the 
source of job generation, support the conservation of foreign exchange, increase exports of 
non-traditional commodities and contribute through innovation and creativity to economic 
growth and development.  
Kufour (2008) argued that small businesses in Ghana constitute the most significant part of the 
labour force and form the basis of the private sector locally. SMEs are characterized as 
improving the competitiveness of the local markets and making efficient use of limited 
resources, and promoting long-term GDP growth in less developed countries (Aryeetey 
&Ahene, 2005).  
Baume (20004) noted that SMEs are vital to any economy since they efficiently use resources, 
are the basis of creativity, the fountain of entrepreneurship, and utilize financial resources, 
develop family savings, and innovate. They also create at a lesser cost, have excellent 
geographic locations, a great existence in rural localities and a higher capacity to absorb a 
surplus workforce.   
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Brown and Medoff (1989) stated that small businesses are often perceived as having some 
advantages over larger firms. On the other hand, larger firms have unfavourable circumstances 
such as weaker autonomy, stricter legal frameworks, less flexible planning, and work settings 
that are personal. SMEs are seen to depend on self-made tailored service. Besides, small 
businesses are likely to offer faster services, superior products, reasonable prices and provide 
official and casual after sales services.  
Vossen (1998) argued that while large firms’ assets are material in nature, small firms’ assets 
are commonly behavioral. Lack of an entrenched bureaucracy is the most critical asset of SMEs 
and perhaps the one which is often associated with larger firms.  
Edmiston (2007) stated that an embedded bureaucracy could result in a long stretch of 
command and subsequently ineffective communication, rigidity, and reduced managerial 
coordination. Additionally, small firms, as they operate in a more competitive environment, 
tend to be innovative to stay ahead of their rivals. Lastly, as ownership and management in 
smaller firms are possibly linked, the personal rewards for prospective innovators are higher. 
Notwithstanding such merits, Mensah (2004) explained that small enterprises endure several 
limitations particularly financial problems, as they usually do not have adequate capital. 
Several empirical studies have documented the lack of finance as the critical problem 
hampering the rapid development of small enterprises in most developing countries (Arthur, 
2003; Deakins, North, Baldock and Whittam, 2008). 
1.1.6 Financial Constraints Facing the SME Sector in Ghana 
Zaman et al. (2011) stated that small businesses play a significant role in the economic 
development of various countries through the provision of job opportunities at low cost and 
sustain economic prosperity. However, most SMEs confront many factors that thwart their 
growth and development. These factors include lack of credit facilities, infrastructural 
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weaknesses, lack of managerial skills, low technological level/grading, weak establishment and 
rules, as well as the lack of access to international markets. Financial resources have been 
identified as the most significant challenge facing SMEs in Ghana (Abor and Quartey 2010; 
Lader, 1996; Cook and Nixson 2000; Parker et al. 2005). The lack of finance has limited the 
growth potential of many and well-documented evidence suggests that SMEs face more 
difficulties in raising finance than larger firms (Hutchinson and Xavier, 2006; Beck et al. 2006). 
Formal finance organizations have designed their products to meet the requirements of larger 
corporations and the cost per loan is higher in the case of SMEs than larger firms because, on 
average, larger firms borrow more substantial amounts than SMEs (Abor and Quartey, 2010).  
SMEs in Ghana also lack the adequate collateral to pledge for loans. Owing to their risk, lenders 
always demand a security before granting a loan request. However, because of their size, SMEs 
are unable to provide adequate collateral. Many lenders refuse to provide finance to SMEs due 
to their high probability of failure. For fear of intrusion, SME owners restrict themselves to the 
use of their limited financial resources rather than seek the assistance of a third party.  Kotey 
(1999) pointed out that financing constraints can result in business failure, but several SME 
owners dislike using long-term debt finance. SMEs are known to follow the pecking order 
hypothesis whereby they prefer to use personal finance (Irwin and Scott, 2006). 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Access to finance is one vital managerially difficult decision facing business enterprises in 
most developing countries including Ghana. Several SMEs have difficulties accessing finance 
that prevents their growth beyond the early stage. Other SMEs go bankrupt at the initial stage. 
Ou & Haynes, (2006) and Cook, (2001) state that access to funding has been emphasized as 
crucial to SMEs’ development. Various studies indicate that small businesses rely much more 
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on internal financing than external financing. Financing procedures adopted by SMEs range 
from internal sources like owners’ savings and/ retained profits (Wu Song, & Zeng, 2008), to 
external sources which include monetary support from family members, trade credit, business 
angels and risk capital (Abouzeedan, 2003; Barker, 2007). 
According to Lader (1996), access to funding has been recognized as the leading problem 
facing SMEs. Parker et al., (1995) assert that according to a World Bank survey report, 90% 
of the small businesses investigated stated that non-availability of credit was a pivotal 
hindrance to investment. Levy (1993) revealed that non-availability of financial resources to 
small enterprises as compared to large corporations impeded their development.  
In Africa including Ghana, many SME entrepreneurs have few options to access funding other 
than depending on personal savings or retained earnings and on the benevolence of friends and 
families to fund their investments.  Thus, most financial institutions including banks are 
reluctant to lend to SMEs due to the high risks linked with their enterprises and the lack of 
guarantees that are typically required by the banks as a prerequisite to credit (Berger et al., 
2006, Vuvor and Ackah, 2011). 
The government of Ghana, in 2004 passed a law, Venture Capital Trust Fund Act, 2004 (Act 
680) to support the provision of financial resources for the promotion of SMEs and 
development of the venture capital market. (ibid) It has been a decade since the government 
established the Venture Capital Fund and there is very little empirical research on venture 
capital financing in developing countries including Ghana.  Hence, this study aims to fill this 
research gap by exploring how venture capital financing influences the growth and 
development of SMEs in Ghana. Empirical evidence documented in this investigation will 
enable readers to gain an in-depth understanding of how the venture capital industry influences 
the growth and development of young innovative small businesses in Ghana. 
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Venture capital is equity investment in firms whose principal goal is to support the launch or 
early growth of new businesses that do not hitherto have access to the public securities markets 
or institutional lenders (Gupta and Sapienza, 1992).  
Venture capital is defined as “as capital provided by firms who invest alongside management 
in young companies that are not quoted on the stock market. The objective is a high return on 
the investment. The young company creates value in partnership with the venture capitalist’s 
money and professional expertise” (OECD, 1996, p.5).   
EVCA (2013) defined venture capital as professional equity that is co-invested with the 
entrepreneur to fund an early stage (seed and start-up) or expansion venture. Offsetting the high 
risk, the investor expects a higher than average return on the investment. Venture capital is a 
subset of private equity.  
Venture capitals are equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, 
where the investor is a financial intermediary who is typically active as a director, an advisor, 
or even a manager of the firm (Kortum and Lerner 1998).  Megginson (2004) described venture 
capital as a professionally managed pool of money raised for the sole purpose of making 
actively managed direct equity investments in rapidly growing private companies.  
More strict definitions of venture capital exclude buyouts, mezzanine, and other financial 
dealings. Equity investments such as common stock, or preferred stock, convertible debentures 
or other financial instruments are used by venture capitalists when the small business is sold 
through either a merger or a public equity offering. Venture capitalists obtain their returns on 
their investment by way of capital gain at this liquidity event (i.e., Initial Public Offering).  
Sahai (2010) explained that the distinction concerning private equity and venture capital is the 
phase of the lifecycle of the firm at which each form of capital is focused. VC refers to a subset 
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of PE, which is equity investment made to support the pre-launch, launch and early-stage 
development phases of business (OECD, 2013). Private equity investments are expended in 
companies during the expansion phase when the firms have established products, markets, and 
stable cash flows history. In contrast, venture capital investments are expended in the earlier 
stages of the life-cycle of a firm when the trustworthiness of its business model is still in the 
process of being acknowledged. 
Venture capital financing is usually “the initial capital invested by sources outside the firm and 
the last to exit”. In the parlance of the market, the ‘front money’ or funds usually are 
subordinated to all other financial commitments of the enterprise. Aside from common stock 
financing, the most common forms of alternative equity instruments issued in venture capital 
investments are convertible debentures, warrants and letter stock options” (Rao,1997, p.11-30). 
Venture capital financing, means typically high risk and long-term investment in industrial 
projects with high reward potential, at any stage of execution of the project or its production 
cycle. Venture capital financing is done via the initiation of an economic activity or an 
industrial or commercial project or to improve a process or a product in an enterprise associated 
with both risk and reward (Verma, 1994). 
 
  1.3 Research Objectives  
  The objectives of the study are to: 
i. Investigate the effects of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth in Ghana. 
ii. Examine the factors, which affect venture capital investment activity in Ghana. 
iii. Identify and analyze factors which influence SME entrepreneurs’ accessibility to 
venture capital financing in Ghana. 
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iv. Suggest measures and policies that could be implemented by policymakers to address 
the challenges that SME entrepreneurs face in accessing venture capital funding in 
Ghana. 
 
1.4 Research Questions and Related Hypotheses 
a. Research Questions 
i. How does venture capital financing impact SMEs’ growth and development in Ghana? 
ii. What factors drive venture capital investment activity in Ghana? 
iii. What factors influence SME entrepreneurs’ accessibility to venture capital financing in 
Ghana? 
iv. What measures can policymakers adopt to address the challenges and obstacles SME 
entrepreneurs face in accessing venture capital financing in Ghana? 
b. Hypotheses 
1. H1= There is a positive and significant relationship between SMEs which receive 
venture capital funding (in the context of increased annual sales and employment growth) 
compared to SMEs which do not receive venture capital funding. 
2. H2= GDP growth rate is positive and significantly influences venture capital 
investments activity. 
3. H3=High interest rate is negative and significantly influences venture capital 
investments activity. 
4. H4= High unemployment rate is negative and significantly influences venture capital 
investments activity. 
5. H5= Market capitalization and stock traded are positive and significantly associated 
with venture capital investments activity.  
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6. H6= High inflation rate is negative and significantly influences venture capital 
investments activity. 
7. H7= Reduction in capital gains tax is positive and significantly associated with 
increases in venture capital investments activity. 
8. H8= Scientific and technical journal articles (a component of R&D) are positive and 
significantly correlated to venture capital investments activity. 
9. H9= Index of economic freedom is positive and significantly affects venture capital 
investments activity. 
10. H10= Female SME owners are negative and significantly correlated with accessing 
venture capital financing compared to their male counterparts. 
11. H11= Age of SME owner/managers is negative and significantly associated with 
obtaining venture capital financing 
12. H12= There is a negative and significant relationship between the marital status of 
SME owner/managers and access to venture capital financing. 
13. H13= There is a positive and significant relationship between educational background 
of SME owner/managers and access to venture capital financing. 
14. H14= There is a positive and significant relationship between SME owners/managers’ 
working experience and access to venture capital financing. 
15. H15= There is a positive and significant relationship between the age of the firm and 
access to venture capital financing. 
16. H16= There is a positive and significant relationship between the size of the firm and 
access to venture capital financing. 
17. H17= There is a positive and significant relationship between the legal status of an 
SME owner/manager’s firm and access to venture capital financing. 
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18. H18= There is a positive and significant relationship between SME managers 
operating in the manufacturing/construction sector and venture capital financing.  
19. H19= There is a positive and significant relationship between geographical location of 
a firm and SME managers’ ability to obtain venture capital financing. 
20. H20= There is a positive and significant association between SME owners’ business 
plans and access to venture capital financing. 
21. H21= There is a positive and significant relationship between SME owner/managers’ 
social networking and venture capital financing. 
22. H1= There is a negative and significant relationship between high-interest charged 
and SME owner/managers’ access to venture capital financing. 
 
1.5 Contributions of the Research Study  
Numerous studies on venture capital have been carried out in the developed countries such as 
the US, Canada, the UK, and other European countries, while few empirical studies have been 
undertaken in developing countries. Thus, the venture capital concept is a recent development 
in most developing countries.  This research is expected to contribute to the promotion of the 
SME sector and the development of the venture capital industry in Ghana. This study attempts 
to bridge the literature gap on the venture capital financing of SMEs in Ghana.   
The results from this study will assist policymakers and the government to design policies and 
strategies that can support the growth of a vibrant venture capital market that will promote the 
development of SMEs in Ghana. 
This study will enable the government, development partners and the private sector to have a 
better understanding of the contributions to and the challenges and prospects of the venture 
capital industry for SME development in Ghana.   
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The research study will also serve as a guide for young and upcoming entrepreneurs who have 
business acumen and desire to establish their businesses, but lack the financial resources to use 
VC financing as an alternative source of SME financing. 
Finally, the knowledge gained from venture capital financing in Ghana will serve as a useful 
information source for potential investors and other key players who are interested in 
participating in the venture capital industry in Ghana. 
 
 1.6 Organization of the Research Study 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Chapter two describes the relevant 
literature on venture capital financing and SMEs’ development. It highlights the prominent 
related empirical evidence on the impacts and determinants of venture capital investments in 
SMEs’ development as well as their accessibility to debt/equity financing. Chapter three 
discusses the methodology and data collection used in the study. Chapter four discusses the 
empirical results and findings. Chapter five presents the discussion and conclusions of the 
study, the policy implications and the recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides empirical studies on SMEs and venture 
capital financing and Section 2.3 presents empirical studies on venture capital financing in 
Ghana. Section 2.4 discusses the impact of venture capital funding on SMEs’ growth. Section 
2.5 provides an overview of the determinants of venture capital investments Section 2.6 
outlines the determinants of SMEs’ accessibility to debt or equity finance and Section 2.7 
highlights empirical studies on SMEs’ accessibility to financing and its determinants in Ghana. 
Section 2.8 discusses the research gap in the literature. 
 
2.2 Empirical Studies on the Venture Capital Financing of SMEs.  
Venture capital is non-bank financing for small-sized and start-up businesses and is common 
in developed financial markets (Freear & Sohi, 1994). According to Gompers and Lerner 
(1998), VC is a professionally managed pool of money raised for the sole motive of active 
management of direct equity investments in fast-growing private businesses. This form of 
finance is regarded as a modern entrepreneurial financial innovation. Obtaining VC is crucial 
for commencing a new venture for countries that hope to connect to highly developed 
economies. Venture capitalists (VCs) provide financial support for doubtful business proposals 
by SMEs which show potential but unproven designs. If the VCs are persuaded that a business 
model shows potential, they would invest in the business and provide the required funds while 
partaking in the risk.  In industrialized countries where venture capital has played an immense 
role in supporting SMEs, the sector is so widely developed that it has formal and informal 
venture capitalists referred to as business angels (Freear, 2003).   
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According to Memba (2014) the dominance of venture capital, in advanced countries has 
performed a critical role in improving SMEs’ growth through the provision of equity capital. 
Freear, Sohl & Wetzel (1994) provided two primary methods of outside equity capital for 
entrepreneurs: venture capitalists and business angels. The VC market is made-up of 
professional funds and the informal VC market consists of a varied and widespread population 
of high net worth individuals. In nations where both kinds of VC take part in funding small 
businesses, they are professional investors who contribute their business expertise, industry 
experience, and links to a business project (Sohl, 2003). 
VC is a method of funding planned to offer equity or quasi-equity financing to small 
businesses, with the primary return to investors as capital gains or share gains, rather than from 
dividends. VCs are vigorously involved in the tactical manoeuvres and running of small 
businesses to help achieve investment objectives and provide positive support by adding value. 
Investors are fascinated by VC investments because of the possibility of massive gains from 
later sales of the company’s shares, and therefore are eager to receive the higher risks entailed, 
as compared to conventional loans. Indeed, a typical PE investor’s portfolio usually comprises 
a variation of investee firms, of which some will fail, some will yield adequate returns and a 
handful will be highly advantageous (Freeman, 2015).  
Venture capital funds are mostly invested in small businesses with high growth potential. On 
the other hand, they might take part in take-overs of more reputable firms. The participation 
period of a venture capitalist is usually two to five years, after which they will trade the shares 
of the business on a stock market through an initial public offering (IPO), trade sale, 
management buyout or sale of total shares in the business to a reputable competitor or other 
VCs.  
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The investment can be considered a good prospect provided the exit from the investment is 
successful (Freeman, 2015). Puri and Zarutskie, (2008) suggest that VCs offer a considerable 
share of their funds to young companies that show growth prospects. This indicates that VC 
could play a very vital role for small companies and not only to close a growing gap in funding. 
They are also for companies that may be confronted with difficulty in attracting capital due to 
asymmetric information, insufficient reputable historical records for saleable products, and 
inadequate assets which could be used as security for loans from the bank (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001). They also contended that VC is not only crucial in supporting businesses dealing 
with credit difficulties, but also in assisting businesses to develop (Mollica and Zingales, 2008; 
Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002).  
Venture capital institutions can contribute to small and innovative companies through different 
means. VCs invest in companies with limited tangible assets which banks may find difficult to 
fund because VCs are more competent in supervising their investments (Lerner 1995; Gompers 
&Lerner1996). Black and Gilson (1998) recommended that VCs can improve a company’s 
reputation to obtain better agreements when seeking funding. Hellmann and Puri (2000) and 
Bottazzi et al (2008) showed VCs help to improve the proficiency of the business which they 
finance. Hellmann and Puri (2000) showed proof that venture capital institutions influence 
product-market tactics, and also make time to market lesser businesses that obtain VC in the 
biotechnology industry in the US. Chemmanur et al. (2008) provided fresh insights into the 
influence of VC and showed that the general effectiveness of VC-funded companies, gauged 
by total factor productivity, is higher compared to non-VC funded companies which they 
ascribed to the screening and monitoring role by VCs of small businesses. 
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2.3 Empirical Studies on Venture Capital Financing in Ghana 
Empirical studies on the venture industry in Ghana are limited. This is not a surprise since the 
industry is in its infant stage. However, Mensah (2004) argues that venture capital funding is 
not new in Ghana because, in 1991, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
together with the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) supported the 
development of a VC fund in Ghana. It was re-introduced into the country in 2006 as a form 
of financing to help in the promotion of SMEs and the development of the venture industry. 
Hence, only a handful of research studies have been carried out on the subject and researchers 
are more interested in other forms of financing such as bank loans, micro-finance and the stock 
market in Ghana.  
Sam-Brew (2011) investigated the effect of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth in 
Tema Metropolis in a single case study and found that SMEs prefer self-financing, but 
occasionally receive support from financial institutions. SMEs that receive venture capital 
financing also received technical skills, managerial expertise, access to marketing and 
distribution support. 
Owusu-Adjei (2010) examined the state of the private equity industry in Ghana and the extent 
to which it contributes to private sector development. Based on personal interviews and case 
studies on five locally based companies, the author found that, while the industry is still 
growing, it made a significant contribution to businesses in Ghana through the provision of 
capital and technical assistance.   
Agyeman (2010) investigated challenges facing venture capital firms in developing countries, 
with emphasis on Ghana, based on a semi-structured interview, documentary evidence, and 
direct observation. The author found that the venture industry is beset with numerous 
challenges such as inadequate outlet prospects due to a stable IPO environment, inadequate 
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industry policies and rules and regulations, inadequate Research & Development support as 
well as poor record-keeping by SMEs. 
Obeng et al. (2009) appraised the venture capital activities in Ghana, based on survey 
questionnaires and interviews of 29 SME firms. The authors concluded that venture capital is 
an emerging industry with high growth prospects as evidenced in the increasing trend of total 
capital under management and investment. 
Poku and Frimpong (2009) assessed the prospects of venture capital finance in Ghana, using a 
survey questionnaire and a sample of 80 small businesses in the Greater Accra region of Ghana. 
The authors found the majority of the small businesses see venture capital support as an answer 
to their financial problems, but are unwilling to partner with venture capital firms to nurture 
their business due to fear of losing control rights. The findings also reveal that the prospect of 
the venture capital industry looks promising and can be maintained if the government creates 
the right environment for the industry to grow. 
Gatsi and Nsekkyire (2010) described venture capital in Ghana as very young and heavily 
dependent on a Venture Capital Trust Fund with limited fund-raising activities. They also 
revealed that venture capital is skewed towards expansion and later stage investments. 
Sarpong (2015), who used a self-administered questionnaire on 50 SMEs in Kumasi, revealed 
that venture capital financing is still not accessible in the region and more effort should be 
made to bridge the gap among critical stakeholders.  
2.4 Empirical Studies on the Impacts of Venture Capital Financing on SMEs’ Growth. 
Over the last twenty years, both academics and policy-makers have contended that businesses 
funded by VC grow faster, are more innovative and generate above average employment 
(Alemany and Marti, 2005). Numerous studies that have analyzed the effect of VC investments 
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on business growth by depending on matched pair methods or cross-sectional regression by  
comparing sales growth, employment or the total assets of VC-funded and Non-VC-funded 
businesses (see. Puri and Zarutskie, 2008; Engel and Keilbach 2007; Alemany and Marti, 2005; 
Jain and Kini, 1995). In general, a positive correlation between VC funding and growth is 
observed, though the results differ (see, e.g., Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). The authors using 
hand collected data, argued that VC backed companies in Europe do not grow and create jobs 
faster than Non-VC backed companies because of the immaturity of European venture capital. 
Further, they also found that VC backed companies do not generate more sales and employment 
than Non-VC backed companies. However, VC backed companies which perform R&D appear 
to increase their sales less than Non-VC backed companies.  
Engel and Keilbach (2007) studied some extensive records that contained almost all registered 
companies on the German trade register and used matching methods to compare VC-backed 
businesses with Non-VC backed businesses. The authors found that growth in employment of 
VC-backed businesses was about twofold larger than Non-VC funded counterparts. On the 
contrary, Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) used data from the period 1996-2000 on 511 businesses 
listed on the European new stock market; the authors found no evidence of effects of VC on 
growth in employment in three years after the IPO. Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) observed 
significant employment growth in VC-backed companies during the year before and after the 
IPO compared to a control group of companies without VC backing. 
Belke et al. (2004, 2005, and 2006) applied information on 20 advanced countries from 1986 
to 1999. The authors identified that VC investment results in reduced unemployment and 
increased employment. The authors also found the positive effect of VC investment on growth 
in employment to be more dynamic and theorized that it might take time for VC investments 
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to gain their full employment potential through feedback and spin-off effects on other 
businesses. 
Alemany and Marti (2005) conducted a study by comparing 323 companies in Spain which 
received VC financing from 1993-1998 plus a control group sample. However, Non-VC funded 
companies’ samples matched were based on the location of the company, sector or industry, 
size, and age in which VC funding was attained. The authors considered early and later phase 
funding, with the reorganization and MBOs/LBOs by computing for the average sales growth, 
employment and total assets after the year the investment happened to the third year after the 
incidence, and differentiating based on the stage of the company’s life-cycle (i.e., start-up, 
growth, later stage) in which VC funding was received. VC-funded companies outperformed 
Non-VC funded companies when VC investments occurred in the start-up or growth stage.  
Astrid & Bruno (2004) studied VC-funded companies from 1970-2000 and found out that sales 
increased twofold, they paid taxes about thrice, produced twofold exports and spent nearly 
thrice on R&D as against the average Non-VC funded companies.  
Bürghel et al. (2000) evaluated sales growth and the staff of 500 start-ups in Germany and the 
UK but failed to discover any impact of VC financing.  EVCA (2001) concluded that VC-
funded companies recorded a high sales growth as compared to other companies. The result 
shows that companies that used venture capital experienced growth in sales.  
Hellmann and Puri (2002) revealed that once the investor invests his or her cash in the business, 
he/she must dedicate enough time in assisting the business to be successful, organizing internal 
structures and proper management of human resources. Thus, venture capitalists assist in 
adding value to make the firm professional.  Being professional is the most significant 
advantage of VC funding. Hellmann and Puri (2000) established that innovative businesses are 
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more likely to receive VC funding as compared to imitator start-ups and that VC is linked to a 
significant reduction in the period needed to convey merchandise to the market. 
Jain and Kini (1995) matched 136 sampled US-listed companies that received VC funding 
preceding IPO with a matched sample of Non-VC funded IPO companies in the same sector 
that experienced IPOs of comparable size. The authors considered growth in sales from the 
year before and after the IPO and the subsequent three years, respectively. During the IPO time, 
VC-backed companies significantly surpassed the Non-VC funded matched group.  
Manigart and Van Hyfte (1999) investigated 187 VC-funded companies in Belgium and found 
a significant effect on the control group regarding superior growth in assets and cash flow, but 
not turnover and employment growth. The authors discovered that the growth rate of the total 
assets of VC-funded companies was significantly larger than the control group every year, 
commencing in the year in which the company received VC funding over the ensuing five 
years.  
Engel (2003) identified significant growth effects based on some broad German sampled 
companies offered by the country’s top credit ranking agency. The author employed propensity 
score matching and found that VC- funded companies attained more than twice the yearly 
employment growth compared to Non-VC funded companies. 
Puri and Zabrutskie (2012) analyzed VC-backed companies by comparing matched and non-
matched samples. The authors found that VC has a positive effect on sales growth. However, 
VC-funded companies on average are less profitable compared to non-VC-funded companies, 
which indicates that the massive scale of the investee matters more than the profit for VCs. 
Puri and Zarutskie (2012) showed in their study that VC-backed companies had not only  higher 
average employment than a peer group of Non-VC-backed companies, but also displayed 
higher growth rates of employment. According to the authors, the ratio of VC-backed 
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companies amounted to only 0.05 to 0.16 % of the total company’s population, whereas the 
share of the employment in VC-backed companies was at least 2.7 % and reached 7.3 % during 
the study period.  
Davila, Foster, and Gupta’s (2003) study underpinned this finding by describing the 
employment patterns of VC backed firms. The authors pointed out that receiving VC has a 
signalling effect and increases employment growth after the investment. With regard to firm 
survival, when comparing the failure rates of firms that received VC to firms that did not 
receive VC, Puri, and Zarutskie (2012) found that the former showed a much lower rate of 
failure than the latter (34.1 % versus 66.3 % as of 2005). 
Bertoni, Colombo, and Grilli (2005) analyzed whether companies with higher employment 
growth easily obtained VC based on a dataset of 537 Italian new technology firms. The authors 
found proof of significantly higher growth in employment of VC-funded companies as 
compared to the Non-VC funded companies, thus validating the positive impact of VC on 
employment growth. In contrast, only weak evidence is exhibited in companies’ growth 
preceding the initial VC round which leads to a greater probability of receiving VC financing. 
This finding supports the view that the venture capital financing and the managerial support 
provided by VCs resulted in the company’s growth more than the ability to pick the winners 
(best companies). 
 Romain and Pottelsberghe (2004) who used a longitudinal dataset of 16 OECD nations 
between 1990 and 2001, found that a build-up of VC investment increases the output flexibility 
of R&D. Improved VC intensity allows it to grasp the research information created by 
universities and companies. Furthermore, from extensive information in Germany, Audretsch 
and Keilbach (2002) demonstrated that VC investment is a significant and critical factor that 
fosters productivity and efficiency in Europe. Kenney et al. (2004), based on subjective proof, 
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showed that the growing electronic and semiconductor industries, and the software industry in 
Taiwan and Israel, respectively also benefited significantly from VC investment.  
According to Mason and Harrison (2004), venture capital funding is connected with a high 
degree of uncertainty, which describes the unpredictability of the positive earnings that might 
take place after a period. VCs may perhaps also engage in an innovative business method that 
is different from the owners’ strategy; the former can even remove the owner from the business.  
Reynolds (2000) stressed that VCs ought to activate, maintain and accelerate the growth and 
performance of the small business, and this results in enhanced profitability. The critical role 
of VCs’ investment is to remove the primary financial difficulties which take place in the 
development stage of a new business. 
Baeyens and Manigart (2003) emphasized that venture capital has a significant additional 
quality: to provide integrity to attract new funding. The authors explained that by screening, 
witnessing and adding value, VCs lessen the asymmetries information and financial uncertainty 
and therefore attach genuineness to the VC-backed company and as a result impact on 
additional funding. This process stimulates the progress and improvement of entrepreneurship 
in a country’s economy in general.  
Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002), Amit et al. (1998) and Gompers (1995) stressed that VC investors 
usually concentrate on specific industries. Owing to their specialty in specific sectors, they 
supposedly cultivate context-specific screening competencies that enable them to assess quite 
precisely the marketable worth of business schemes and the innovative ability of promoters 
(Chan 1983, Amit et al. 1998) for a divergent opinion (Amit et al. 1990). Hence, they can 
efficiently manage adverse selection problems, which might otherwise thwart excessively 
concealed value companies from acquiring the funding they require. Thus, lessening of 
financial difficulties results in more substantial firm growth. Subsequently, VC firms are not 
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passive partners (Gorman and Sahlman 1989, Barry et al. 1990). In contrast, VCs keenly 
monitor and advise their portfolio companies. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) showed in their study that 41.4 percent of the board members’ 
seats of the US VC-funded companies are under VCs’ management. Again, 25 percent of them 
also control the majority of board seats. VC investors apparently carry out vital tutoring 
functions to the advantage of the investee companies (Gorman and Sahlman 1989; Kaplan and 
Strömberg 2004). Further, venture capitalists offer advisory support to portfolio companies in 
areas such as strategic planning, human resource management, marketing, accounting, and 
finance, since these companies usually lack internal capabilities.  
Hellmann and Puri (2002) confirmed that VC investors favour staffing with outside managers, 
approval of stock selection strategies, and evaluation of human resource strategies by portfolio 
companies, which contribute to their managerial “professionalization.”  
Megginson and Weiss (1991) established that the US VC-funded IPO companies demonstrate 
lesser under-pricing as against Non-VC funded IPO companies that are compared according to 
sector and IPO size. However, it is essential to recognize that the agency connection involving 
the VC investor and the owner-manager of portfolio companies can provoke conflicts, resulting 
in a worsening of the performance of the latter companies.  Owner-managers and outside 
investors might have different plans; differences might consume the manager’s effort and 
commitment at the expense of the quest for business prospects. Assuming no differences occur, 
the desire of VC investors to monitor managerial decisions might increase administrative and 
validation procedures, impeding the flexibility and capability of firms to seize suitable business 
prospects.  
Hellmann and Puri (2000) based on an examination of 149 ventures in Silicon Valley, 
discovered that VC-funded companies transport their goods to market more quickly than other 
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Non-VC funded companies in the US. Ueda and Hirukawa (2003) employed Multi-Factor 
Productivity (MFP) by using growth as a measure of innovation to determine whether VC 
investments are significantly related to labour productivity growth. The authors established that 
MFP growth is positively and significantly correlated with VC investments in the US. The 
outcome is noticed in the ICT sector. Furthermore, the level of employment growth is higher 
in the VC-funded sampled companies only when one considers luminary performing 
companies which fit the percentage range with the highest growth sufficiently for a long time 
(at least 3 years after funding). Manigart et al. (2002) revealed that venture capital is a 
significant substitute for companies that have problems getting more conventional funding 
sources and VC is a robust financial addition for start-up companies that do not have proof of 
regular profitability.  
Peneder (2010) investigated the effect of VC funding on innovation and company growth by 
using two-stage propensity score matching on micro-data from Austria. The author disclosed 
that companies with VC funding grow significantly faster than other companies and perform 
much better regarding innovative output. 
McCormick (1996) using data from advanced countries demonstrated that many countries 
engaged with venture capital focused on small businesses which had experienced significant 
growth at average cost. A well-developed venture capital market in the US established 
partnerships, mobilizing finance from many investors, and sought potential businesses to invest 
in and to team-up with these companies to grow them into publicly traded companies.  
The amount of money invested by the partnerships in 1993 multiplied to more than three billion 
US dollars.  
A report by Global Insight (2009) on the economic impact of venture capital-backed firms as 
reported by US NVCA revealed that companies funded by VCs in 2008 hired over 12 million 
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people and generated revenues of almost $3 trillion. The numbers accounted for 11 % of private 
sector jobs and were equal to 21 % of the GDP of the US that year. The report further suggests 
that, although several VC-funded companies have the impetus to develop faster and create 
more jobs than their non-VC comparable group, their accomplishment cannot be 
underestimated. 
According to a report on the private equity market in Canada (2002), the Canadian venture 
capital industry experienced robust growth and enhanced the high-growth-potential of SMEs’ 
access to venture capital between 1996 and 2002.  If the industry can maintain these growth 
developments, the Canadian venture capital sector should remain a significant part of the 
business and investment landscape, promote innovation and productivity, and support new job 
and wealth creation.  
The US General Accounting Office (GAO) (1982: p.10) examined the impact of the VC market 
on the US economy. Assessing 72 publicly listed VC-backed companies in operation in 1979 
(1332 VC-backed companies existed at the time), GAO concluded that employment rose in 
1989 from 52,000 to 2.54 million based on the yearly growth assumptions. Similarly, a report 
by the NVCA (2001) estimated that firms’ VC investments were accountable for the generation 
of 4.3 million jobs and $736 billion in annual revenue in 2000.  
In the UK, a study by the British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) (1999) revealed that PE 
funded companies nurtured yearly increased rates of 24 percent, or thrice faster than companies 
in the Financial Times-Stock Exchange Index (FTSE) 100 and 70% faster than the FTSE 250. 
The BVCA concluded that VC-backed firms hired 2 million workers or 10 percent of the 
current private labour force. The estimate seems somewhat high but offers some sign of how 
vital PE/VC has been to the growth of the British economy. Table 2.1 below shows a summary 
of the empirical studies on the impact of venture capital on SMEs’ growth. 
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Table 2.1: Summary of empirical studies’ on the impact of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth 
Authors  Coverage Methods Findings/Conclusions 
Alemany and Marti, (2005) Spain 1996-1998 Panel data analysis VC-funded companies’ exhibit faster growth in 
sales, gross margins, total assets, intangible 
assets and corporate tax. Employment in VC 
backed companies’ increased by 30.5% per year 
from 1997-2004. 
Manigart et al., (2002) Belgium,1987-1997 Survival analysis VC backed companies do not exhibit higher 
survival rates. The question is not whether 
young firms are backed by VC, but by which 
type of VC (for example government, private). 
Audretsch and Lehmann 
(2004) 
Germany, 1997-2000 Quantile Regressions Growth regarding employment is higher in VC 
backed firms. 
Engel and Keilbach (2007) Germany, 1995-1998 Propensity score 
matching 
Employment in VC backed companies grows 
faster than employment in companies that are 
not backed by VC. 
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Puri and Zarutskie ,2012) US, 1981-2005 Panel data analysis 
 
 
 
 
The rate of failure by VC funded companies is 
only half as high as the failure rates of firms 
without VC backing. VC-funded companies 
show a faster growth in sales and payrolls than 
comparable firms without VC. Average 
employment is higher and grows faster for VC-
funded companies in comparison to companies 
without VC support. 
Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) European,1996-2000 Hand collection After IPO, VC-funded companies do not 
generate more sales and more employment than 
companies that are not backed by VC. 
Belke et al., (2004) OECD countries, 1986-
1999 
Dynamic data panel VC has a positive impact on employment. 
Bürghel et al., (2000) OECD Countries  Panel data analysis VC has no impact on employment and sales 
growth. 
Astrid and Bruno (2004) UK & Germany,1997-
2003 
Questionnaire No significant effect of VC on sales growth and 
employment growth. 
EVCA (2013) 16 OECD,1990-2001 Panel data analysis The build-up of VC is a significant factor which 
contributes directly to productivity growth. The 
social return of VC is significantly higher than 
the social return of businesses and public 
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research & development. VC has an unintended 
impact on productivity growth in that it 
improves the output elasticity of R&D. 
Hellmann and Puri (2002) US Survey and interview VC is connected to a variety of 
professionalization measures, such as human 
resource policies and execution of stock option 
plans. 
Engel (2003) Germany Propensity score 
matching 
Results indicate that surviving VC-funded 
companies realize higher growth rates compared 
to surviving Non-VC funded companies. 
Davila et al., (2003) US, 1994-2000. Logit model VC has a positive and significant effect on 
employment at the firm level. 
Bertoni et al., (2005) Italy Gibrat-law-type 
dynamic panel data 
model 
Found strong evidence that VC investments 
positively impact firm growth. Most of it is 
received after the first round of VC finance. 
Peneder (2010) Austrian, 1996-2005 Propensity Score 
Matching 
Sales grow faster in VC backed firms 
Popov and Roosenboom (2009) 21 Countries in Europe  
1998-2008 
Panel data analysis PE investment has a positive effect on the rate 
of business formation. 
Amit et al., (1998) 
 
Canada, 1991-1996. Survey instrument Found significant industry effects in the data, 
with VCs having uneven representation in 
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industries that are thought to have high levels of 
informational asymmetry. 
Gorman and Sahlman (1998) 
 
US, 1984 Questionnaire via mail Found that VCs spend about half their time 
monitoring nine portfolio investments of which 
five are companies on the boards on which they 
sit.  
Jain and Kini (1995) US, 1976-1988 Panel data model Found that VC-backed companies have 
significantly lower operating returns on assets 
and operating cash flows over assets compared 
to non-VC backed IPOs in the year before the 
offering.  
Samila and Sorenson (2011) US,1993-2002 Panel Data Analysis Found VC has a positive impact on firm births, 
aggregate income, and employment. 
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2.5 Empirical Studies on the Determinants of Venture Capital Investments Activity 
Porteba (1989) examined the relationship between capital gains taxes and venture capital 
investments in the US between 1969 and 1987. The author established that the supply of 
venture capital was not affected by capital gains taxes as most investors were excluded from 
taxes. Nonetheless, Porteba argued that capital gains taxes affect negatively the demand for 
venture capital. Poterba explained VC investment as an adjustment in supply and demand. The 
author contended that many of the alterations in financing could take place from an adjustment 
in either the supply of or demand for venture capital. Poterba also claimed that VC funds are 
from investors who are excluded from taxes, and they are affected by the disparity in capital 
gains tax rates. Poterba described this impact as not affecting those who supply the funds but 
instead prompting the employees to become entrepreneurs leading to a demand for more VC.  
After Poterba’s (1987, 1989) model, Gompers and Lerner (1998) found practical support for 
Poterba’s claim that lesser capital gains tax rates have a strong influence on the VC investments 
provided by tax-exempt investors. However, Jensen (1991) and Sahlman & Stevenson (1986) 
contend that institutional investors are exposed to over or underinvestment in markets like 
venture capital. They argued that this absurd pattern of investment can explain the differences 
in fund raising. They also suggested that these discrepancies can impede entrepreneurship in 
the US economy.  
Black and Gilson (1998) argued that venture capital companies will be more vibrant in nations 
with stock oriented capital markets than in nations with bank oriented capital markets. The 
authors explained that venture capital develops solely where an active stock market is present 
as VCs manage to efficiently exit from investee businesses through successful IPOs. Based on 
this, the authors argued that the US VC market is more dynamic compared to VC markets in 
Germany and Japan.  
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Black and Gilson (1998) found a correlation between the countries’ financial structure and the 
VC market. They claimed that the vital source of the U.S. dominance in the VC market is the 
presence of a strong IPO market. A dynamic stock market entails a liquid stock market and is 
further suited to a strong VC market compared to a bank market because of the prospects for 
VCs to exit during an IPO. Similarly, Jeng and Wells (2000) developed a design intended to 
find the contributing factors to VC and examined them based on a cross-section of the data of 
21 nations over ten years. The authors discovered that inflexibility of the labour market, the 
degree of IPOs, government strategies for entrepreneurship, and liquidation measures 
explained a substantial part of cross-country difference in VC investments.  
Gompers and Lerner (1998) studied the economy of the US from 1969-1994.  Using the IPO 
as a substitute for fund performance, they found no significant effect in their study. Ostensibly, 
the IPO was strongly related to the estimated returns on the alternative investments and GDP. 
The authors discovered that GDP has a significant impact on VC, but no impact on the IPO. 
However, Jeng and Wells’ (2000) study showed a different result where GDP formed part of 
the impact on IPOs but was not significant in their study.  
Becher and Hellmann (2003) presented fresh evidence about German involvement in 
developing a dynamic VC market and argued that a dynamic IPO market was relevant, but by 
itself not enough, particularly in a bank-based system like Germany. Variations in corporate 
governance and the attitude of a country towards private enterprise are also critical. 
Schertler (2003) examined the dynamic VC activity with data from 14 Western European 
countries from 1988 -2000. The author demonstrated that stock market liquidity, availability 
of human capital, and labour market firmness do not affect the development phase of VC 
investments, but affect the early phase of VC investments. Contrary to Jeng and Wells (2000), 
Schertler found that stock market liquidity has a positive and significant effect on investments 
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at an early stage. Conflicting results could be explained by their different handling of proxies. 
For example, Jeng and Wells (2000) applied IPOs market value while Schertler (2003) used 
capitalization of the stock market as a replacement for stock market liquidity. Jeng and Wells 
(2000) revealed that IPOs are strong drivers of VC investments, hence high levels of IPOs in a 
country lead to more venture capital. On the other hand, Scherlter (2003) found that stock 
market liquidity has a significant and positive impact on VC investment at an early stage. 
However, as with Jeng and Wells (2000), he finds stock market capitalization growth rate does 
not have a significant impact on VC investments at an early stage.  
The pension fund in an economy is an additional variable that has been studied in the VC 
literature since they are permitted to invest in VC.  Pension funds involve so much money, 
therefore, their contribution influences the supply of VC (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998. Pension funds may be vital in the US, but in Europe they do not deal with large 
sums of money and European countries dislike investing in unquoted firms.  
Achs and Audretsch (1994) determined the macroeconomic factors that might influence VC by 
affecting activities of start-ups. VC fund raising for limited partnerships in the US from 1972 
to 1979 was examined by Gompers and Lerner (1998). They focused on the cumulative 
industry level to verify whether macroeconomics, rules or using the total VC obligations and 
the number of investees at the state level might influence VC activity.  The authors recognized 
that a decrease in retirement fund restrictions and expenses on R&D show positive effects on 
VC fund raising at the state-level. The authors also realized that a decline in capital gains tax 
rates caused an upsurge in demand for VC as more employees are invigorated to be 
entrepreneurs.  
Jeng and Wells (2000) studied the factors influencing VC using longitudinal data of 21 OECD 
nations from 1986 to1995. The authors’ dependent variable was VC in the early expansion 
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phase, which involved investments in the early phase and when the new fund's size rose. They 
found that the factors were affected differently by different kinds of investment. While 
investments in the growth phase were responsive to the size of IPOs, the exit method did not 
influence those completed in the early phases. However, other variables connected with the 
inflexibility of the labour market that affected funds raised, did not affect the investment at the 
expansion stage.  
In the Jeng-Wells model, GDP and market capitalization showed an insignificant influence on 
venture capital. Jeng and Wells (1998) found that the IPO is a positive and significant 
contributing factor to a later stage of investment. The authors incorporated lawful and 
shareholder rights that encompass the institutional structure which influences the effectiveness 
of the stock markets, and issues fundamental to IPOs not linked to VC as instruments to control 
for endogeneity. Consequent to controlling for this possible cause of predisposition, they 
discovered that stock market capitalization, private pension funds, IPOs for early phase VC, 
GDP growth, rule-of-law, capital gains tax, rights of equity-holders, anti-director rights and 
labour market rigidities, which relate to investments at early and later stages are insignificant. 
Kortum and Lerner (1998) examined the relationship involving VC and innovation across 20 
businesses in the US for more than 30 years. The authors found from their analysis that venture 
capital significantly enhanced the patent rate and contributed approximately 15% of industrial 
innovation.  
Jagwani (2000) investigated factors which influence venture capital in the US based on the 
application of OLS to time-series data. The author asserted that an investment decision is based 
on past performance and lagged one period on the interest rate variable in the investigation.  
Romain and van Pottelsberghe, (2003) investigated critical determinants of VC investments in 
16 main OECD nations from 1990-2001, and they found three key issues affecting VC demand 
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and supply. The issues comprised research and technological prospects, entrepreneurship 
setting and macroeconomic conditions. The authors asserted that interest rates in the short-term 
positively affect VC demand, while interest rates in the long-term have a robust adverse effect 
on VC supply. The authors indicated that the cycle of VC investments relates to economic 
growth as they found the flow of VC funds responds positively and significantly to economic 
growth, but during the high growth period the flow of VC outperforms economic growth rates 
and inversely. The labour market situation positively influences this sequence. The labour 
market rigidity points to lessening the positive effect of economic growth on the degree of VC 
investments and effects of the awareness of the stock market on the growth of companies' 
investment in R&D. Furthermore, they corroborated the positive role of the entrepreneurial 
culture's domination and tax inducements in venture capital market development. However, 
they found no significant effect for financial markets liquidity. 
Romain and Potterie (2003) used a longitudinal dataset of 16 OECD countries from 1990 to 
1998 and a general least squares technique, to study the determinants of venture capital. The 
authors initially presented each variable independently in their experimental equation and then 
concurrently examined whether any differences might be identified. The results remained 
unaffected. The authors revealed that GDP growth, interest rates, patent numbers, corporate 
R&D expenses and capital stock of corporate R&D are significantly correlated to VC. The 
authors also established that risk and corporate income tax rates are negative and significantly 
correlated to VC. 
Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2004) also investigated the determinants of venture capital 
using GDP growth rates, variables related to technological opportunities (corporate R&D 
expenditure growth rate as a substitute, corporate R&D investment, and patents numbers). 
Further, variables connected with entrepreneurial settings such as the degree of corporate 
 
 
 
46 
 
income tax, the index of entrepreneurial action and labour market rigidities influence demand 
for and supply of VC.  Using cross-section-time series data of 16 European countries from 
1990 to 2000, the authors detected a positive effect of interest rate and the GDP on the VC 
intensity. Indicators associated with technological prospects also positively affect the VC’s 
relative size, while the index of rigidities of the labour market lessens the positive occurrence 
of economic growth or R&D expenses on the VC intensity. Another determinant that positively 
influences the VC invested, without detecting variations between countries is the bulk of the 
money raised from the private pension scheme.  
Bonini and Alkan (2009) employed a longitudinal dataset of 16 nations from Australia, Europe, 
and North America from 1995 to 2002, to study the determinants of venture capital. The authors 
established positive and significant connections between corruption control and a replacement 
for lower political risk, but the connection was not strong.  
La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) used OLS to investigate laws 
safeguarding external stockholders and creditors from embezzlement in 49 countries. The 
authors identified legal origin as a vital determinant of the laws governing the security of 
external investors from embezzlement by corporate insiders and countries with common law 
were seen to provide better security than countries with civil law. The authors also showed that 
better investor security is robustly related to dynamic capital markets, prompt IPOs, extra 
diffuse possession of public companies, and other pointers of financial improvement. Later 
examination showed that countries with civil law demonstrate other problematic 
characteristics, such as heftier government involvement in economic activity (La Porte et al., 
1999) and extra arduous rules of new business entry (La Porta et al., 2002). 
Groh and Liechtenstein (2008) used a survey questionnaire to examine factors which influence 
the provision of international capital in VC and PE partnerships on potential institutional 
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investors globally. The information presented by the respondents on the benchmark for the 
provision of international assets shows security of property rights is the primary concern for 
the international investors, followed by the accessibility of domestic VCs and the competency 
of the local entrepreneurs.  Contrary to previous studies, most of the respondents demonstrate 
that the actions of IPOs and the domestic public stock markets size are insignificant. 
Schertler (2003) employed a longitudinal dataset from 14 European countries between 1988 
and 2000, to determine whether VC investment for businesses in the early phase of 
development rely positively on the stock market capitalization, abundant human capital, and 
labour market inflexibility. The author explained that the abnormal positive effect of labour 
market inflexibility might be ascribed to a different capital-labour ratio, for example a company 
working in an economy with strict labour markets calls for more additional capital per 
employee than their counterpart working in an economy with flexible labour markets. 
Félix et al. (2007) applied a longitudinal dataset to examine the factors affecting venture capital 
investment in 23 European nations between the period 1993 - 2003 and concluded that GDP, 
capitalization of the stock market and interest rate, are positive and significantly correlated to 
the volume of VC.  
Jeng and Wells (2000) classified drivers of different investments executed based on the phases 
of business development. Economic growth, interest rates in the long-term, rates of 
unemployment, and capitalization of the stock market have a significant effect on funding in 
the high-tech sectors. At the initial phase, interest rates in the long-term, rates of 
unemployment, IPO disinvestment devices and market to book ratios of equity are recognized 
as the primary influence of venture capital investment activity.  
Clarysse, Knockaert, and Wright (2009) applied a longitudinal data method to recognize the 
supply of and demand for determinants of VC activity in the UK from 1985-2006, Israel from 
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1999-2007 and the US from 1980-2007. The authors established that the volumes of funds 
raised at an early phase and overall VC invested in the three countries were influenced by three 
key factors, specifically overall entrepreneurial activity, capitalization of the stock market, and 
R&D expenses. 
Groh and Liechtenstein (2009) investigated the attractiveness of risk capital investors for 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Using questionnaires administered to institutional 
investors, the authors questioned the investors about the significance of some emerging 
markets’ allotment benchmarks which are appealing to PE investors. The authors concluded 
that on average risk capital investors are more appealing to the EU-15 than the CEE region. 
Investors in the CEE region are fascinated by a lesser corporate income tax, even though 
investors are dejected by the little liquidity of the state capital markets.  
Groh and Liechtenstein (2010) discussed the overall outcome of the merged indices built on 
the identical pointers employed in their 2009 paper to evaluate the attractiveness of 27 
European nations on the 6-tier groups of attraction based on corporate governance, tax 
administration, investors’ protection, social and human conditions, entrepreneurial culture and 
prospects, economic prosperity and the magnitude and liquidity of the nations’ capital markets. 
The authors found that the UK is the most appealing nation for institutional investors compared 
to other European countries like Germany and Spain. 
Jeng and Wells (2000) asserted that liquidity of the stock market is a requirement in building 
managerial skills. Investors who want to float their shares on the securities market turn out to 
be applicants of the VC firms and tend to provide management support and finances to other 
firms. The literature empirically confirmed these sentiments. Gompers and Lerner (2000) noted 
that the activity of VC firms is improved in countries where capital markets are developed. 
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Cherif & Gassing (2011), Clarysse et al. (2009), and Kelly (2010) recognized the positive 
effects of capitalization of the stock market on the venture capital investments.  
Adongo (2011) applied the OLS method to semi-log design which consists of a cross-sectional 
dataset to investigate the influence of venture capital investments in 36 countries in Africa. The 
author concluded that the rule-of-law, R&D expenses as a percentage of economic growth and 
enhanced information involving investors and prospective investees are positive and 
significantly correlated to VC activity in Africa. His findings show that financial and regulatory 
factors are influenced by the institutional environment which impacts on VC investment 
activity in Africa. However, he also revealed that capital gains taxes are negative and 
significantly linked to VC investment activity.  
Lerner and Shoar (2005) examined 210 investments by private equity firms in developing 
countries. The authors found a clear correlation between the legal environment and contractual 
use of convertible preferred stock with covenants. In a study of a sample of 1,431 VC deals 
across 17 European countries between 1998 and 2001, Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellman (2009) 
suggest that VCs should have strong incentives to give non-convertible support to 
entrepreneurs and to invest in developing capacities for providing this support if the legal 
environment is strong. The reason is that the right legal environment ensures that providing 
and investing in support activities pay off for the VCs.  
Cumming, Schmidt, and Walz (2010) investigated a sample of 3,848 VC investments across 
39 countries between 1971 and 2003. The authors found that a better legal environment leads 
to faster deal screening that facilitates board representation in the entrepreneurial firm. 
Empirical evidence shows that a dynamic VC market is vital for the growth of small businesses 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999). For instance, over the last 50 years, the developed VC market in 
the US has offered early backing to many businesses like Microsoft, Apple, Intel, Lotus, Sun 
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Microsystems or Federal Express, which currently have a presence in most developed 
economies. Furthermore, this type of financing has been established as a catalyst for innovative 
entrepreneurial businesses.  
This study seeks to identify and assess economic, political and legal factors that determine 
venture capital activity in Ghana. As with any industry, the VC industry in Ghana is subject to 
the impact of macroeconomic and institutional factors on its financial development.  
A dynamic venture capital industry is a necessity for the SMEs’ growth and development and 
thus contributes to the economy of Ghana. Since venture capital supports small businesses, 
they create employment, develop innovative technologies and make a significant contribution 
to GDP. Most of the empirical studies were undertaken in the developed countries. Hence this 
study uses a panel of 15 countries selected from Sub-Sahara Africa to examine the 
macroeconomic and institutional determinants of venture capital investment activity in Ghana. 
Table 2.2 shows a summary of empirical studies on determinants of venture capital investments 
across the world. 
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       Table 2.2: Summary of empirical studies on the determinants of venture capital investment activity across the World. 
Authors  Coverage Methods Findings/Conclusions 
Black and Gilson (1998) US and Germany  Comparative 
analysis 
Shows the relationship between an active stock 
market and a strong venture capital market. They 
also find that an inactive stock market in a bank-
based structure impedes the development of a 
venture capital industry 
Jeng and Wells (2000) Europe Panel data model IPOs are the robust spur of venture capital 
investment. Private pension fund levels, are 
significant determinants over time but not across 
countries. Economic growth and market 
capitalization growth are insignificant. Government 
policies can have a sturdy impact both by setting the 
regulatory stage and by spurring investments during 
recessions 
Becher and Hellmann 
(2003) 
Germany OLS regression Shows a dynamic IPO market alone although 
essential, is not enough particularly in a bank-based 
system like Germany 
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Porteba (1989) US Demand and 
supply model 
Shows capital gains taxation affects both demand for 
and supply of venture capital; the reduction of tax 
rates leads to increase in the supply as a result of the 
increase in the post-tax rate return on investments 
and, thus encourages the demand for the increase in 
the number of entrepreneurs who decide to establish 
new business units 
Schertler (2003) 14 Western European 
Countries, 1988-2000 
Dynamic panel 
data model 
Suggests that not only does a liquid stock market 
play an essential role in the development of venture 
capital markets, but they are not the only factor that 
drives venture capital activity  
Kortum and Lerner (1998) US, 1965-1992  Non-linear least 
square regression 
Concludes that the intensity of venture capital 
activity in an industry significantly increases its 
patent rate. The ratio of venture capital to R&D has 
averaged less than 3% in recent years, this estimate 
suggests that venture capital accounts for about 15% 
of industrial innovations 
Jagwani (2000) US, 1978-1995 OLS The results indicate that the regression coefficient of 
the capital gains tax rate is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This confirms the 
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importance of this variable since it represents the 
profit carried out by venture capital companies 
Romain and van 
Pottelsberghe, (2003)  
16 European countries, 
1990-2000 
Panel data model Shows economic growth and both short-term and 
long-term interest rates have a positive effect on 
venture capital intensity. The indicators of 
technological opportunity are positive and 
significantly related to the relative level of venture 
capital. Turning to an entrepreneurial environment, 
they find that labour market rigidities lessen the 
impact of GDP and R&D on venture capital. 
However, the level of entrepreneurship increases the 
influence of R&D on venture capital 
Bonini and Alkan (2009) 16 Countries, 1995-2002 OLS regression Found a positive and significant correlation between 
control of corruption, a proxy for lower political risk, 
but acknowledged that the relationship was not 
strong 
La Porta et al., (1997, 
1998) 
 49 Countries worldwide OLS regression Results show that common-law countries usually 
have the strongest and French civil law the weakest, 
legal protection of investors, with German and 
Scandinavian civil-law countries located in the 
middle.  
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Félix et al. (2007) 23 European countries, 
1992-2003 
Panel data model 
(fixed effect 
/Random effect) 
The authors conclude that the rate of economic 
growth, stock market capitalization and interest rates 
have positive and significant relationships with the 
amount of venture capital  
Clarysse et al. (2009) Israel (1999-2007)  
US (1980-2007)  
UK (1985-2006), 
Panel data model Found that the amounts of early stage and total VC 
invested in the three countries are determined by 
three main factors, namely total entrepreneurial 
activity (as measured by the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor), stock market 
capitalization, and R&D expenditure 
Groh and Liechtenstein 
(2009) 
Worldwide Questionnaire via 
email 
Found safeguarding of property rights is the primary 
concern for the international investors followed by 
the availability of local venture capitalists and the 
management quality and the skills of the local 
entrepreneurs 
Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) 
United States, 1972-1994 Panel data model Concluded that regulatory alterations affecting 
pension funds, capital gains tax rates, overall 
economic growth, and research and development 
expenditures, as well as firm-specific performance 
and reputation affect fundraising  
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Cherif and Gazdar (2011) 
 
21 European Countries, 
1997-2006           
Panel data model Found that market capitalization, GDP growth, R&D 
expenditures, and unemployment are the most 
macroeconomic determinants of European Venture 
Capital investments. Early stage investments, funds 
raised are different which are affected by 
institutional quality. While the index of economic 
freedom has a significant and a positive effect on 
funds raised, it does not appear to be a significant 
determinant in early-stage investments 
Marti and Balboa (2001) 16 European Countries, 
       1991-1999 
Panel data model The authors determined that the amount of 
investments has a significant effect on fund raising. 
However, the divestments are negative and 
significantly related to fund raising activities in the 
group of countries analyzed 
Leleux and Serlemont 
(2003) 
15 European Countries, 
      1990-1996 
Panel data model Found that countries which offer relatively weak 
investor protections (French and German civil law 
countries) develop smaller venture capital industries. 
Their findings also demonstrate that the very nature 
of the legal systems regarding investors’ protection, 
more than the quality of the enforcement of these 
rules, seems to influence market size 
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Schröder (2009) 15 European Countries, 
      1995-2005 
Panel data model The results illustrate that technology and innovation 
opportunities and the entrepreneurial environment 
influence the early stage risk capital. In terms of the 
financial system, the analysis reveals that a bank-
based system has a negative impact on the relative 
amount of early-stage VC investments while a 
market-based system generates risk capital for young 
entrepreneurs 
Cumming et al. (2010) 39 countries in North and 
South America, Europe 
and Asia,1971-2003 
 Found better legal institutions including better 
accounting standards significantly increase the 
benefits to venture capitalist board representation 
even with multivariate controls for other market 
factors, venture capital fund, entrepreneurial firm 
and transaction characteristics 
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2.6 Empirical Studies on Determinants of SMEs’ Accessibility to External Financing 
Several studies have investigated SMEs’ accessibility to finance in both developed and 
developing countries. The empirical evidence substantiates that SMEs’ requirement and access 
to funding is influenced by numerous factors such as growth, profitability, firm size, firm age, 
ownership and industry (Degryse et al. 2012; Chittenden and Hutchinson 1996). Furthermore, 
past studies established that the macroeconomic, legal and financial environments affect 
financing of SMEs (Levine 2002; La Porta et al. 1997; Rajan and Zingales 1995). It has been 
debated whether national markets are essential for the growth of SMEs as the volumes of their 
financial needs are often too small to aid transactions across borders (Guiso et al. 2004; 
Mullineux and Murinde 2010).  
A study by Torre et al. (2008) shows that banks in Chile and Argentina have started to eye 
SMEs owing to the substantial competition in the corporate and retail sectors. These banks 
recognize the SME sector as extremely lucrative with excellent opportunities. The authors 
show that banks in these countries are conscious of the difficulties working with SMEs, but 
they deem that collaboration with SMEs is a step forward for the banks to offer financing 
benefits. Fraser (2004) cited in Obamuyi (2007) and Beck et al. (2006) detected that size and 
age influence the funding relationship between lenders and borrowers 
Bigsten et al. (2003) indicated that in developing countries, high risk, asymmetric information 
problems, insufficient collateral, creditor-debtor distance, small and recurring credit 
transactions of small businesses make borrowing costs differ among different methods of 
credit. Access to credit by micro and small firms can also be ascribed to their features such as 
owners’ gender, age, and education etc.  
Hussien (2007) postulated the possibility that selecting commercial bank credit was positively 
ascribed to firm size, educational attainment, and gender. The author further elucidated that 
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credit information, education and extension visits have the probability of increasing the 
information base and the firms' decision-making capabilities, including the capacity to evaluate 
advantages and disadvantages of choosing proper credit and production technology. 
Empirical studies on SMEs’ financing have revealed that small businesses in countries with 
healthier institutional improvements and better safeguarding of property rights are 
comparatively less financially constrained as investors are willing to invest in these countries 
(Hernandez-Canovas & Koeter-Kant 2011; Beck et al. 2008). However, several past studies 
only differentiate between outside equity and external debt, and do not consider the existence 
of variation in outside funding methods, which can complement and replace conventional debt 
or equity instruments (Casey & O’Toole 2014; Cosh et al., 2009). Also, it has been established 
that this impact alters over the business cycle, especially during financial crises (Psillaki and 
Eleftheriou 2014; Casey and O’Toole 2014). 
Yongqian et al., (2012) and Irwing & Scott, (2010) asserted that globally the SME sector had 
reported difficulties in accessing financing. Obtaining outside funding for SMEs has grown to 
be more expensive and difficult whereas ease of access has dramatically reduced. SMEs’ 
financing-gap restricts their investment prospects and impedes their growth. Getting funding 
is commonly seen as an important factor for businesses and particularly SMEs, to sustain their 
daily business operation and to achieve long-term investment prospects as well as a 
development goal.  Restrictions on access to capital markets have directed businesses to depend 
greatly on the banks for credit. Hence, an efficient financial system plays an important role in 
assigning resources to the best companies and investment ventures. Funding constraints 
significantly minimise a firm’s growth and access to productive resources leading to the 
sluggishness of the SME sector, which can threaten the sector’s contribution to the economy. 
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A study by Beck (2007) demonstrated that SMEs in developing countries are more constrained 
by finance problems due to flaws in the financial and legal institutions. The author investigated 
more than 70 developing countries and concluded that governments should play active roles in 
building suitable institutions, provide the legal structure and undertake market-oriented liberal 
programmes to reduce funding problems for SMEs. The author also warned against 
considerable participation of governments in SME funding because over the past decades, 
research has shown government failure in government SMEs’ lending markets.  
Fatoki and Smit (2011) claimed South African SMEs’ internal factors such as professional 
competence, security, social connection and business information and SMEs’ external factors 
such as macroeconomics, legal environment, ethical awareness, crime, and corruption restrain 
new SMEs from obtaining credits.  
Olomi et al. (2008) identified three key sets of constraints that affect SMEs’ accessibility to 
funding in Tanzania.  SMEs’ knowledge and skill levels are low, there is an embryonic business 
culture, no separation of business from household or individual matters, a lack of recorded 
credit history and a tendency for them not to find all the financing options. Another constraint 
is the low capability of the SMEs, including lack of competent staff and experience to produce 
products that are of good quality. In addition, there are inconsistencies in the right environment 
regarding rules that overprotect debtors at the expense of creditors, lack of a national 
identification system and credit reference bureaux. 
Riding et al. (2006), using a sample of 2,800 Canadian businesses, examined gender differences 
among Canadian SMEs seeking external financial capital and found that women’s businesses 
are significantly less likely to seek equity capital. However, male and female business owners 
that apply for financing are equally likely to obtain capital.   
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Brush et al. (2000) suggested that organizational barriers such as differences in social networks 
based on gender may result in women remaining outside the formal male-dominated VC 
network and gender differences in human capital such as management and track record, make 
it more difficult for female entrepreneurs to make acquaintances to make deals. 
Amatucci and Sohl (2004) conducted a case study involving five entrepreneurs who received 
financing from angels’ investors. The authors revealed some strong statements expressed by 
some respondents concerning the difficulties women encountered and attributed these 
difficulties to investors’ assumptions or stereotyping about owners’ management potential 
despite extensive business backgrounds. 
Brooks et al. (2014) explored the relationship between entrepreneur gender, physical 
attractiveness, and investors’ funding decisions by observing the presentation of three 
entrepreneurial pitch competitions in the US over three years. The authors found that gender 
and physical attractiveness are used to discriminate against female entrepreneurs. 
The extant literature on venture capital highlights that human capital such as education, 
managerial experience, and skill training are important selection criteria of VCs’ target choice 
(Muzyka et al., 1996). For example, Becker (1964) and Robinson and Sexton (1994) found that 
educational achievement is correlated with the benevolence of receiving financial resources in 
entrepreneurial ventures. Bhagavatual et al. (2010) showed in a sample of 107 entrepreneurs 
that human capital such as experience and skills have a direct and indirect effect on access to 
external financing.  Baum and Silverman (2004) argued that due to high uncertainty about the 
quality of start-ups, investors’ decisions on the financing of start-ups depends on start-up assets, 
i.e., technological capital, social capital and human capital. Bates and Bradford (1992) 
examined 14,424 sample firms using discriminant analysis and found that owners’ education, 
age and the amount of equity investment and on-going VC firm status are positively correlated 
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to receipt of funding. Hsu (2007) investigated 149 early stage start-up firms and detected that 
an entrepreneur’s prior firm-founders experience increases both the likelihood of receiving VC 
investments through direct and indirect ties with VCs. 
Omri and Frikla (2012), Kim et al. (2006) and Davidson and Honig (2003) found that prior 
entrepreneurial experience is correlated with the probability of getting external financial 
resources. Similarly, Shepherd and Zacharaks (1999) observed that the most reliable findings 
across studies are that VCs prefer the ability of the founders’ team, based on higher managerial 
skills or track record (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984b; Hutt & Thomas, 1985).  
Shane and Stuart (2002) focused on the contribution of the founder of social capital as a 
determinant of new venture performance. The authors found that founders having a direct or 
indirect relationship are likely to obtain VC funding.  Fried and Hisrich (1994) suggested that 
since VCs receive so many business plans to fund, social networks are important in choosing 
which start-ups get funded. Burton et al. (2002) argued that entrepreneurs with previous career 
experience in more reputable firms are more likely to obtain information and position 
advantages with measurable effects in receiving external financing at the creation of members 
such as CEOs, top management, other board members, or prestigious connections to attract VC 
(D’Aveni, 1990; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Musteen et al., 2010). 
In summary, the findings of past studies show that SME owner/managers’ preferences towards 
debt or equity financing and their ability to access such sources of funding are influenced by 
firms’ characteristics such as growth, profitability, firm size and firm age, ownership, and 
industry. Further, the socio-demographic attributes of SME owner/managers including gender, 
age, educational attainment, previous experience, reputations and social connections also 
influence their ability to access external financing (Low, 2006; Kung’u, 2011).  Table 2.3 
 
 
 
62 
 
shows a summary of the empirical studies on factors which influence SME owner/managers’ 
access to external financing. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of the factors which influence SMEs’ access to external financing. 
Authors Coverage Methodology Results/Findings 
Amatucci and Sohl (2004) 5 CEOs Case studies Found that investors’ assumptions 
and stereotypes are used to 
discriminate against women with 
regard to women’s management 
potential making it difficult for 
women to access VC. 
Bhavgavatual et al. (2010) 107 Entrepreurs in the US Hierarchical regression Found that human capital such as 
prior experience and skills have 
direct/indirect effects on external 
financing. 
Bigsten et al. (2003) 200 firms in Africa,1991-1995 Panel data  Access to credit by SMEs can be 
attributed to characteristics of 
owners such as gender, age, and 
education. 
Shepherd and Zacharaks (1999) 59 students sampled Conjoint analysis Identified that the probability of 
VCs’ selection criteria for 
investment decisions are based on 
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founding team, prior experience, 
and educational level 
Tyebee and Bruno (1984) 41 VC firms in the US Discriminate analysis Identified entrepreneurs’ assets 
such as technological capital, and 
social capital are correlated to VC 
accessibility. 
Baum and Silverman (2004) 204 Start-ups in Canada Panel data analysis Determined that founding team, 
managerial skills, and track 
records, are used as a 
measurement for VC investments. 
Bates and Braford (1992) 14,424 sampled firms in the US Discriminate analysis Established that entrepreneurs’ 
education, age, amount of funds 
required, and firms’ reputation are 
positively related to receiving VC. 
Muzyka et al. (1996) 73 VCs firms in the US Cluster & Conjoint analysis Found that human capital such as 
education, managerial experience, 
and skill training is an essential 
measurement for VC target 
selection. 
Robinson and Saxton (1994) US Probits regression model Found that educational 
achievement is correlated with the 
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benevolence of receiving financial 
resources. 
Riding et al. (2006) 2844 firms in Canada Logistic regression model Established that the majority of 
women-led businesses are less 
likely to seek VC. 
Hsu (2007) 149 Early Stage Start-ups in the 
US 
Probits regression model Found entrepreneurs’ experience, 
and founding team experience 
increase both the likelihood of 
receiving VC investment through 
both direct/indirect ties with VCs. 
Shane and Stuart (2002) 134 firms in MIT, US Events model/ Piecewise constant 
models 
Found that new ventures whose 
founders have social capital or 
social network relationships with 
VCs are most likely to receive VC 
funding. 
Fried and Hisrich (1994) 18 VC firms in the US Case studies Found that business plans and 
social network ties are more 
important in determining which 
firms receive start-up funds. 
Burton et al. (2002) 172 young high-tech firms in the 
US 
Logistic regression model Found that entrepreneurs with 
prior career experience in 
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reputable firms are likely to obtain 
information and position 
advantage with a measurable 
effect on receiving external 
funding. 
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2.7 Empirical studies on SMEs’ Accessibility to External Financing and Its 
Determinants in Ghana. 
Numerous empirical studies have acknowledged the lack of finance as the primary problem 
inhibiting the fast growth of SMEs in developing countries (Arthur, 2003; Mensah, 2004; 
Deakins, North, Baldock, & Whittam, 2008).  Abor and Biekpe (2006) indicated that obtaining 
finance is a significant difficulty facing SMEs in Ghana. SMEs’ lack of finance has also been 
confirmed in a study by the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) in 2011 which showed 
insufficient access to credit was the key factor impeding SMEs’ growth in Ghana (Nkuah et 
al., 2013). Other researchers such as Duah et al. (2012), Ackah and Vuvor (2011) identified 
risk perception of the SMEs’ management, ability to obtain collateral, the importance of SME 
record keeping, high-interest rates and short repayment periods among others as the significant 
constraints of SMEs’ access to credit. 
Aryeetey et al. (1994) used a sample of 133 firms, and found accessibility to finance is the most 
critical obstacle to the businesses’ future expansion and growth; about 60% viewed finance as 
their most pressing problem. They also found that smaller and older firms emphasize lack of 
finance more than larger and newer firms. According to Aryeetey et al., 38% of the SMEs 
investigated acknowledged credit as the primary constraint facing their businesses. SMEs have 
restricted access to capital markets, domestically and internationally, partly due to the 
perceived higher risk, asymmetric information, and the higher intermediation costs for SMEs. 
Hence, SMEs usually do not obtain long-term funding whether debt or equity. An investigation 
conducted by Aryeetey et al. (1994) and Parker et al. (1995), showed that SMEs have a 
significant constraint in accessing funding/credit from the formal financial institutions in 
Ghana. 
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Baah-Nuakoh (2003) found obtaining capital is the most frequently cited problem facing all 
firms and business sectors in Ghana because of insufficient information on the performance of 
SMEs and inadequate collateral securities. 
HFC Bank (2004) stated that SMEs in Ghana have been relegated or have inadequate means 
of obtaining credit. Also, insufficient informal supports are available through business angels 
and personal savings; this invariably affects their capacity to use modern technology, as they 
do not have huge capital to purchase this modern technology (UNIDO, 2002). 
Quaye, Abrokwah, Sarbah, and Osei, (2014) found that a financing gap exists in the SME sector 
and large corporations in Ghana. The authors concluded the presence of a funding gap in the 
country as the majority of SMEs are declined access to funding by official financial institutions 
in the country. This is due to the perceived high risk and inadequate collateral associated with 
small enterprises in Ghana. 
Gokel and Akonea (2002) indicated that SMEs were excluded from the financial market after 
financial liberalization and continue to suffer from a credit shortage.  This is because the 
banking industry has become urbanized and mainly for the educated to the disadvantage of 
local enterprises in the credit market. 
 Agyei, (2012) and Gyamfi, (2012) claimed SMEs have difficulties in accessing credit facilities 
and the support of financial institutions.  The reason is first the lack of physical infrastructure 
(Agyei, 2012; Gyamfi, 2012). For example, most of the SMEs in the investigation by Ahiabor 
(2013) indicated insufficient physical infrastructure as a pre-requisite to obtaining substantial 
credit facilities. Again, the difficulty includes lack of the right collateral by SMEs to obtain 
credit facilities (Adjei, 2012). A fundamental problem confronting the majority of SMEs is 
inadequate skills or lack of proper skills (Ageyi, 2012; Ahiabor, 2013). This problem reflects 
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severely on SMEs’ financial performance in Ghana (Agyei, 2013) and accounts for lack of 
proper record-keeping by SMEs (Agyei, 2013; Muhammad et al., 2010).  
Owing to poor record keeping, several SMEs are unable to provide essential documents and 
evidence to obtain financial support from financial institutions (Agyei, 2013).  
Inadequate formal education among numerous SME owners is also widespread (Agyei, 2013). 
This problem accounts for the failure of SMEs to keep proper records and to negotiate for 
projects and contracts that develop their equity and liquidity.  
Regarding financial support, interest rates and conditions for offering loans by financial 
institutions are very stringent. Because of this, few SMEs can secure funding from such 
institutions (Ahiabor, 2013). Government rules and inflation are also counterproductive to the 
development of SMEs and their creditworthiness (Agyei, 2013). Hence, high inflation and 
interest rates might change while the economic shocks of high inflation might make it 
impossible to pay off loans or obtain financial support. 
Yankson (2004) researched SMEs’ financing and asserted that SMEs usually do not need 
substantial initial capital and advanced technology, therefore they mostly fund start-ups 
through individual savings or credit from family members and friends. The author stated that 
the initial capital outlay of SMEs in developing countries is solely funded from individual 
savings or those of relatives and friends and the later investments are funded mainly from 
retained earnings. Yankson’s findings are consistent with a report by the World Bank which 
established that small entrepreneurs start with small amounts of capital from their savings, 
families or friends and steadily develop their business by ploughing back profits (World Bank 
1994, p.7).  However, the author failed to establish why this trend of financing has not changed 
with the liberalization of the financial sector in Ghana. 
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Afenyo (2006) also discovered that self or retained earnings are the most frequently used source 
of funds by SMEs to finance their operations. Government-sponsored agencies appeared not to 
have been known by the SMEs due to inadequate information. This confirmed the finding of 
Mensah (2004) that SMEs failed to take advantage of government-sponsored interventions. 
Mensah (2004) reviewed the SME sector and several issues relating to SMEs’ development 
and success in Ghana. The author concluded that, even though some traditional banks fund 
SME businesses, they are yet to integrate it into their loan structure and develop a separate 
lending policy for them. Mensah’s work focuses on identifying those factors that hinder SMEs’ 
access to funding despite the financial liberalization policy in Ghana. 
Nkuah, Tanyeh, and Gaeten (2013) studied the challenges of SMEs’ access to credit in the Wa 
Municipality of Ghana. The authors quoted Antwi-Asare and Addison (2000), who asserted 
that the Structural Adjustment Programme on Financial Institutions (FINSAP) mostly resolved 
the operational and institutional shortcomings of Ghana’s financial sector. The authors further 
suggested a robust and competitive financial sector can contribute significantly to increasing 
access to funding by enterprises. Antwi-Asare and Addison (2000) proposed liberalization of 
the financial sector to offer access to funding to SMEs. Their study, however, failed to identify 
the factors, which constrain SMEs’ access to funding. 
Ackah and Vuvor (2011) investigated the challenges confronting SMEs in getting credit in 
Ghana and found microfinance institutions are eager to offer funds to SMEs. However, SMEs 
in Ghana are unable to meet the needed requisites. They recognize security, SMEs’ equity base, 
surging interest rates and short repayment time as critical difficulties facing SMEs. Their 
results are consistent with the findings of Duah et al. (2012). Even though their work 
established some key factors that hinder access to credit by the SMEs, it also failed to establish 
the interrelationships between these variables. 
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In a field survey of SMEs in Tamale in the Northern Region of Ghana, Alhassan and Sakara 
(2014) found that a firm’s characteristics such as fixed assets, firm size, and form of business, 
as well as the sector or industry in the economy, are essential success factors in accessing bank 
finance. Similarly, Osei-Assibey (2014) found that a firm’s age, asset structure and ownership 
of a bank account increase the likelihood of having access to finance among rural non-farm 
enterprises in Ghana. 
Aryeetey et al., (1994) argued that the SME’s performance is one of the criteria for assessing 
the creditworthiness of the firm. This is because firms that are performing well are most likely 
to pay back loans.  Several indicators can measure a firm's performance among which are 
included labour productivity, increase in sales or turnover ratios, profit, and firm capacity 
utilization, and export growth over a given period (Baah-Nuakoh 2003; Aryeetey et al., 1994). 
Evidence from empirical studies indicates superior sales and profits are linked to obtaining 
more credit (Bebczuk, 2004; Aryeetey et al., 1994). The reasons for lack of credit are poor 
business performance. Baah-Nuakoh (2003) found that credit is the most severe constraint 
among declining and stagnant firms. 
According to Kumah (2011), the size of a firm is also one of the criteria for assessing its 
creditworthiness by financial institutions.  Aryeetey et al. (1994) also found that medium-sized 
enterprises and mature firms are often offered credit three times more than younger firms. This 
was due to the inadequate collateral of the smaller firms. 
Several studies have argued that older firms face fewer constraints in accessing credit compared 
to newer firms. This is because older firms tend to have a higher reputation which increases 
their likelihood of accessing credit (Osei-Assibey, 2014). Aryeetey et al. (1994) found only 
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 10 % of start-up enterprises in Ghana could obtain loans from the bank because most start-up 
firms lack the necessary collateral to obtain loans from financial institutions. Baah-Nuakoh 
(2003) also discovered that access to finance is a severe constraint among new enterprises. This 
is because of the lack of adequate information on the financial performance of new and young 
firms which makes it difficult for lenders to approve their credit demand (Adomako-Ansah, 
2012). 
Kumah (2011) indicated that enterprises in the services sector are more likely to access credit 
compared to their counterparts in the agricultural sector due to the low level of risk and 
relatively high rising sales level and revenue associated with the former. 
Osei-Assibey (2014) found that a firm’s ownership of land, which is used as a proxy of asset 
structure, is a significant determinant of access to credit among rural non-farm enterprises in 
Ghana because this collateral compensates the lenders in case of default by borrowers. This 
finding confirms a study by Adomako-Ansah (2012), which shows that out of 15 banks and 
non-bank institutions in Ghana, 13 of them consider collateral as the most critical factor in 
approving loans. 
The relationship between firms and financial institutions is often measured by the firm’s 
ownership of a savings bank account (Osei-Assibey, 2014). For instance, Osei-Assibey (2014) 
found that the relationship between firms and financial institutions, as measured by ownership 
of a bank account is positive and statistically significant in accessing credit from formal 
financial institutions. This is because this relationship enables banks to assess the credit history 
and cash flow of a firm; hence, reducing transaction costs in generating information on the 
firms. Further, ownership of a bank account implies that the borrower is financially literate and 
may be able to repay the loan. 
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The characteristics of the owner are also important factors considered in SMEs’ loan 
assessment to determine their creditworthiness and ability to repay loans (Pandula, 2011; Osei-
Assibey, 2014). Kumah (2011) and Osei-Assibey (2014) showed no significant gender 
difference in access to credit as the financial institutions in Ghana tend to be fair and non-
discriminatory in their provision of credit to SMEs. 
Ahmed and Hamid (2011) found that the owner’s education level is positive and significantly 
correlated to the probability of access to credit because firms in which the manager has a 
bachelor’s, or a post-graduate degree exhibit a higher likelihood of access to credit compared 
to those firms in which the managers are not graduates. The number of years spent by the 
owner-manager in formal business education- such as completion of secondary education, 
vocational training and university education, such as graduate and postgraduate degrees is used 
to determine the owner’s level of education. However, most SME owners in developing 
countries tend to have a low level of formal education. Most firm owners learn their trade 
through an apprenticeship with an experienced master (Aryeetey et al., 1994). 
Ahmed and Hamid (2011) indicated that the experience and managerial competency of the 
firms’ managers/owners imply human capital quality which would possibly reduce contact and 
assist negotiations with the providers of credit. Deakins et al. (2010) noted that young and 
inexperienced SME owners tend to be credit constrained as a result of factors such as 
inadequate security, insufficient personal resources, lack of trading records, credibility and 
other sources of funding. Zarook, Rahman, and Khanam (2013) found that a percentage 
increase in a manager’s years of experience increases access to finance by 1.062 percent. The 
owner’s managerial experience and skills are gauged by the number of years they have been 
managing the business. 
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2.8 Research Gap in the Literature 
A survey of the literature on venture capital financing of SMEs shows that a significant gap 
exists on the impact and factors contributing to venture capital investment activity in most 
developing countries including Ghana.  Most of the empirical studies have been focused on 
developed countries like the US and Western Europe. Examples include those of Hellmann & 
Puri 2002; Bottazzi et al. 2008, Kortum & Lerner 2000, Engel & Keilbach 2007, Alemany & 
Marti 2005, Gomper & Lerner 2002, Jeng & Wells 2000, Peneder 2010; Gilson and 
Blacks1998. This is not surprising since the venture capital concept originated in the US and 
has been adopted by most countries in Europe; however, the concept is very new in most 
developing countries. Hence, very little empirical examination has been carried out in these  
countries. Furthermore, the lack of data on venture capital especially in developing countries 
makes it difficult for researchers to investigate venture capital financing.   
In Ghana, not many investigations have been performed on venture capital funding on SMEs. 
Only a handful of empirical studies have been conducted. Examples include Boadu (2014), 
Brew-Sam (2010), Owusu-Adjei (2010), Gatsi and Nsekyire (2010), Obeng et al. (2009) and 
Poku and Frimpong (2009) which were mostly based on questionnaires and interviews. In order 
to fill this gap in the literature, our study seeks to investigate the impact of venture capital 
funding on SMEs’ growth and development. The study examines the determinants of venture 
capital investment activity in Ghana, as well as identifying and analyzing the factors which 
influence the access of SMEs’ owners/managers to venture capital financing through 
econometric models. 
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Chapter 3 
 Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter discusses the data and methods used in the study. Section 3.2 describes the study 
area. Section 3.3 provides the sample selection and Section 3.4 provides the sources, and 
description of the data. Section 3.5 discusses the concept of impact evaluation and 
methodologies. Section 3.6 provides details of the empirical models used to investigate the 
impact of venture capital funding on SMEs’ growth in Ghana. Section 3.7 outlines the 
empirical models used to examine the factors that influence venture capital investments  
Section 3.8 provides the empirical model used to identify and assess the factors, which 
influence SME owners’ accessibility to venture capital financing in Ghana. 
 
3.2 Description of Study Area  
The Greater Accra Region is situated in the South-Eastern part of Ghana laterally on the Gulf 
of Guinea. It has coastal savannah, a small forest zone and stretches inland towards the Eastern 
Region with some attractive coastline mostly in the rural part of the region. It is the smallest of 
the ten administrative regions of the country by land mass. It covers a total of 3,245sq.km or 
1.4 percent of the entire land mass of the country. The overall populace of the region has grown 
from 2,905,726 to 4,010,054, the second highest after the Ashanti Region (Ghana Statistical 
Service) (GSS, 2011). It is the most densely populated area with 1,236 persons per square 
metre. Most of the inhabitants of Accra are engaged in economic activities such as wholesale 
and retail trade, agriculture and manufacturing (GSS, 2011).  
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The study was undertaken in the Accra Metropolitan Area (AMA) and the Tema Metropolitan 
Area (TMA) in the Greater Accra Region. These areas were chosen because they are the main 
commercial and industrial districts of the country where major industrial and economic 
activities are undertaken, and where most SMEs are located. The Greater Accra region is sub-
classified into ten administrative districts namely AMA, TMA, Ga East and West District, 
Dangme West and East District, Dodowa, and Ada-Foah.  AMA is among the 16 MMDAs in 
the Greater Accra Region and one of the 216 metropolises in Ghana. The 2010 population 
census indicated that there were approximately 1.6 million inhabitants in the region with 
females representing 51.9% and males 48.1 % (GSS, 2011).  AMA is the commercial centre of 
the Greater Accra Region and other parts of the country, which can boast large financial 
institutions, manufacturing companies, oil companies, telecommunication, tourism, education, 
and health institutions.  Presently the city has the most diversified economy of any area in 
Ghana (Grant, 2009; Yeboah et al., 2013 and Grant and Yankson, 2003).   
Tema is a city on the Bay of Benin and the Atlantic coast of Ghana. It is situated 25 kilometres 
(16 miles) east of the capital city of Accra in the Greater Accra Region. The 2010 population 
census estimates indicate that the inhabitants of Tema are 292,773, which represents 7.3% of 
the region’s population. Tema has been transformed from a small fishing community into an 
industrial epicentre of Ghana’s economy.  Major companies located in Tema include Volta 
Aluminium (VALCO), Tema Oil Refinery (TOR), Nestles Ghana Ltd., Wahome Steel Ltd., 
Tema Shipyard and a free trade enclave. About 26.3% of the residents are employed in 
wholesale and retail trades and repair of motor vehicles, 18.8% are in manufacturing, 8.8% in 
transportation and storage, 8.2% in the accommodation and food service industry, and 0.3% in 
real estate, mining and quarrying respectively (GSS, 2012). 
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3.3 Sample Selection 
SME owner-managers who could provide in-depth knowledge of the effects of SMEs’ 
financing (i.e., venture capital financing) on firm growth regarding total assets growth, annual 
sales growth and employment growth were selected. This study employed a non-probability 
sampling technique to select SMEs in different sectors of the Ghanaian economy such as 
Manufacturing/Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trades, Agriculture, Forestry/Fisheries, 
and Services. 
The study used a purposive sampling technique (Miles and Huberman, 1994) as suggested by 
Achtenhagen et al., (2010) who argued that a purposive sampling approach should be used in 
studies which focus on specific types of firms. Purposive sampling ensures that information is 
solicited from participants who have in-depth knowledge and experience of the subject matter 
under study. The purposive sampling method is a deliberate selection of respondents who 
possess certain qualities. The researcher only chooses the subject matter and looks for people 
who have the ability and are prepared to share information based on their expertise or 
experience (Bernard, 2002). 
The sample frame for this research is obtained from the Accra-Tema Metropolitan Areas in 
Ghana. This is because about 90% of SMEs who used venture capital financing in their 
businesses are in this metropolis. The sample size for the study was calculated based on 
Cochrane’s (1963, p.75) formula (see. Appendix A). The study computed sample response is 
385 SMEs owners/managers from the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. In order to address 
sample reduction, the sample should be bigger than the computed sample response required 
taking into consideration non-responses. Coleman, (1999), Husain, (1998) and Brennan, (1991) 
suggest that generally between a 60% and 90% response rate is required based on survey 
questionnaires in past studies. Subsequently, 600 questionnaires were administered to the 
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selected SMEs owners/mangers. A total of 400 questionnaires were collected, but 15 were 
rejected due to incompleteness. Hence, the response rate was 67% with a usable response of 
385.    
 
3.4 Data Description and Sources 
Primary and secondary data were used for the study. The survey questionnaires were used to 
gather primary data in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. Before administering the survey, a 
pre-test of the questionnaires was administered to 20 SMEs in Adenta a suburb of Accra to 
assess the simplicity, reliability, and validity of the survey questions. The survey questions 
were amended after the detection of errors and distortions from the pre-test. The survey was 
administered from June 2016 to September 2016.  
A total of 600 questionnaires were distributed to SME owners/managers in the Accra-Tema 
Metropolis, and 400 were received. A total of 65 responses was received from VC backed 
companies and 320 responses from the non-VC backed SMEs companies. Out of the 400 
responses that were received, 15 of them were rejected due to incomplete responses; hence our 
usable response rate was 67 percent (385 responses). 
The questionnaire for the study was organized into five sections. Section one gathers 
information about SMEs’ accessibility to finance in general. The second section focuses on 
participants who used venture capital to finance their businesses; section three focuses on 
participants who did not use venture capital to finance their businesses.  The fourth section 
focuses on general business characteristics of the participants and the last section focuses on 
their socio-demographic characteristics (see Appendix B). 
The survey questions include closed-ended questions to simplify the participants’ answers. The 
questionnaires were administered through face to face interaction with participants. The 
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participants took an average of 45 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The questionnaires 
were collected by the researcher immediately after they were completed. The researcher used 
different approaches or strategies in administering the survey. The participants for the study 
were obtained from the databases of the Association of Ghana Industries and the Venture 
Capital Fund Secretariat and were all SME owners.  In terms of the non-venture backed SMEs, 
the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) Secretariat was contacted, and an introductory letter 
was obtained to assist the researcher to administer the questionnaires to the respondents. 
Similarly, contact was made with the Venture Capital Fund Secretariat for an introductory letter 
to enable the researcher to solicit information from VC fund managers who connected the 
researcher to SME owners who had received venture capital support. Meetings were arranged 
by the VC fund managers to enable the researcher to interact with their SME owners. These 
meetings took place at a prearranged location or the offices of the companies during the week.   
Secondary data for the study was obtained from various sources. These include databases from 
the World Bank and the Heritage Foundation. The dataset consists of a panel data from 15 
African countries over ten-year period from 2006-2015. The list of countries includes 
Botswana, Cote D’lvoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These countries were 
selected based on the Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractiveness Index Report 
in 2013. The macro-economic variables employed for the empirical analysis such as GDP 
growth rate, Inflation rate, market capitalization, stock traded, interest rate, capital gains tax, 
and scientific and technical journal articles were obtained from the World Bank database. The 
institutional variables index of economic freedom was obtained from the Heritage Foundation. 
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3.5 Impact Evaluation of Venture Capital Financing on SMEs’ Growth 
3.5.1   Impact Evaluation  
The definition of impact evaluation differs widely among donors and other stakeholders in the 
development community. Hearn and Buffardi (2016, p.7) assert “the lack of consistent 
definition and technical debate about methods have led to confusion among donors and 
implementation staff’. Omoto (2003) contends that “impact evaluation” or “impact 
assessment” is used interchangeably. Since the international development community cannot 
agree on a single definition of impact evaluation, it is no surprise that some groups advocate 
for quantitative methods, while others call for a mixed methods approach. However, The 
European Evaluation Society has taken the position that evaluation should not be defined by a 
particular method (EES, 2007). Professor Stern said that impact evaluation should not be 
confused with any one design, methodology or philosophy; “the core of what impact evaluation 
must be about is whether the program or policy in some way causes the effect” (DIFD, 2012, 
p.24). 
According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), impact evaluation is a long-run effect 
created because of the development program, primary and secondary, directly or indirectly, 
positive and negative, planned or unplanned. The impact may be economic, socio-cultural, 
institutional, technological, and environmental (OECD/DAC, 2002 p.24). However, the World 
Bank defines impact evaluation as an appraisal of the transformation that occurred in the 
welfare of the people, household, communities, and regions because of a particular program. 
The emphasis is on the causality or “attribution” of the transformation and what could have 
occurred if the program was absent, the “counterfactual” (World Bank-IEG, 2011).  
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According to 3IE (2008), impact evaluation is defined as an analysis which measures the net 
variation of effects for a particular group that can be ascribed to a precise program using the 
most excellent method accessible and is viable and suitable to the assessment question that is 
being explored and to the precise context.  
According to Baker (2000), the degree to which a program has caused a required/unrequired 
transformation in the intended effect is what impact evaluation assesses. It concerns the net 
outcome of an intervention on the institutions, individuals and households that may be ascribed 
wholly to the intervention. Thus, impact evaluation involves the assessment of research 
outcomes and continuous variations that result from the intervention. Khandker et al. (2010) 
described impact evaluation as the act of investigation if the changes in well-being are 
undoubted as a result of the intervention and not due to other factors. The impact of any 
program on the people cannot be accomplished without undertaking the intended direct product 
of research. Consequently, in any broad impact assessment, it is essential to differentiate 
between the intervention outcomes and the contribution of the intervention outcomes to 
development, and both aspects must be handled at the same time (3IE, 2008). 
Impact evaluation is used to measure the effect of a program or project or to evaluate the 
outcome of a new product or policy. In both circumstances, the central question of the 
assessment remains the same. Thus, to what extent has the welfare of participants been 
transformed as compared to the way their situation would have been if the program or policy 
had not been implemented? How did the program affect the beneficiaries and how were the 
beneficiaries affected by the policy or project? Is the policy or project directly responsible for 
the improvements in the lives of the people, or would they have any way to be enhanced? Can 
the programming scheme be altered to enhance the effect? Is there any rationalization for the 
cost?  
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However, we cannot find answers to these questions by merely measuring the outcome of the 
program. There may be external attributes linked with the results that are not caused by the 
program. To guarantee objectivity, evaluation of the impact must measure the counterfactual, 
thus what would have transpired if the project did not happen or what would have been factual. 
For instance, assuming a fresh graduate is employed after undertaking a labour training 
program, can we directly attribute it to the program or would that person would have found 
work in any case? To estimate the counterfactual, it is essential to net out the outcome of the 
intervention from outside influences. This can be achieved by matching comparison or control 
groups with the treatment group. In this current study, to estimate the counterfactual, we 
construct a control group for those SMEs who did not receive venture capital financing (Non-
VC backed SMEs) and compare them to those SMEs who received venture capital financing 
thus, the treated groups (VC-backed SMEs). To assess the effect of the venture capital 
financing on SMEs’ growth, we estimate the effects of the intervention (outcomes) by netting 
out the mean difference between the treated group (VC-backed SMEs) and the control group 
(Non-VC backed SMEs).  
Comparable groups are chosen randomly from the identical population as program participants, 
while non-participants of the program under analysis are more or less a “comparison group.” 
The control and the treatment groups should have similar characteristics; program participation 
should be the only difference between these two groups. A counterfactual compares what 
happened with what could have happened assuming the program had not happened, or what 
otherwise would have been factual. Experimental designs evaluate the counterfactual through 
a random selection of the intervention within a well-defined group and compare the treatment 
group by intervention with the control group. Through this method, the variances of the 
outcomes among the groups can be ascribed exclusively to the intervention. In a situation where 
the program was not randomly assigned, quasi-experimental methods are applied, using 
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statistical methods (i.e., propensity score matching) to imitate a control group (White, 2014; 
Card, 2011; Ravallion, 2003). 
3.5.2 Impact Evaluation Methodologies 
To identify a program’s effect on individual participants, we need to relate the observed effect 
with the outcomes, assuming the individual did not take part in the program, thus the 
counterfactual effect. However, the omitted data is the central problem in the evaluation of any 
social program (Ravallion, 2005; Bryson et al., 2002).  Ezemenari et al. (1999) proposed that 
to evaluate the impact of a program, it is expected to differentiate the effect from intervention, 
which might relate to the outcomes, but not be triggered by the program. By introducing a 
“control group” the task of “netting out” the program outcome from external influences is 
improved. “Control group” refers to a matched group of households or individuals, who did 
not get the intervention, but nevertheless have similar attributes to those who received the 
intervention, known as a “treatment group.” To correctly identify these groups, it is essential 
to establish what is likely to have happened if there were no intervention. In our study, to 
identify and assess the effects of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth, we created the 
control group (Non-VC backed SMEs) by identifying SMEs which did not receive venture 
capital financing, or which were rejected and compared them to SMEs which received venture 
capital financing. The control groups were created based on firm characteristics and SME 
owner-managers’ characteristics and matched to the treated groups with similar characteristics. 
According to Barker, (2000), the core of evaluation design is how to determine the 
counterfactual. Several methodologies can be used to achieve this. These methods come under 
two general groups, experimental models or randomized, and quasi-experimental models or 
non-randomized. However, to net out the program effect is slightly complicated as 
counterfactual situations are likely to be affected by contamination and bias selection, as well 
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as historical records. Qualitative and participatory procedures can evaluate the impact. These 
methods often give critical intuitions into recipients’ viewpoints, the program’s value to 
recipients, the procedures that might have affected outcomes, and an in-depth analysis of 
outcomes noted in the quantitative analysis. Theoretically, evaluators can use three main 
approaches to establish treatment and control groups; i.e., randomization or experimental 
design; non-randomization or non-experimental design, and quasi-experimental design. In 
practice, selecting a particular method in the social sciences hinges on, among others, cost, data 
availability, and ethical considerations (White, 2014; Boruch, 2016). 
 In our study, to determine the effects of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth, we applied 
non-experimental design with a matching method based on PSM-DiD estimation to measure 
the programme’s impact, i.e., venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth in the Accra-Tema 
Metropolis in Ghana. This approach was deemed fit since our goal was to address the issues of 
counterfactual and selection bias that might affect the outcome.  
i. Experimental Design/ Randomization  
Randomizations otherwise known as experimental designs are seen mainly as the most 
vigorous of the evaluation methods. Given correct sample sizes, the distribution procedure 
automatically creates similar treatment and control groups that statistically match each other; 
by random allocation of intervention among eligible beneficiaries. Theoretically, this is a useful 
outcome, as the control groups are produced from random allotment, which represents an ideal 
counterfactual, devoid of the problem of bias selection, which arises in evaluations (Gertler, 
2004; Rogers, 2014; Bamberger, 2010; Khandker et al., 2010).  
The critical advantage of the randomization method is that interpretation of the results is 
straightforward. Thus, the effect of the program on the outcome is evaluated by the sample 
average differences between treatment groups and control groups. Control and treatment 
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groups subsequently allow the researcher to assess the program’s effect on the participants 
(Baker, 2000). Although experimental models are regarded as the best technique to evaluate 
program effectiveness, in practice there are numerous challenges.  
Firstly, random sampling may be unethical, because to achieve the objective of the study, those 
who are qualified to benefit may be rejected. A classic example is to deprive some members of 
a population of medical treatment that may turn out to be lifesaving. Secondly, it may pose a 
political challenge to offer intervention by discriminating one group against the other group 
(Baker, 2000).  
Thirdly, the latitude of the program may imply that control groups are not available such as a 
change in policy that is extensive in scope (Baker, 2000).  
Fourthly, identified individual characteristics within control groups could undoubtedly alter 
during the trial, which possibly nullifies or taints the outcome.  For example, assuming 
individuals come in and out of the area where the project is undertaken, they might come and 
leave from any of the two groups. On the other hand, individuals who do not benefit from the 
program might find it through other means, or those receiving a program may refuse it (Baker, 
2000). 
 Fifthly to guarantee that selection is random is problematic. For instance, managers may reject 
high-risk applicants to accomplish better results. Lastly, experimental designs can be costly 
and in some circumstances, consume much time, especially in the collection of new data 
(Baker, 2000).  
In this present study, to overcome the challenges, purposive sampling was used to select our 
target populace. Our selection criteria were based on firm size, age, and industry or sector in 
which the firm operates. Most of our target population were respondents who were willing to 
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participate. Regarding cost, our study was confined to only one out of ten regions in Ghana. 
This was deliberately done to reduce the cost and time associated with conducting the study in 
all the regions of Ghana.  
Most of these problems can be resolved with the application of experimental design with 
careful planning. One method is selecting beneficiaries randomly. This presents a clear 
politically transparent sharing mechanism and foundation for an excellent evaluation analysis, 
as a financial plan or lack of data often makes it difficult to correctly find and get to the most 
qualified recipient (Baker, 2000).  
Another method is to get the control groups into the program in a period after the planning and 
commencement of the assessment. With this method, random assignment is established when 
the qualified benefactor gets the program, and not on condition that they get it (McKay, 1978). 
In Colombia, during the appraisal of a program on nutrition, this method was used which gave 
the extra benefit of addressing questions that concerned the critical time required for the 
program’s potential to reduce malnutrition (McKay 1978).  
Lastly, randomization is used inside a subgroup of similarly qualified beneficiaries, the most 
qualified receive and the least qualified are denied benefits, for example, a social fund 
evaluation conducted in the El Chaco region of Bolivia (Pradhan et al., 1998). However, with 
the application of the latter, the results attained from the assessment would be significant for 
the randomly selected target group. 
Selecting individuals randomly to treatment and control groups ensures that after the 
intervention any difference in outcomes between comparable and treatment groups may be 
ascribed to the intervention. One fundamental merit of randomization is the ability to overcome 
selection bias, which occurs when the participation of individuals in the program is linked to 
their unobservable characteristics, which is likely to influence the outcome of the program. 
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Evidently, randomization must take place before the program commences (Ezemenari et al., 
1999). In this present study, we adopted non-randomised design due to the non-experimental 
nature of our study.    
ii. Internal and External Validity 
Internal validity means the outcomes assessed in the program which is net of possible unclear 
influences, or the comparison group denotes the correct counterfactuals, and estimates the 
precise effect of the program (Baker, 2000). Randomization gives a group that is being 
controlled which is statistically comparable to the group receiving the treatment, before the 
commencement of the program. As soon as the program commences, the control group is 
exposed to the identical set of outside influences over a period, excluding the program, which 
is in case there are changes in the outcomes between comparable groups and treatment groups, 
which can only be attributed to the existence of the program in the control group. Thus, it is 
only through randomized selection of treatment that internal validity of an impact evaluation 
is guaranteed (Svensson, 2008; Cook and Campbell, 1979; Gertler et al., 2016). 
External validity involves the assessment of the outcome in the evaluation sample, which is 
generalized to the population of all qualified units (Gertler et al., 2016; Khorsan & Crawford, 
2014). The evaluation sample must epitomise the population of qualified components; thus, the 
sample being evaluated is required to be chosen from the populace by any of numerous 
differences of sampling randomly. Through a randomized selection of treatment, impact 
evaluation can show internally valid estimates; on the contrary, assuming the evaluation is 
completed using non-random probability sampled population, the expected impacts are 
unlikely to be generalized to the population of qualified components. However, assuming the 
evaluation uses a random sample population of qualified individuals, treatment is not specified 
in a randomized manner, even though the sample will be representative, yet, the comparison 
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group is likely to remain invalid (Gertler et al., 2016). In this current study, to ensure the 
internal and external validity of our findings, we make sure that the respondents were selected 
from the same region using the same criteria and the same set of questions for all the 
respondents.  
iii. Quasi-Experimental design 
Quasi-experimental design or a non-randomization method is adopted to create groups when it 
is impossible to randomise individuals or groups of treatment and control groups. It involves 
the creation of a comparison group by matching comparisons (Baker, 2000). Matching is 
created through the identification of non-participants with key characteristics comparable to 
participants. Both participant and non-participant groups should be compared based on either 
a few observable features or a handful of known characteristics, which are well-known to affect 
mutual participation and outcomes of the program. Selection of matched comparison groups 
should be made before program implementation (White, 2014; Baker, 2000). Econometric 
techniques, such as matching, double in difference, instrumental variables, and reflexive 
comparisons methods are used to create comparable groups that are identical to the treatment 
groups. Before the use of these methods, the treatment and comparison groups are regularly 
distributed after the intervention through quasi-experimental methods. Consequently, statistical 
controls methods are employed to assess variances between treatment and control groups. A 
matching method is to create a control group that can match the treatment group. Under specific 
conditions, a control group is also selected before the treatment, even though assignment is not 
randomly done (Baker, 2000). 
One key advantage of using non-randomized experimental design is that it can rely on existing 
data sources, is faster and inexpensive to carry out, and is usable after a program has been 
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executed, provided there is adequate extant information. The main drawbacks of non-
randomized experimental designs are: 
 Since the method is statistically slightly vigorous, trustworthiness of the outcomes is 
often reduced; 
 Statistically, this method can be difficult 
 The problem of selection bias.  
According to Baker (2000) to create a control group, instead of randomly apportioning one, 
several factors can impact the trustworthiness of outcomes. Statistical complication demands 
essential knowledge of how the evaluation was designed and interpretation of the outcomes. 
More often, it is unimaginable, generally in a developing country’s environments. The third 
problem is selection bias that is related to the degree to which the participation in a program 
differs by subclasses of a target population; hence it may affect the model and eventually the 
outcomes (Baker, 2000). Two types of bias can be identified: those which are a result of 
differences in observed characteristics and those which result from differences in unobserved 
characteristics, often known as bias selection or self-selection. A bias observation could involve 
the selection standards through which an individual is targeted, for example, participation in 
the labour market, school enrolled or location. Individual ability, motivation to work, family 
links, and a biased procedure of selecting individuals for a program are unobservable biases 
that may affect bias program outcomes. 
As discussed, these two kinds of biases can produce inaccurate outcomes, which include 
underestimation and overestimation of real program effects as positive effects while real 
program effects are adverse and statistically insignificant effects when real program effects are 
significant (Baker, 2000). A statistical technique like matching and instrumental variables can 
be used to control bias. However, they are difficult to remove completely and that remains a 
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crucial obstacle for scholars in the field of impact evaluation (see Imbens and Angrist, 1994; 
Miguel et al., 2004). Thus, the primary shortcoming of the instrumental variable approach is 
that it is often difficult to find a suitable instrument to identify the treatment effect. One needs 
at least one regressor which determines the programme participation but is not itself established 
by the factors which influence the outcomes (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; Heckman, 1995). 
Matched-comparison methods are considered mainly as the second-best substitute for 
experimental design among all quasi-experimental design approaches. Most of the literature on 
evaluation methodology concentrates on how to employ the types of evaluation and echoes 
both the existence of usage of matched comparison and the countless difficulties in having 
imperfect comparison groups (Friedlander and Robins 1995; LaLonde and Maynard 1987, 
Fraker and Maynard 1987; LaLonde 1986).    
The propensity score matching method offers substantial improvements (Jalan and Ravallion 
1998; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). PSM is popular among researchers who do not have 
sufficient time and who work without baseline data, since it is possible to supplement with 
cross-sectional data. However, PSM depends on possessing the correct information since it 
depends on oversampling program beneficiaries throughout and using a more extensive data 
collection and comparing it to a control group chosen from the primary more significant 
sample, generally from a national household survey (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). This 
evaluation method seems particularly encouraging with the advancement in the usage of 
extensive analyses in less developed nations, such as the Living Standards Measurement 
Studies. For example, Jalan and Ravallion, (1998) used single cross-section data with a 
matching technique to estimate the effect of the Trabajar public works program in Argentina. 
A non-experimental method is used in situations where program allocation is purposely 
located. For programs intentionally arranged, it is common to find a distinct cross-section data 
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survey completed after the program has been announced (Bryson et al., 2002; Jalan and 
Ravallion, 2003; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983).  
According to Bryson et al. (2002), there are two broad groups of non-experimental approach; 
cross-sectional estimator and prior and post estimators. The idea of a before and after an 
estimator of an impact evaluation method is to match the outcome variable for an individual 
group consisting of program participants against the outcome of similar non-participants or a 
bigger comparable group before program participation. Moreover, to assess the variance 
between the two groups as an estimation of Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT), cross-
section evaluators use non-participants to measure the counterfactual for participants which 
turns out to be a quasi-experimental design (Bryson, 2002; Duflo, 2007; Gertler, 2004). 
The quasi-experimental model comprises matching participants in a program with a similar 
non-participant group who are not involved in the program. This encourages randomization but 
should not occur before the intervention (Kerret et al., 2000).  Neither a baseline survey nor 
randomization is a viable alternative; a quasi-experimental design is the only substitute (Jalan 
and Ravallion, 2003). Non-randomized methods require the creation of a (matched) control 
group where individuals who receive the intervention are matched with an “equivalent” group 
from those who did not receive the intervention (Ezemenari et al., 1999). The most frequently 
used quasi-experimental design available for evaluating development programs according to 
Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2006) are PSM, DD, RDD and IV.  
Jalan and Ravallion (2003a) used PSM to estimate the impact of the Trabajar Public Works 
Project in Argentina on income. The Argentine government in reaction to the 1996–97 
macroeconomic crisis, initiated a Trabajar workfare program on income, devoid of using any 
randomization method or any baseline data collection. As a result, the authors decided to use 
the matching method to assess the effect of the program.  The usage of the matching method 
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in this situation also enabled it to analyze how income gains varied among households across 
the pre-intervention of income allocation. By matching participants to their nearest non-
participant neighbours in the area of common support, and netting out the average differences 
in income between all of these matched groups, they assessed that the program resulted in an 
average income increase equal to about half of the workforce program’s wage.  
Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) used the DiD method to deal with a significant 
policy question:  Does the privatization of water services delivery improve health outcomes 
and help alleviate poverty? The Argentine in the 1990s, introduced one of the most extensive 
privatization campaigns ever, by reassigning domestic water companies to planned private 
companies. The authors’ study shows that in the areas where water services were privatized, 
child mortality reduced by 8 percent and the impact was most substantial in the most deprived 
areas. 
 Lemieux and Milligan (2005) used regression discontinuity design to examine the incentive 
effect of social assistance by restricting their sample to men without children and a high school 
diploma by collecting data from the Canadian Census and the Labour Force Survey. Using the 
RDD approach, they found evidence that more social support benefit reduced employment. 
Kaboski and Townsend (1998) used an IV approach to assess the effect of Thailand’s Million 
Baht Village Fund Program on economic outputs of Thai villages. The authors used the 
instrumental variable of inverse number of households. The instrumental variable was used 
because the village fund was not randomly assigned or distributed. The authors found that the 
Million Bhat Village Fund increased the overall credit in the economy. 
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iv. Evaluation methods of ex-post impact evaluation 
The fundamental question of missing counterfactuals can be addressed using different methods 
in impact evaluation theory. Each method has its identifiable principles on the kind of possible 
bias selection in the targeting program and participation, and the values are critical to 
developing a suitable method to assess a program’s effects (Khandker et al., 2010).  
i. Randomization 
ii. Matching methods, especially propensity score matching  
iii. Difference-in-difference approach  
iv. Instrumental variable approach  
v. Regression discontinuity design approach 
vi. Distributional impacts  
vii. Structural modelling approach 
The approaches differ according to their core hypothesis of how to address selection bias to 
assess the treatment of the program’s outcome.  
i. Randomization- Randomization requires a randomly assigned program across a 
sample of subjects, i.e., local area or persons, for instance, the improvement of 
treatment and control groups showing identical before program characteristics pursued 
over a period. One benefit of randomized experiments is its ability to avoid selection 
bias at the level of randomization (Akobeng, 2005; Duflo 2007).  
ii. Propensity score methods - PSM is a mechanism used to identify a suitable 
comparison group that can match the treatment group. Matching is computed using the 
propensity score described as the predicted likelihood of participation when observable 
characteristics are assumed. PSM permits the discovery of a control group from a 
sample of non-participants nearest to the treatment group based on observable 
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characteristics. The propensity score is calculated as a function of individual 
characteristics based on a statistical model (i.e., logit or probit model). Thus, PSM 
compares treatment effects across participant and comparable non-participant groups 
in non-randomized settings, with the comparison carried out on a variety of observable 
features. PSM techniques thus assume that the selection bias is established solely on 
observed characteristics; however, they are unable to assess unobservable factors that 
affect participation (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Bryson et al., 2002; Caliendo and 
Kipeining, 2008). 
iii. Difference-in-Difference Model (DiD) - Difference-in-difference is a standard 
econometric approach commonly used to evaluate the impact of precise treatment on 
an outcome of interest. This method is used in creating an experimental design or a 
quasi-experimental as well as a non-experimental design. Before and after the 
intervention DiD compares the treated group and the comparison group.  The average 
difference between the “before” and “after” values of the impact indicators for both the 
treated and comparison groups is then estimated. The variation in the value of the 
second difference as compared to the first difference is the program effects. This 
technique can be combined with the propensity score method to correct for pre-
treatment differences that influence the parameter in question. DiD entails baseline and 
follow-up data from the same treatment and control group.  DiD expresses valid 
assessment when the selection bias is time-invariant, which means the technique 
removes a selection bias which has no variation over time. On the other hand, in the 
condition that the selection bias changes over a period, the calculated impact will 
exhibit biases. As a result, the model is helpful on the condition that the two groups 
have parallel characteristics improvement trend before in anticipation of the 
introduction of the program. Thus, DiD assumes that unobserved selection does not 
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change over time. The effect of treatment is estimated by netting out differences in 
outcomes between treatment and control components pre-and post-intervention of the 
program (White et al.2006; Baker, 2000; Angrist and Krueger 1999).  
iv. Instrumental Variable Model (IV) - The instrumental variable technique is used with 
cross-sectional or panel data analysis, and in the case of the latter it permits for self-
selection on unobserved features which change with time. The instrumental variable 
technique relates precisely to the choice of unobservable features (Imbens and Angrist, 
1994). The Average Treated Effect on Treated (ATT) instrumental variable is 
recognized if the researcher finds a variable that can influence the assignment into 
treatment but is unrelated to the outcome or the unobservable. Thus, the critical 
objective of the IV technique is to identify a variable or a set of variables, i.e., 
instruments that impact the decision to participate in a programme and at the same time 
do not have an impact on the outcome (Morgan and Winship, 2007; Caliendo and 
Kopening, 2005). In the IV technique, the selection bias on unobservable features is 
corrected by looking for an instrumental variable that is linked to participation, but 
unrelated to unobservable characteristics which affect the outcome of interest. The 
instrument is employed to forecast participation (Heckman 1997; Heckman and 
Navarro-Lazano, 2004; Angrist and Krueger 1991; Angrist 2006; DiNardo and Lee 
2010).  
v. Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)  
Regression discontinuity design possesses many of the properties of a randomized 
experiment, however assigning randomly is unpractical. RDD is a well-known quasi-
experimental strategy, which utilizes a clear-cut understanding of the policy, which 
establishes the suitability for treatment. Assignment for this strategy is exclusively 
dependent on pre-intervention variables, which the researcher can observe, and the 
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likelihood of involvement varies disjointedly as a function of these variables. RDD 
matches the outcomes of a group of measurement components (e.g., individuals) 
beyond the endpoint for qualification with a group of components below endpoint. The 
hypothesis that individuals almost close to the end for eligibility are comparable to 
selection bias must be reduced. However, other problems are likely to be dominant. 
RDD could be a satisfactory method if clear rules exist for the project selection as 
against a program that targets many different recipients. Thus, the RDD method is an 
expansion of IV and the experimental technique; it utilizes exogenous program 
regulations (such as criteria for eligibility) to assess participants and non-participants 
in a neighbouring locality around the eligibility cut-off (Campbell 1969; Van Der 
Klaauw 2002; Lee and Lemieux 2010; Khandker et al., 2010).  
In assessing the effects of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth in Ghana, our 
study combines PSM and DiD estimation to address the problems of selection bias and 
to correct estimates of observable and non-observable factors which might influence 
the outcome. In our study, randomization could not be used because of the non-
randomized nature of our study. Our study also could not use the instrumental variable 
method, because we do not need to find an instrument that can address endogeneity that 
might affect our results.  The regression discontinuity design is also not appropriate for 
our study because we need to have cut-off eligibility criteria for our target population 
by using, for example, the number of employees say, 6-99 persons or fixed assets valued 
to determine the control group and compare it to our treated group. Table 3.1 depicts 
examples of impact evaluation methods used in the empirical studies.
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Table 3.1 Examples of impact evaluation methods  
Authors Objective Methods Results/Findings 
Crépon et al., 2011 
 
To evaluate the delegation to private 
providers of placement services for 
young graduates who had spent at 
least six months in unemployment. 
RCT The programme had a substantial impact on the 
employment situation of young job-seekers eight 
months after the treatment. 
 
Schultz (2004) To identify the effects of conditional 
cash transfers on some outcomes, in 
particular, school enrolment. 
RCT The author found an average increase in enrolment 
of 3.4 percent for all students in grades 1-8, with 
the largest among girls who completed grade 6 
(14.8 percent). The possible reason is that girls 
tend to drop out of school at higher rates as they 
get older than boys due to socio-cultural norms. 
Angrist et al. (2002) To determine the effects of the 
voucher program on educational and 
social outcomes. 
RCT The authors found that lottery winners were 10 
percent more likely to complete the 8th grade and 
scored, on average 0.2 standard deviations higher 
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on standardized tests three years after the initial 
lottery. 
Jalan and Ravallian (2003) To assess how the interaction effects 
between income and education 
influence child health as a result of 
access to piped water in rural India. 
 
PSM The authors found an intricate pattern of 
interaction effects; for example, poverty attenuates 
the child-health gains from piped water, but less so 
the higher the level of maternal education. 
 
Levy and Myers (2003)  To investigate for the first time 
whether an age-specific factor, older 
individuals' beliefs about their aging, 
predicts their likelihood of engaging 
in preventive health behaviours over 
time. 
PSM The authors found that individuals with more 
positive self-perceptions of aging tended to 
practise more preventive health behaviours over 
the next two decades after controlling for age, 
education, functional health, gender, self-rated 
health, and race. 
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Brand and Halaby (2005) To identify and estimate the effects of 
elite college attendance on 
educational and career achievement. 
PSM The authors’ findings suggest that attending an 
elite college yields an advantage concerning 
educational achievement and occupational status; 
the results for wages are mixed. 
Jin and Leslie (2003) To examine the effect of an increase 
in product quality information to 
consumers on a firm’s choice of 
quality. 
DiD The results show that the grade card causes the 
restaurants’ health inspection score to increase, 
and consumer demand became sensitive to 
changes in restaurants’ hygiene quality. The 
results implied grade cards cause restaurants to 
make hygiene quality improvements. 
Card and Krueger (1994) To examine the effect of a minimum 
wage on employment. 
DiD The authors found no evidence that a rise in the 
minimum wage reduces employment. 
Galiani et al. (2005) To study the effect of privatization of 
water services on child mortality in 
Argentina. 
DiD The authors’ results suggest that privatization of 
water services reduced child mortality. 
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Glewe and Jacoby (1995) To examine the effect of nutrition and 
health on education in Ghana, 
 
IV  This study reveals the difficulty in finding a valid 
instrument that satisfies the exclusion restriction, 
considering that it is highly unlikely that these IVs 
were unrelated to unobservable factors associated 
with education. 
Ravallion and Wodon 
(2000) 
To examine whether child labour 
displaces schooling and perpetuates 
poverty in the long-term 
IV The author used a prior program at the village 
level as IV. The study indicated that the subsidy 
increased schooling by far more than it reduced 
poverty. 
Angrist and Krueger 
(1991) 
To estimate the impact of compulsory 
schooling on earnings. 
IV  The authors provide evidence that students who 
are compelled to attend school longer by 
compulsory schooling laws earn higher wages 
because of their extra schooling and that 
compulsory schooling laws are effective in 
compelling students to attend school. 
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Lemieux and Milligan 
(2005) 
To evaluate social assistance and 
labour supply in Canada. 
RDD The authors found that access to significant social 
assistance benefits reduced employment by about 
4.5 percent for men between 25-39 years without 
children. 
Barrera-Osorio, Linden, 
Urquiola(2007) 
To evaluate the impact of a school 
fee reduction program (graduated) on 
school enrolment rates in the city of 
Bogota in Colombia. 
RDD The authors found that the program had a 
significant and positive impact on school 
enrolment rates. 
Levy & Ohls (2007)  To compare social safety nets based 
on a poverty index in Jamaica 
RDD The authors found that the program increased 
school attendance for children ages 6-17 by an 
average of 0.5 days per month, which is significant 
given an already reasonably high attendance rate 
of 85 percent. Likewise, health care visits by 
children ages 1 to 6 increased by roughly 38 
percent. 
Source:
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3.6 Impact Evaluation of Venture Capital financing on SMEs’ Growth 
  The empirical model for impact evaluation on venture capital financing on SME growth is 
based on PSM and DiD estimation models. Combining PSM and DiD techniques is applied in 
a situation where the outcome information on participants in the program and comparable 
individuals who did not participate is assessed as “pre” and “post” the program in question 
(Michalek 2007, 2008, 2009; Ravallion, 2004). One significant benefit of the PSM-DID 
estimator is that it permits control for unobserved time-invariant components and consequently 
enhances the credibility of the identification of the treatment effect. 
3.6.1 Indicators of Impact Evaluation Outcome 
The key driver for impact assessment of a program or intervention is to measure the degree to 
which the program or intervention impacts the agent. The agent is defined as a group of 
individuals, households, firms, cities, etc. The outcomes of interest are theoretically derived 
from the utility function of the agent; however, the utility is an unrealistic measurement to 
estimate the outcomes and it represents a broad sense of the outcomes of impact assessment 
(Gertler et al., 2016; Baker, 2000). For instance, to evaluate the economic effects of a 
microcredit programme on rural households, two indicators have been used (Hulme, 2000). 
The current study uses sales growth and employment growth as outcome indicators as used by 
Peneder (2010) and Engel (2003) in their studies.  
3.6.2 Empirical Models 
In evaluating the effect of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth, this study follows the 
impact evaluation procedures by setting participation in a venture capital financing program 
similarly to a job training program participation (Heckman and George, 1980) or microcredit 
program (Hulme, 2000). An individual, household, firm or city can be defined as a 
dichotomous treatment state, parallel to participants or non-participants in a venture capital 
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financing programme. This participation results in two potential outcomes for SMEs. Let D = 
1 if SMEs received venture capital financing; 0 otherwise. Let Yi1 represent the possible 
outcome for SMEs which received the venture capital financing, and Yi0 represent the potential 
outcome for those that did not receive venture capital financing. Yi1 and Yi0 are mutually 
exclusive, and the values received depend on the participation state, and therefore a single 
outcome can be observed while the ‘counterfactual’ cannot be observed. The expected impact 
of venture capital funding on the outcome of the ith firm in a sample is expressed as follows: 
      δi = Yi1 – Yi0                                                                                                                                      ( 3.1) 
The actual observed outcome for a firm depends on the exclusive nature of the counterfactual 
and the exclusively distributed assumption (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; Rubin, 1990) can be 
described as follows: 
 
        Yi=DiYi1+ (1-Di) Yi0                                                                                           (3.2) 
 
Or     
          
         Yi=Yi0+ Deltai +Di, where i = 1, 2, 3…….n.                                                                                  (3.3) 
 
Estimating equation (3.3) to obtain the coefficient of impact δ using OLS would produce a 
biased result due to self-selection and endogeneity problems. Also, the literature indicates that 
there is more than one impact estimator for any outcome indicator. Since our research interest 
is to provide relevant policy implications for the targeted SMEs that need venture capital 
financing, we restrict our focus to estimating the programme impact using only Average 
Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT) proposed by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983). Consequently, 
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two types of programme impact estimators are used to evaluate the effect of venture capital 
financing on SME growth. 
3.6.3 Propensity Score Matching Approach 
a) PSM estimators and assumptions 
 PSM is a common technique used in drawing a causal inference in programme evaluation 
studies. PSM is grounded on the concept of differentiating the program participation group 
treated groups’ (i.e., venture capital funded SMEs) outcomes with the outcomes of 
‘comparable’ non-participation control groups (i.e., non-venture capital funded SMEs). The 
outcome differences between these groups are ascribed to the program (Heckman, Ichimura, 
&Todd, 1998). This approach has been comprehensively applied to impact the evaluation of 
job and education programmes (see Dehejia &Wahba, 2002; Heckman et al., 1997; Titus, 
2007). The empirical demonstration can be established in different areas of study. It is 
connected to all cases where there is treatment, i.e., treatment and control groups. The 
circumstances of treatment may differ. For example, Perkins et al., (2000) demonstrated how 
to use matching in pharmacoepidemiologic research. Bryson (2002) also conducted a study on 
the impact of union membership on wages of employees. Our objective is to investigate the 
effect of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth; the focus is on the effect of the 
intervention. i.e., venture capital funding on SMEs’ economic performance.  
 Dehejia and Wahba (2002) proposed that PSM is helpful for a cross-sectional data survey, as 
considering the background of the survey data; it might be expensive to resurvey thousands of 
units in future. However, an impact evaluation study must surmount the critical estimation 
difficulty and tackle the probable existence of selection bias. The initial problem occurs since 
one will wish to establish the variance between the outcomes of participants and non-
participants (i.e., Venture funded SMEs and Non-Venture funded SMEs). It is impossible to 
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observe both outcomes for venture capital funded SMEs and non-venture capital funded SMEs 
simultaneously. It is not prudent to take the mean outcome of non-venture capital funded 
SMEs’ estimate since venture capital funded SMEs and non-venture capital funded SMEs in 
the absence of treatment. This leads to selection bias, for example, motivated individuals have 
a higher possibility of engaging in a job training program and have a higher likelihood of 
getting a job (Heckman 1996; Bryson 2002; Lalonde 2003).  
According to Heckman et al. (1998), a significant problem about non-randomisation methods 
is the existence of self-selection that arises from the non-random location of the program and 
the non-random selection of participants that makes evaluation difficult. Bernard et al. (2010) 
identified three possible causes of bias. First, there are significant differences concerning 
treatment and control groups at household level due to the characteristics that are observable 
that might have a direct influence on the outcome of interest. Second, unobservable 
characteristics are the cause of the difference. Primary differences between those who 
participate and those who did not non-participate are possible to either wholly or partially 
reflect differences among participants and non-participants groups instead of the effect of 
participating in the program. 
PSM deals with observed features by relating the outcomes of the treatment group and similar 
comparable group, based on similar observed features, which minimise the selection bias. PSM 
estimation becomes biased when it impossible to control for these characteristics. How to 
remove the unobservable characteristics is still the core problem of the PSM technique.  
Ravallion (2005) contends that contamination of the control group can be hard to avoid as a 
result of the reactions of the markets and governments.   
The PSM method compares venture capital funded SMEs and non-venture capital funded 
SMEs with similar observable characteristics to deduce the intervention impact (Caliendo and 
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Kopeining, 2008). However, there are likely to exist some observations of participants in the 
venture capital funded SMEs and non-venture capital funded SMEs that cannot be matched as 
a result of significant differences in their observable characteristics. The differences in 
participants, such as large firms with significantly high sales revenue in the control group and 
low sales revenue or secluded firms with self-subsistence characteristics in the treatment group, 
are called outliers. These outlier participants cannot be matched using their sales revenue. 
Including these unmatched participants in evaluating the impact may produce misleading 
interpretation. One dominant characteristic of the matching method is that, after the treated and 
control participants are compared, the unmatched participants in the matching process are 
removed and are not used to assess the programme impact (i.e., matching is performed within 
the overlapping or common support region). Therefore, the matching algorithm can 
significantly reduce bias in programme evaluation studies (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, &Todd, 
1996; Rosebaum & Rubin, 1983; Setboonsarng & Parpiev, 2008). 
The PSM approach can be used to assess the effect of venture capital financing. Under similar 
settings as in job training or microcredit programmes, the PSM method initially estimates the 
propensity scores of venture capital funded SMEs and non-venture capital funded SMEs based 
on observed characteristics and then compares the mean outcome of the venture capital funded 
SMEs with (similar scores) non-venture capital funded SMEs. Thus, the rationale of PSM is to 
choose SMEs that do not receive venture capital among all SMEs to generate a comparable 
group and then match outcomes of SMEs that receive venture capital.  PSM depends on the 
critical premise that non-venture funded SMEs, among other things, must have similar 
outcomes as venture-backed SMEs would have acquired in the absence of VC funding. This 
hypothesis is called ‘confoundedness’ or ‘conditional independence assumption’ (CIA) 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1993). 
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The core of this hypothesis is that both control and treatment groups with the identical 
propensity score have an equal chance of assignment to the treatment as in randomised 
experiments (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The hypothesis assumes that outcome Y is 
autonomous of treatment D, conditional on some covariate X following Dawid’s (1979) 
notation is given as follows: 
Assumption 1. Unconfoundedness: Y0, Y1, Ц DX                                                       (3.4) 
Assumption 1 enables us to define the outcome distributions of participant and non-participant 
groups as follows: 
E(Y0X, D =1) = E(Y0X,D = 0)                                                                                  (3.5a) 
 
And E(Y1X, D = 1) E(Y1X, D = 0) = E(Y1X)                                                        (3.5b) 
 
Equations (3.5a) and (3.5b) imply that the treated group’s outcomes have the identical 
assignment that the control group possibly might experience if they have taken part in a venture 
capital funding program. Similarly to randomisation, the distributions of all related predictors 
X in the treated and control group balance through matching. Heckman et al. (1979) indicate 
that the omitted counterfactual average could be created from outcomes of the control group 
and treatment group as follows: 
E(Y0X, D = 1) = E(Y0X,D = 0) = E(Y0X)                                                               (3.6a) 
 
and E(Y1X, D = 1) = E(Y1X,D = 0) = E(Y1X)                                                        (3.6b) 
 
Both equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) simultaneously define for all X.  
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Assumption 2. Overlap: 0 < Pr(D = 1X) < 1, for all X                                               (3.7) 
 
Assumption 2 suggests X’s support is identical in these groups, i.e., S = Support (XD = 1) = 
Support (XD = 0). This hypothesis checks X from becoming a flawless predictor since one 
can identify for individuals a counterpart in the control group. Matching is performed over the 
common support region only when there are regions where the support of X does not overlap 
for the treated and non-treated individuals (Lechner, 2000). Blundell et al. (2005) suggest that 
the interpretation of the estimated effects ought to be defined as the average treatment effect of 
those individuals which falls in the common support region. 
According to Rosenbaum & Rubin, (1983), assumptions 1 and two are referred to jointly as 
‘strong ignorability.’ 
Heckman et al. (1997) provide an alternative assumption for estimating ATT under the 
matching method. 
Assumption 3, Mean Independence: 
         E(Y0X, D = 1) = E(Y0X,D = 0)                                                                          (3.8a) 
and   E(Y1X, D = 1) = E(Y1X,D = 0)                                                                          (3.8b) 
Based on the above assumptions ATT can be written as: 
 
δ ATT   = E(Y1-Y0X,D = 1) 
   PSM  
 
δ ATT   = E(Y1-Y0X,D = 1)- Ex[E(Y0X,D=1)D=1] 
   PSM  
 
δ ATT   = E(Y1-Y0X,D = 1)- Ex[E(Y0X,D=0)D=1]                                                       (3.9) 
   PSM  
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Thus, the first period in equation (3.9) is evaluated as treated groups and the second period 
from average outcomes of the corresponding control group. The outside probability takes over 
the assignment of covariates X in the population that is treated (Caliendo, p.33). 
According to Dehejia and Wehba (2002), the PSM method produces estimates with low bias if 
the datasets satisfy the following conditions: (i) data for treatment and comparison groups are 
collected using the same questionnaire; (ii) both treatment and comparison groups are drawn 
from the same quarter; (iii) the dataset contains a “rich set of variables” connected to the 
program participation and outcome of interest (Smith & Todd 2005, p.6). Similarity, the treated 
and control groups’ observable characteristics, increases the likelihood of getting matches and 
hence reduces the bias. The PSM technique permits the regulation of possible bias such as non-
placement and bias selection on observed features in participation in the program (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig, 2008).  
In this study, various PSM estimator effects of venture capital funding on SMEs’ growth are 
discussed.  A set of covariates are included in the regression to control for selection bias on 
observable factors. The set of controlling covariates should meet the conditions of matching 
controlling variables discussed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Zhao (2004), Imbens (2004) 
and Lee (2005) among others. 
b) Implementation Strategies of Propensity Score Matching Estimators 
Theoretically, the SMEs signify one matched pair equal to each other except in the intervention 
from the venture capital financing program. Thus, matching can separate the idiosyncratic 
effect factors from the outcome variables by reducing observed heterogeneity between the 
SMEs backed by venture capital and SMEs that are not backed by venture capital. The process 
of implementing PSM involves two phases. In the first phase, logit or probit is employed to 
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compute the propensity score or likelihood of obtaining venture capital funding conditional on 
control variables, and then classify individuals or firms into blocks based on their scores. 
Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008) argue that using logistics regression and probit models to estimate 
the propensity score yields similar results for a binary treatment case such as the one we 
investigate. Logistic or probit models are known as linear probability models (LPM) due to 
LPM’s shortcoming of calculating probability more than 1 and less than 0 for some samples. 
Logistic regression and probit models are also preferred when the distribution of the response 
variable is highly skewed (Ullah, 2013; Tucker, 2011; Berhe, 2016). This process may include 
stepwise model selection, by reiterating steps until the closest treatment and control groups are 
attained. In the second phase, the computed propensity score is used together with different 
average treatment effect estimates to obtain Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT) 
estimation.  
Different possible matching procedures can be used to examine the impact of Venture Capital 
Funding on SMEs’ growth. One possible procedure is nearest neighbour matching (NNM): 
It is the most straightforward matching estimator. In NNM, individuals within the control group 
are selected to match comparable group treated individuals who are nearest in relation to the 
propensity score (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). NNM is computed with or without replacement. 
For NN by replacement, a comparable individual is matched to more than one treatment 
individual, which results in increased matching quality and decreases the accuracy of 
estimations. Whereas for NN matching without replacement, a comparable individual is used 
only once. NN matching without replacement increases bias, but it improves the accuracy of 
estimations. In a situation where the control group and treatment group are different, it is 
problematic to find a satisfactory matching comparison by replacement (Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002). What this means is that by matching without replacement, if it happens that there is less 
comparison group related to the treated group, we might be forced to match the treatment group 
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to a comparable group which is different from the estimated propensity score (Lalonde, 1986). 
Pierfederico & Signore (2015) performed Nearest Neighbour Matching to trade efficiency for 
a lower estimation bias.  
 Stratification Matching: It performs matching by dividing an array of the differences of the 
propensity score in blocks to ensure that within individual block tests, the average propensity 
scores of treatment and control groups are indifferent (Becker & Ichino, 2002). The idea of 
matching by stratification is to divide the region of common support of the propensity score 
into a set of blocks and to estimate the effect in each block by subtracting the average change 
in outcomes of treatment and control groups. This technique is called blocking matching, 
interval matching and sub-classification (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). A question that a 
researcher needs to answer is what quantity of blocks or layers are required in any experimental 
design? Cochrane & Chambers (1965) explained that eliminating 95% of the biases connected 
with the entire covariates five sub-divisions are usually adequate.  Imbens (2004) observed that 
all predispositions under confoundedness are linked to the propensity score, the implication is 
the use of five blocks or layers eliminates the majority of the bias linked with the entire 
covariates. One technique to rationalize the selection of the number of blocks or layers is to 
control the balance of propensity scores within an individual block (Aakvik 2001). 
Stratification matching algorithm, in fact, removes observations when either a treated or a 
control group is not present. Therefore, the stratification method is not recommended for data 
in which the treated and control groups are unbalanced. Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2002) 
implemented interval or stratified matching with intervals because it has been proven that five 
classes are often adequate to remove 95% of bias with all covariates. 
Radius Matching: Radius matching is another possible matching procedure. With radius 
matching, ATE determines the average unit-level treatment effect of the treated whereby the 
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control groups within a predefined radius of propensity scores are matched to a treated group. 
In cases within a radius where there exists more than one control component, the mean outcome 
of the control component is used; bad matches are avoided by using this method and 
overcoming the drawback of stratification matching, so the quality of matching increases 
(Caliendo & Kopeining, 2008). Given the dataset, the better the quality of matching becomes 
with a smaller radius, since match control and treated units have close scores. However, 
matching by radius accepts treated units, which comprise control matches in a radius, thus 
assuming the radius is small, a lot of treated units may not match and are rejected. 
Consequently, ATT from the radius matching estimate no longer signifies the population of the 
treated units (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Caliendo & Kopeining, 2008). However, Dehejia 
&Wahba (2002) argued that radius matching employs only the number of matched units present 
within a predefined radius, thus allowing for the use of extra units when good matches are 
present and fewer units when they are not. 
Kernel Matching: Kernel matching is used to match all treated components and average 
weights of entire controls per weights that are contrariwise related to the distance among the 
propensity scores of the treatment and controls (Arun, Imai, & Sinha, 2006). Kernel matching 
provides a solution to the problem of discarding observations in radius matching because the 
kernel matching estimator possesses a smaller variance because data from all or almost all 
control units are expended (Becker and Ichino, 2002). However, one drawback of this method 
is poor matching since few or several far-distance control units are likely to be expended to 
match with one treated unit (Caliendo & Kopeining, 2008). For instance, kernel matching was 
used by Oh et al. (2009) to reduce the variance of the estimated ATE. 
According to Smith and Todd (2005), the quality of the matches is unaffected by the matching 
algorithms employed. Thus, the various matching algorithms used do not make much of a 
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difference regarding unbiased impact estimates. What makes a difference is the quality and 
availability of the underlying data, i.e., rich and high-quality data are required (Smith and Todd, 
2005). 
c) Choosing Covariates for Propensity Score Matching. 
Choosing the covariates in the PSM method is important because they directly affect the 
estimation outcomes. Lee (2005) suggests that the selecting covariate X must be 
predetermined, which affects both Y and treatment D.  Furthermore, to prevent the causality 
bias, X is not required to be influenced by D; as a result, the after-treated covariate should not 
be controlled since it would eliminate part or all the effect of D on Y. Our choice of covariates 
for computing the propensity score was based on SME owners’ features (such as age, gender, 
educational level, experience, marital status and income levels) and firm characteristics (such 
as firm age, size, and sector) and pre-treatment outcomes. 
Conditional Independence Assumption (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) means treatment must 
not be affected by the observable control predictors, and outcomes of interest are autonomous 
of the treatment assigned. Hence, the variables included must be fixed over time or quantified 
before the intervention (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008) and before-treatment variables quantified 
must not be influenced by the expectancy of treated group participation (Imbens, 2004). For 
example, if the household recognizes they will get credit, this may lead to higher expenditure 
even before the household is loaned the money (Doan, 2011). To meet the conditional 
assumption requirements that treatment (i.e., venture capital financing) does not affect our 
covariates or predictors (i.e., SME owners’ and firms’ characteristics) and the outcome of 
interest (i.e., sales and employment growth), our selected covariates are based on the SME 
owners’ socio-demographic characteristics (i.e., age, gender, marital status, education, 
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experience, and income) as well as the firms’ characteristics (such as firm age, size, legal status, 
and sector). 
Furthermore, there must be the exclusion of variables that are not related to the outcome or 
unsuitable covariates of the treatment participation decision model (Rubin and Thomas, 1996; 
Bryson et al., 2002). Bryson, Dorsett, and Purdon (2002) suggest selecting a variable that 
influences only participation but not treatment outcomes. As a result, it is pointless to control 
for this since the outcome of interest is not influenced by this variable. In contrast, assuming a 
variable affects only the outcome and not the participation of the treatment group, it should not 
be controlled since the variable will make an insignificant difference concerning treatment and 
control groups. Thus, only the variables that affect the decision concurrently to participate and 
the outcome must be incorporated at the score estimation stage (Bryson, Dorsett, & Purdon, 
2002, p. 24). 
Finally, the elimination of important variables could severely escalate bias in estimates (see 
Dehejia Wahba 1999 or Heckman et al. 1997). If a covariate is inadequately linked with the 
outcomes, the treatment might decrease the precision of the estimates (Imbens, 2004). Due to 
uncertainty, however, it is better to add several covariates rather than small covariates (Bryson 
et al., 2002). Furthermore, Dehejia and Wahba, (1999) suggest starting with covariates linearly 
and checking whether a balancing of covariates within each stratum is obtained, and then test 
for the statistical significance of variances in the assignment of covariates. Once the balance is 
obtained, the specification is accepted. Otherwise, one should change the potential covariates 
into higher-order relationships and interactions until the balancing is satisfied (Grilli, & 
Rampichini 2011).  
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d) Defining the Common Support and Overlap. 
Another consideration is defining the common support and overlap for the control and treated 
groups. The second assumption of PSM is a common support. Only a subgroup of the control 
group which is identical to the treatment group is employed. Thus it is necessary to validate 
the overlay and mutual support among the treatment and control groups. Lechner (2002) 
suggests inspecting the density distribution of propensity scores to validate the overlap and 
common support to test whether comparison concerning the treatment and control group is 
sizable. Imbens (2004) shows how the PSM method handles the lack of overlap. The 
probability or score receives a value from 0 to 1; the observations with probabilities close to 
one will get higher weights, which leads to an increase in the difference of the average 
treatment estimator. As a result, the PSM is better designed to handle restricted overlap in the 
covariate distributions than parametric regression models because adding control observations 
of outliers, i.e., scores near 0 or 1, in a parametric regression approach will lead to substantial 
changes in the estimated coefficients (Caliendo & Kopeinig,2005; Li, 2012). 
If the assumption of common support is violated, what happens? If treated and control 
observations fall outside the common support, they need to be dropped. If the number of 
outside-common support observations of the treatment group is large, the estimate of the 
within-common support observations may be distorted and false (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008; 
Imbens, 2004). Therefore, overlooking the common support problem or assessing a 
subpopulation within the common support may give distorted estimates and inferences 
(Lechner, 2002; Schreinemachers et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the lack of overlap in covariate distributions between the control as well as 
treatment groups might result in imprecise estimations and cause the estimators to be sensitive 
to the choice of specification (Crum, Hotz, Imbens, & Mitnik, 2004). Evaluators often use a 
 
 
 
116 
 
strategy of trimming the sample to address limited overlap. Crump et al. (2009) advocate 
discarding all units of both control and treatment groups that have an estimated propensity 
score external to the array [0.1, 0.9]; the authors’ show that the exact gain from the method is 
substantial with most of the gain captured. Thus, using probit or logit models to estimate the 
scores will give different results when the propensity scores are close to 1 or 0, and the weights 
possibly will be significant, so these units might considerably affect the approximation of the 
treatment effects, and hence the estimation becomes inaccurate (Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). 
Conversely, some external validity might be lost by altering the spotlight to average treatment 
effects for a sub-division in the range [0.1, 0.9] of the original sample if the dropout 
observations significantly affect the estimated result when large numbers of observations are 
discarded. The estimates could be misleading even if the strategy of estimation improves the 
lack of overlap (Crump et al., 2009). For example, Godtland et al. (2004) used three different 
steps to generate a common support of propensity scores to match non-participants to the 
participant sample.  
e) Matching quality 
The matching procedures as highlighted above try to lessen the complexity of the pre-treatment 
variables by reducing the variables to only one, thus bypassing the dimension problem. 
Nonetheless, by reducing the dimension, there is an indisputable loss of information. Therefore, 
it is vital to assess the quality of the matching procedures by examining the ability of the 
matching procedure to balance the distribution of the relevant variables in both the treatment 
and control groups. Several methods are available in the literature to assess the quality of 
matching, namely the standardized bias (SB), the pseudo-R2 and the t-test. The primary goal 
of these different methods is to compare the situation before and after matching and to verify 
whether any differences remain after conditioning on the propensity score (Caliendo and 
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Kopeinig, 2008). If differences remain after matching, then the PSM does not perform 
successfully and should be improved by adding, for example, other variables or interaction 
terms in the estimation of the propensity score. 
In summary, matching is expected to produce less biased results than OLS because matching 
compares treated groups only with comparable groups. Nevertheless, the ‘similarity’ of 
comparable groups to the treated group is built on observed characteristics, so there is the 
likelihood of bias assuming unobserved characteristics that influence both participation in 
treatment and outcomes of interest. The assumption is based merely on the condition that we 
are unable to manage the entire variables, particularly the unobserved characteristics that 
influence both participation in treatment and outcomes of interest (Bryson et al., 2002). 
However, since our data focused only on the SMEs in urban areas, the disparity between SMEs 
financed by venture capital and SMEs not financed by venture capital is not expected to be 
substantial. Hence the likelihood of bias may reduce the reliability of the matching estimates.  
However, one weakness of the PSM method is that it fails to control for unobservable 
characteristics, which may generate a hidden bias since the scores are estimated only by 
observed characteristics. Dias, Ichimura, and Berg (2007) argue that if the treatment 
assignment and the outcomes are affected by unobservable characteristics, matching tends to 
give biased results because the unobservable cannot be controlled. This means that the 
observed characteristics may not adequately capture the individual motivation, ability, and 
skills, which may affect treatment participation. Again, the success of PSM strictly depends on 
how the control and treatment groups are related in terms of space and time, and the two groups 
should have as few baseline differences as possible (Lee, 2005). 
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3.6.4 Impact Estimation for Panel Data: Difference-In-Difference Approach 
a) Difference-in-Difference estimation and assumptions 
Although PSM attempts to relate the variance between the outcome variables of those who 
participate and those who do not non-participate in a program with comparable inherent 
characteristics, it cannot correct unobservable bias since it only controls for observed variables. 
Difference-in-difference matching estimator (DiD) eliminates any bias as a result of 
unobservable, time-invariant differences among the treated and matched control groups 
(Gilligan and Hoddinott, 2007). The DiD technique is increasingly a standard method for 
identifying programme impact in the absence of purely experimental data (Ashenfelter & Card, 
1985; Athey &Imbens, 2006). It takes some time for a policy to be implemented or to take 
effect on the target group of participants. The observed outcomes over time may be ascribed 
not only to the treatment but also to observed and unobserved factors such as economic 
conditions, other concurrent policies, individual motivation, ability, etc. Thus, to assess the real 
effect of the policy, it is essential to exclude such undesired attributes. DiD is a technique used 
to estimate the effects of a treatment or event in a given period.  The DiD estimation model 
represents the difference between the before/after situation and within subjects’ differences of 
the treatment and control groups. Thus, it is highly appropriate in the context where a particular 
event (in this case, venture capital financing of SMEs) makes it desirable to investigate the 
before and after situation. Moreover, the attractiveness of DiD estimation is due to its 
straightforwardness and the possibility of sidestepping many of the endogeneity problems that 
occur when making comparisons concerning diverse individuals (Meyer, 1995).  Card and 
Krueger (1994) used DiD to analyze the effects of a rise in the minimum wage on employment 
in New Jersey. The author employed DiD to assess the effects of immigration on native wages 
and employment. Bamberger, Carlton, and Newman (2004) also used DiD to investigate the 
effects of airline alliances on airline fares.  
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While the single cross-sectional evaluation prevents the issue of omitted trends when we match 
two groups over the same period, a single time-series model side-steps the problem of 
unobserved differences between groups of firms by observing the same firms before and after 
the treatment.  The two single difference models complement each other in a double estimator 
model, making the DiD model a potent estimator (Roberts and Whited, 2012). It is 
acknowledged that the conventional DiD estimator is grounded on a strong assumption.  
Specifically, the conventional DiD estimator requires that, on condition that the treatment is 
absent, average outcomes for treated and controls must follow comparable trends over a period. 
This hypothesis may be unlikely if before-treatment features that are expected are linked with 
the changing aspects of variable outcomes which are uneven among the treated and the 
untreated group (Roberts and Whited, 2012). For example, Garvey and Hanka (1999) used DiD 
to evaluate the impact of state anti-takeover laws on leverage by exploring the data one year 
after the law was passed. The authors compared the leverage ratios of firms in states that 
approved the law (treated group) and those that did not approve the law (control group). 
 
 3.6.5 Estimation Strategy 
The present study evaluates the effect of venture capital financing on SME growth in Ghana. 
As a preliminary check and to obtain a better understanding on the collected data, we performed 
multiple regression analysis for VC and non-VC backed SMEs. Multiple regression analysis is 
a very valuable econometric model for predicting a quantitative outcome for firms growth, and 
has been applied by numerous researchers. It is also applied to test hypotheses of relationships 
between dependent variables and independent variables along with a prediction (Dominique 
Salvatore, Derrick Reagle, 2002). The multiple regression model we developed has the growth 
of SMEs as a dependent variable, and it is measured by the number of workforce or the annual 
sales turnover. Whiles socio-demographic characteristics such as the SME owner’s age, 
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gender, marital status, education, experience, income level and firms’ characteristics such as 
firm size, age, sector, legal status, location are our explanatory variables. Our main is to 
investigate the effects of venture capital financing on the growth of SMEs in Ghana. In other 
words we seek to identify the effect of the independent variables on SMEs’ growth, and what 
are their relationships in terms of access to VC financing. 
We used a multiple regression model defined by the following equation;  
Y= α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 +....................................................................... βp Xp +ε.     (3.10) 
Where, Y = Growth of SMEs as measured by number of workforce or annual sales growth                                                                                         
α = Constant term, ε = error term      and β1- βp = coefficients of the independent variables.                                                                                                                                                        
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The following Table 3.2 indicates the variables used in our model. 
Table 3.2: Summary of Variables used in our Multiple Regression Model 
Variables Description Sign Expected 
Y  SMEs’ growth (Annual Sales/Employee) 
 
       +/- 
X1 VC dummy  
 
       + 
X2 Gender 
 
       + 
X3 Owner’s Age 
 
       - 
X4 Marital Status 
 
        - 
X5 Education 
 
        + 
X6 Experience 
 
         + 
X7 Income Level 
 
         +/- 
X8 Ownership 
 
          + 
X9 Firm Size 
 
         + 
X10 Firm Age 
 
         + 
X11 Location         +/- 
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The next step is to estimate our PSM-Did models. To moderate the possible selection bias in 
the impact assessment, this study employed cross sectional data analysis due to the accessibility 
of data collected from sampled SMEs. Furthermore, all sampled SMEs in this study are selected 
from areas where venture capital financing is accessible, which helps to lessen the possible 
non-random program assignment bias (Nguyen, 2007). 
A DiD estimation framework entails that the outcomes under investigation (such as SMEs’ 
growth regarding annual sales and employment) be observed for the two periods. The first 
group,  a VC backed group consists of SMEs that received venture capital support during the 
start of the VC financing (i.e., post-program period) but not before the start of the program (i.e., 
pre-program period); the second group, called the Non-VC backed group consists of SMEs that 
did not receive venture capital support during any period (Athey and Imbens, 2006; Betrand et 
al., 2004). 
The simplest set-up of DiD estimation is the case with two groups and two periods. Venture-
backed SMEs (treatment group) are exposed to treatment (programme participation) in the 
second period but not the first period. The non-venture backed SMEs (control group) are not 
exposed to the treatment. Using the non-venture backed SMEs as a control group, the basic 
idea is to evaluate the impact of this treatment.  
The standard DiD technique adopted from (Wooldridge, 2002) is regressed as follows. 
Yit = β0 +δ0ԁ2t + βРi + γMit + εit                                                                                                                           (3.11) 
Where Yit  is the SMEs’ outcome examined (i.e., annual sales or employment growth) for SME 
i at period t; d2t is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for t=2 (post-VC financing period) 
and 0 for t=1 (pre-VC financing period) Pi is a group dummy variable which takes a value of 
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one if  SME i belongs to the VC backed SME group and zero otherwise;Mit is an interaction 
term of the product of d2t and Pi, which shows the program participation and is equal to one if 
SME i obtained venture capital funding and the observation happens during the second period 
(i.e., receiving venture capital financing) and zero otherwise;δ0 represents time influence 
suffered by both treatment and control groups;β1 represents the potential time-invariant 
differences in overall averages between the two groups; γ is the primary parameter of interest 
which measures the average program effect on the VC backed SME (treatment) group;ℇ it is the 
idiosyncratic error which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed over SMEs 
and time, with mean zero at each period. 
The critical assumption of the standard DiD method, also called the common trend assumption, 
is that γ would be zero in the absence of the program, or E[εitMit] =0. Thus, the average change 
in the outcome variables (Yit) would not have been systematically different between the VC 
backed group and the non-VC backed group if there were no programs (Abadie, 2005a, and b; 
Meyer, 1995). Under this assumption, an unbiased estimation of γ can be obtained by just 
calculating the difference of two differences: (1) the average difference in the outcomes over 
the two time periods for the venture-backed group; and (2) the same differences for the non-
venture backed group (Athey and Imbens,2006; Abadie,2005a). The following equation 
illustrates this:  
 ᷆γsdd = ∆ȲB -∆ȲN                                                                                                                               (3.12)                                                                                   
          = E[Yi,t=2 – Yi,t=1Pi=1) – E(Yi,t=2 – Yi,t=1Pi=0 
where “∆” denotes the change from t=1 to t=2, ᷆γsdd indicates the standard DiD estimator of γ 
the overbar represents the average across SMEs, B and N denote VC backed SMEs and non-
VC backed SMEs, respectively. As a result of deducting the average differences in the Non-
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VC backed group from the average differences in the VC backed group from equation (3.11), 
the DiD estimation strategy ensures two types of estimation bias be removed, namely bias from 
the cross-sectional comparison between the two groups in the post-program period, which 
could be due to permanent differences between these two groups (captured by β1) but 
unconnected to the program, and bias from the comparison over the two periods for the VC 
backed groups.  It could be due to time trends (captured by δ0) but unrelated to the program 
(Ashenfelter and Card,1985; Abadie, 2005a;  Athey and Imbens, 2006; Imbens and 
Wooldridge, 2007).  
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Table 3.3: Mean estimation from the DiD regression model.  
 Post-Treatment                     Pre-Treatment                   Difference 
Treatment β0 + β1 + β2 + β3                    β0 + β2                              β1+β3 
Control   β0 + β3                                    β0        β3 
Difference β1 + β2                                    β2        β1 
Source: Whited and Robert, 2012 
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The inner columns 1 & 2 in Table 3.3 are the provisional means. For instance, the average y 
from SMEs in the treatment group (i.e., VC backed SMEs) during the post-treatment period is 
(β0 + β1 + β2 + β3). Similarly, the average y for SMEs in the control group (i.e., non-VC backed 
SMEs) during the pre-treatment period is β0. The outer column 3 corresponds to differences in 
these provisional means. The average difference in y between VC backed and non-VC backed 
groups during the pre-treatment period is (β0 + β2) – β0 = β2. The block in the bottom corner is 
the DiD estimate, which can be attained by either (a) differencing down the right most column, 
or (b) differencing across the bottom row. 
 
3.7 Determinants of Venture Capital Investment Activity 
3.7.1 Empirical Model 
Our study uses a panel data model to assess the factors influencing venture capital investment 
activity in Ghana. The empirical investigation, both regarding model and data used is similar 
to that of Cherif and Gazdar (2011). The present study obtained secondary data from the World 
Bank database and Heritage Foundation. The dataset consists of a panel data from 15 African 
countries over ten-year period from 2006-2015. The list of countries includes Botswana, Cote 
D’lvoire, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. These countries were selected based on 
the Venture Capital Attractiveness Country Index Report in 2013. 
Panel data inquiry is an increasingly well-known type of longitudinal data study among 
researchers in several fields. Cross-section observation can be households, countries, firms or 
individuals. In contrast to OLS regression, panel data regression has two dimensions, cross-
section and time series. As a result of the two-dimensional nature of panel data, the datasets 
provide rich sources of information for accurate analysis (Frees, 2004; Hsiao, 1986). 
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Panel data regression has several advantages over one-dimensional regression. First, it permits 
individual differences to be controlled (Hsiao 2003). It is feasible to use either one-way or two-
way examination to control for the individual and time-invariant variables, but neither a time-
series nor a cross-section study can do it. This implies that by using only time-series or cross-
section study that does not control for heterogeneity, the researcher may run the danger of 
getting biased results. Second, panel data gives additional revealing data, extra changeability, 
and adds a degree of freedom and extra competence (Baltagi 2005). While time-series inquiry 
often suffers from multicollinearity; this is less likely in panel data. In panel data, the difference 
in the data can be disintegrated into variation between and within variables. The former 
disparity is usually more significant. Because of the additional and more informative data, 
panel data can produce added consistent parameter estimates. Panel data can significantly 
increase the number of observations by merging time-series and cross-section observations. 
This is important for the analysis of macroeconomic and institutional determinants of venture 
capital investment activity, which are characterized by cross-section observations and time-
series. Thirdly, panel data is used to obtain reliable estimators with the existence of variables 
which are omitted (Wooldridge 2002). OLS will provide biased estimators if omitted or 
unobservable variables are related to the dependent variables. This is a problem when 
investigating only cross-section data; however, panel data provides a solution to this problem.  
There are, however, some limitations or disadvantages associated with panel data including the 
following. First and foremost, design, data collection and data management can pose a problem 
because of the cross-section time-series aspect of information involved. Secondly, the selection 
of a suitable model hinges on the degree of consistency of the intercept and coefficients of the 
slope and the level to which some individual cross-section impacts connected with the 
explanatory variables can pose a problem (Song and Witt 2000). Our dataset is considered 
panel data because it consists of observation of subjects over time. Observing a broad cross-
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section of subjects over time allows us to study the dynamic as well as the cross-sectional 
aspect of the problem. 
 To examine the determinants of venture capital investments, longitudinal data regression has 
been used to identify the relationship between the dependent variable and independent 
variables. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS), Fixed Effects Models (FEM), and Random 
Effects Models (REM) are types of panel estimation models.  
 Our dependent variable, which is the venture capital investment funds raised/early stages 
investments, is estimated against a set of observable factors which are expected to affect the 
supply and demand of venture capital investments in a country (Rin et al., 2006). Our 
longitudinal data is regressed as follows: 
Yit = α+βMi,t + θINSTit + μi,t,   for i=1,2……….N,t =1,2…………..Ti                           (3.13)    
Where Y is the dependent variable (defined as VC investments funds raised/early stage 
investments), M is a matrix of macroeconomic variables such as gross domestic product (GDP), 
interest rate, stock market capitalization, stock traded value, unemployment rate, profit and 
capital gains taxes, scientific and technical journal articles, etc. The INST variable is the pointer 
equal to institutional quality, αi is the unobserved country-specific fixed effect, and μi,t is the 
error term for each observation. 
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3.7.2 Estimation Strategy    
There are three ways to estimate a static panel data model. The choice of these three methods 
depends on whether the individual cross-section effects are regarded as constant, fixed or 
random. However, it must be said that the choice of model is not arbitrary as a statistical test 
must be applied to choose the appropriate model that is more consistent and efficient in 
analyzing a given dataset. For this reason, all three models, namely the pooled OLS model, 
Fixed Effect and Random Effect models will be estimated, and then the necessary tests applied 
before choosing the appropriate model.  
 
(i) Pooled OLS regression  
We first run Pooled OLS regression which will provide reliable and competent estimates of the 
homogenous intercept and slope. The good thing about the Pooled OLS model is that it is not 
difficult to assess since one can take all of the data and compute an OLS regression model. 
Nonetheless, the notion that the unit-specific effects are not different in Pooled OLS makes it 
very restrictive and usually unrealistic (Wooldridge, 2003). Baum (2006) argued that Pooled 
OLS regression can have a complex error procedure such as heteroscedasticity across panel 
data, serial correlation. Due to its severe limitations, the decision was to consider only FE or 
RE models in this study. The Pooled OLS regression model is formulated as follows:  
                                           Yit = β0 + β1 + Xit + β2Zit + uit                                         (3.14) 
Where i is the entities and t is the period, X is a vector of venture capital investments variables, 
and Z is a vector of control variables, while uit and the coefficients represent the inherent 
unexplained variation (error) represented by β. In this study, the pooled OLS regression model 
is used if all 150 observations are pooled together and treated as if there is no difference 
between the estimated cross-sections (countries), based on the assumption that the dataset is a 
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prior homogeneous one (Asterious and Hall, 2006). However, this could only be used for 
studies where differences among individuals or objects within the investigated group are 
overlooked, which is not the case in this study. Even though this study investigates the 
determinants of venture capital investments in Ghana, there may be country-specific factors 
that play a role within this study, which suggests that differences between countries should be 
included as dummy variables.  
 
(ii) Fixed Effects model 
The Fixed Effects model is also identified as the least squares dummy variables (LSDV) model, 
where each entity control variables are constant over time but differ across entities (Stock and 
Watson, 2015). Further, the model permits for different constants for each group, which allows 
a dummy variable to be involved in the group. An assumption of the Fixed Effects (FE) model 
is that the coefficients slope is constant for all countries; however, the intercept differs across 
entities. As contended by Greene (2003), the design of the FE model assumes that variances 
across unit can be netted by differences in the constant term. In a fixed effects model, the error 
term is perceived as an unknown parameter to be estimated. According to Baltagi (2005), the 
fixed effects model is a suitable specification provided it concentrates on a precise set of (N) 
countries or regions. One advantage of the fixed effects model is that it is not required to assume 
the effects are autonomous of (εit) since it permits the ignored individual effects to be related 
to the variables included. The weakness of the fixed effects model is that it cannot assess the 
influence of any variable, which is time invariant. Hence, any time-invariant variable is erased 
by the aberrations from means transformation. Additionally, the fixed effects model drawback 
is the loss of a huge degree of freedom due in estimating (N-1) additional parameters. 
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Furthermore, many dummies might escalate multicollinearity among the regressors. The fixed 
effects model is denoted as:  
                   Yit = β0 Xit + Vi + εit                                                                                 (3.15) 
Whereas vi is the unobservable country-specific influences which vary between countries and 
are time-invariant. We run the fixed effect model in our study. The results of the model 
coefficients and its significant p-value will demonstrate the relationship between our dependent 
variable and independent variables. 
 
(iii) Random Effects model  
The Random Effects (RE) estimator seems to be more efficient than the Fixed Effects (FE) 
estimator on the assumption that the firm’s impact is distributed randomly across firms. µi or 
µi + λt is uncorrelated with Xit under the RE assumptions. Consequently, the GLS estimator of 
Balestra and Nerlove (1966) could be adopted. The RE model is a suitable specification if (N) 
cross-sectional units are randomly selected from a huge population.  One merit as argued by 
Owusu-Gyapong (1986) and Greene (1997) is that the GLS estimator is a weighted average 
within-group and between-group estimator, which permits the investigator to obtain evidence 
from the two variations. However, the weakness of the random effects model is that one should 
make specific hypotheses about the form of relationship between the impacts and explanatory 
variables involved (Hsiao 2003). The random effects model is given as follows: 
                                    Yit = βit Xit + vi + εit                                                                         (3.16)            
Whereas vi is between country error and ℇ it is within-country error. Accordingly, vi are 
presumed to be random variables and that Cov(Xit vi) = 0. But if Cov(Xit vi) ≠0 the random 
effect estimator is biased. Hence the Hausman specification test will be used to determine 
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which of these two models is appropriate. We also run the random effect model to ascertain the 
relationship between our dependent variable and explanatory variables.  
 
(iv) Hausman test 
To choose between the FE and RE estimation methods, Hausman (1978) proposes a 
misspecification test which enables it to compare random effects estimates with fixed effects 
estimates to determine if significant differences occur. The two estimators are consistent and 
should meet the true parameter values in a large sample if there is no correlation between the 
individual differences υit and covariates variables. The RE estimator is not consistent if υit is 
related with any of the explanatory variables, whereas the fixed effects estimator remains 
consistent.  Five percent critical value at significance level is used to establish whether the null 
hypothesis of no correlation should be rejected, which means the RE model is ineffective and 
a fixed effects estimator should be adopted. The null hypothesis states that the individual-
specific effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, which means the RE model is 
consistent. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the fixed effects model should be used. In this 
study, we run the Hausman test to determine whether the FE or RE model is the appropriate 
model to be used. The results of the Hausman test will enable us to choose between the fixed 
and random models. 
 
(V) Multicollinearity test 
The problem of multicollinearity appears if two or more variables are highly correlated which 
might affect the estimation of the regression parameters (Hair et al., 2009). High correlation is 
problematic as it renders it difficult to separate the effects of two (or more) variables. Gujarati 
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(2003) illustrates that the existence of multicollinearity makes the assessment and the 
hypothesis testing about regression coefficients indeterminate. The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) is usually used to identify the presence of multicollinearity. We test for multicollinearity 
in all the regression models using the variance inflation factor (VIF) method and tolerance 
indices (Fox, 1991). As a rule of thumb, a maximum VIF of 10 or more is an indication of the 
presence of multicollinearity (Salkind & Rasmussen, 2007). If the VIF is bigger than 10 this 
indicates there is a problem with multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
(vi) Heteroscedasticity test  
We test for the presence of heteroscedasticity in our models by using the Breusch-Pagan test. 
Heteroscedasticity refers to the condition in which the variability of a variable (standard errors) 
is unequal across the range of the predicted value of the DV (Salkind & Rasmussen, 2007). 
The Pagan/Godfrey test is employed to assess for the presence of heteroscedasticity (Breusch, 
& Pagan, 1979; White, 1980).  
 
 (vii) Wooldridge Test 
Finally, we test for serial correlation, since serial correlation in panel data analysis biases our 
model and causes the results to be inefficient. The existence of serial correlation shows that the 
variables in the model contravene the assumptions of the regression (Anderson et al., 2007). 
The results from the Wooldridge test will enable us to determine whether there is a serial 
correlation in the study. 
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3.7.3 Implementation of panel data analysis 
The present study conducts fixed-effect and random-effect regression to examine the country-
level predictors of the influence of venture capital investment activity. The panel data consists 
of observations from 15 African countries. Using the panel data technique, we  estimate the 
effects of eight independent variables (GDP growth rate, market capitalization, the stock 
traded, interest rate, unemployment rate, capital gains taxes, scientific and journal articles, and 
index of economic freedom and a dummy variable on the dependent variable (Gros Capital 
Formation).  
 
The model is given as follows: 
GCF,t = α + β1GDPi,t +β2INTi,t + β3INFi,t + β4UMPi,t + β5MCAPi,t + β6STOi,t + β7CAPit 
+β8IEFi,t+DVi,t + uit + DV                                                                                                          (3.17) 
Equation (3.16) i is used to index the countries and t is used to index time.  
 
3.7. 4 Variables used for the Panel Data Analysis 
Dependent variable 
Venture capital investment activity is the dependent variable. This study adopted gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF) as a substitute for venture capital investment activity. This is similar 
to gross capital formation used by Scherlter (2003) in her study on determinants of private 
equity in Europe. Scherlter (2003) argued that since Europe differs in size, she scaled venture 
capital investment either by gross domestic product or gross capital formation. While gross 
domestic product approximates the overall size of a country’s economy, capital formation is 
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used to approximate capital endowment.  Capital endowment is a better measure to scale 
venture capital activity because of the component of venture capital. 
 
Independent Variables 
Economic growth: (GDP) According to the literature, economic growth is expressed as Gross 
Domestic Product growth in real terms. Several studies have shown a positive correlation 
between private equity investments and economic growth. Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
confirmed the positive impact of GDP on the development of venture capital in the U.S. 
Romain and van de la Potterie (2004) concluded that venture capital/private equity activity is 
significantly related to GDP growth. Félix et al. (2007) established GDP to be a significant 
driver of the venture capital market in Europe. In this study, we test the hypothesis that 
economic growth significantly and positively influences the venture capital investment 
activity. Based on the literature findings, we expect that economic growth will have a positive 
and significant influence on venture capital activity.  
Interest rate :( lending interest rate) Romain and de La Potteria (2004) proposed long-term 
and short-term interest rates as the critical factors in the evolution of venture capital. Félix et 
al. (2007) confirmed that long-term interest rates statistically and positively affect the evolution 
of venture capital. We test the hypothesis that a high-interest rate is negatively and significantly 
related to venture capital investment activity.  
Unemployment rate :(Proxy for labour market ridigities) (defined as total unemployment 
in percentage of the total labour force).Félix et al. (2007) show unemployment rate is a 
macroeconomic indicator, which negatively affects the private equity investments in Europe. 
However, Black and Gilson (1998) believe that labour market restrictions affect venture 
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capital/private equity investments. We test the hypothesis that unemployment rate is negatively 
and significantly related to venture capital investment activity. 
Market Capitalization & Stock Traded Value: Félix et al. (2007) confirmed that market 
capitalization is a significant driver of venture capital markets in Europe. Jeng and Wells (2000) 
considered the number of IPOs as a driver for the private equity market and argued that an 
increase in this variable reflects a dynamic stock market, which can provide exciting 
opportunities to disinvest for the private equity funds. The authors claimed that the number of 
IPOs is the most critical driver for the venture capital funds to allocate additional resources for 
this sector. We assume a positive and significant association between the development of 
venture capital investments and the size of the stock market represented by the indicators of 
market capitalization and the stock traded in absolute terms. Based on the literature findings, 
we expect that market capitalization and the stock traded significantly correlate to venture 
capital investment activity. We test the hypothesis that market capitalization and stock traded 
are positively and significantly associated with venture capital investment activity  
Inflation rate: Inflation rate is the percentage change in the GDP deflator. Inflation has a 
negative and insignificant correlation with venture capital growth since higher inflation may be 
related with lower rates of return on investments comprising venture capital, which makes 
venture capital less attractive (Stimel, 2012). Venture capital is a replacement for other forms 
of financing such as bank loans or credit (see Berger and Schaeck, 2011). We test the 
hypothesis that a high inflation rate is negatively and significantly related to venture capital 
investment activity. 
Capital gains taxes: The influence of a capital gains tax has been investigated in the literature. 
Poterba (1989) found that a reduction in the capital gains tax rate might increase commitments 
to venture capital funds through an increase in the demand for venture capital. Gompers and 
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Lerner (1998) argued that changes in tax rate affect the demand for venture funds, a capital 
gains tax decrease would increase the capital committed by both tax-exempt and tax-sensitive 
investors. We test the hypothesis that a reduction in capital gains tax is positively and 
significantly related to increases in venture capital investment activity.  
Scientific and Technical Journal Articles published: ( Substitute for R&D expenditure) 
Researchers have shown that investment in scientific and industrial academic R&D expenditure 
can stimulate human capital endowment, and is highly correlated with VC investment 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Schertler 2003). Gompers and Lerner (1998) showed that 
scientific and industrial journal article publications and R&D expenditure significantly 
correlates with private equity/venture capital investment activity. Megginson (2003) 
highlighted that countries with growing R&D, especially universities and laboratories are 
essential for the capital industry risk. We test the hypothesis that scientific and technical journal 
articles which are a component of R&D are positively and significantly correlated to venture 
capital investment activity. 
Index of Economic Freedom: (Institutional factors): To evaluate the importance of public 
institutions as a determinant of European venture capital investment in Europe, Cherif and 
Gazdar (2011) used the index of economic freedom from the heritage foundation (1995-2007) 
as an indicator of institutional quality. The composite index is a simple average of 10 individual 
freedoms, each of which is vital to the development of personal and national prosperity. Beach 
and Kane (2007) have defined each of the 10 Economic Freedoms (see Beach and Kane, 2007). 
Cherif and Gazdar (2011) established that the index of economic freedom has significant and 
positive effects on VC funds raised which signify that the institutional environment affects 
funds raised in Europe. La Port et al. (1997, 1998) also highlighted that the quality of a 
country’s legal system facilitates a more favourable environment to induce venture capitalists 
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to invest. We test the hypothesis that the quality of institutions represented by an index of 
economic freedom positively and significantly affects venture capital investment activity. 
Dummy Variable which takes on the value 1, otherwise zero is included to account for the 
effects on Ghana. 
 
 
3.8 Determinants of SMEs Owners’ Accessibility to Venture Capital Financing 
3.8.1 Empirical framework 
For many individuals the choice of commodities and services is discrete, and the traditional 
demand theory has to be altered to investigate such a choice (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; 
Gracia and Magistris, 2008, Train, 2003). Models for determining discrete choices such as 
SME owners’ decision to access venture capital financing or not is called a qualitative choice 
model. The choice to access or not access venture capital falls into the qualitative choice 
framework. If the random term has a logistic distribution, then the decision represents a 
standard binary logit model. However, if it is assumed that the random term is normal, the 
model becomes the binary probit model (Maddala, 1993; Greene, 2000). Several studies (see 
Cox, Hand and Herzberg, 2005 and Horowitz and Savin, 2001) have showed that the logit and 
probit analyses are the most widely used methods for estimating the effects of the variation of 
attributes of individual decision makers on two different choices. In determining this of these 
two models to use, a convenience and common choice should be employed. However, Hosmer 
and Lemeshew (1989) recommend that the logistic regression model (LRM) is easy and 
flexible to use and provides meaningful interpretation. Owing to the benefits possessed by the 
logit model such as approximating the normal distribution quite well and analytical 
convenience, logit models always outdo probit models in predicting choice probabilities (Ruiz-
Tagle, 2005; Stock and Watson, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Based on the mixed 
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results of previous studies that have included the variables of interest here and the exploratory 
nature of this study, the simplicity of the logit procedure is a more suitable fit. The logit model 
is estimated by the maximum likelihood method used in the STATA 13 software. 
 
 
3.8.2 Estimation technique: 
The equation for the logit model is given as follows (Gujarati, 1995): 
VC access (is a binary choice that takes one if SMEs received VC funding, otherwise, zero) = 
f (owners’ characteristics, firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors).       (3.18)                                       
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Where iY  equal 1 if SMEs access venture capital; 0 if SMEs do not access venture capital 
 (SMEs’ access to venture capital is measured by the rounds of financing and amount of funds 
raised). 
       iP  is the likelihood of proxy variable iY =1 (access venture capital) and (1 )iP  is the 
probability of iY =0, 
       ijX are entrepreneurs’ characteristics (such as age, gender, ethnicity, education level, and 
work experience and business plan), firms’ characteristics (such as ownership type, sector 
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(agriculture, manufacturing or services), firm size, firm age, (number of full time employees), 
geographical location and macroeconomic factors (interest rate) and government policies (such 
as taxes and subsidies) and network characteristics (such as networks with banks, government 
officials, suppliers, customers and social organizations and businesses). 
j  are parameters to be estimated, 
ij  is the stochastic term, 
log
1
i
i
P
P
 
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   is termed the log-odds ratio that is the logarithm of the odds. 
Equation (3.12) can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method. The log-likelihood 
function for the model is given as: 
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3.8.3 Explanatory Variables 
Dependent variable: 
The dependent variable for the logit model is dichotomous in nature showing SMEs’ owners 
access to venture capital financing, because there is no direct measurement of venture capital 
accessibility, the ‘accessibility’ is measured by using observation on SMEs owners, such as 
‘SMEs owners who received venture capital financing’ and ‘SMEs owners who did not receive 
venture capital financing”. This is in line with past studies which used formal and informal 
borrowing as accessibility to credit (see Mohamed, 2003; Ravi, 2003).  
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Independent Variables 
Gender (-): 
A study by Chaganti et al., (2005) indicates that female-led businesses prefer internal financing 
to external financing as compared to male-led businesses. Watson (2006) points out that female 
owners are less likely to use debt capital compared to male owners. Coleman and Cohn (2000) 
and Carter and Rosa (1998) also indicated that a manager’s gender might impact the capital 
structure and a firm’s financing decision. Further, Scott and Irwin (2009) determined that 
owner-managers’ characteristics including gender have an effect on the use of external advice 
and, in turn, would reduce their difficulties. We test the hypothesis that female SME owners 
are negatively and significantly correlated with accessing venture capital financing.  
 
Age (-/+): 
The variable age means the age of the SME owner/manager running the business as it shows 
the ability of the owner/manager to establish and finance a business. Carter and Rosa, (1998) 
claimed that the SME owner/manager’s age seems to be a significant factor in explaining a 
firm’s financing decision where younger owners/managers tend to have significantly lower 
start-up capital than older managers. Similarly, Wu et al., (2008) found a relationship between 
managers’ ages and business financing and concluded that middle aged managers have better 
knowledge of the financial market and are more likely to take advantage of bank financing. 
Vos et al., (2007), however, detected similar yet contrasting results where older SME 
owners/managers are less likely to seek or use external financing, while younger managers are 
found to use external financing actively. Again, Coleman, (2004) argued that younger SME 
owners/managers are considered risk-averse and therefore are willing to access external 
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financing. In this study, the age of SME owners/managers is hypothesized to be negatively 
correlated with obtaining venture capital financing. 
 
Marital Status: 
Marital status is a dummy variable indicating whether the SME owner/manager is single or 
married. Marriage often refers to maturity and responsibility. We test the hypothesis that a 
married SME owner/manager is less likely to take a risk than a single manager who is more 
willing to engage in risky projects. For example, Cohn et al., (1975) found that individuals that 
are married allocate a small proportion of wealth to risky assets. Also, Hartog et al., (2000) 
found married individuals were less risk tolerant than singles. 
 
Educational background (+): 
Regarding SME owner/managers’ education, Zhang (2008) reveals that an entrepreneur with 
better formal education is more likely to employ formal financing. Similarly, managers with 
higher educational attainment are also found to be more likely to take advantage of bank 
financing (Wu et al., 2008). The SME owner’s level of education also increases the probability 
of access to credit. This is because highly qualified owners/managers of SMEs are more 
efficient in their work and moreover, providers of funds have more confidence in those with 
higher academic qualifications than those with lower levels of qualification (Berger and Udell, 
2006). Parker (2004) argues that SME managers’ access to finance is linked to education and 
training since education and training are related to knowledge, skills and problem-solving 
ability to exploit opportunities. Irwin and Scott (2010) note that the more educated 
entrepreneurs are more likely to present positive information and businesses plans, and 
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therefore are more likely to receive loans from banks. Also, a study by Sena et al., (2012) 
determined that although not statistically significant, educational qualifications have a positive 
relationship with the use of external financing. In this study, educational background of SME 
owners/managers is hypothesized to be positively and significantly correlated to access to 
venture capital financing. 
 
Experience (+): 
Experience and managerial competency of SMEs owners/managers imply the quality of human 
capital would possibly assist negotiations with financial providers of credit. (Ahmed & Hamid, 
2011). Financial providers believe that SME owners /managers are more likely to have the 
knowledge and skills to manage their businesses and thus lessen the risk of default (Bukvic and 
Barnett, 2003). Borgia and Newman (2012) found that owner-managers’ experience is 
significantly and positively related to the level of firm leverage. In this study, SME 
owners/managers’ experience is hypothesized to be positively and significantly related to 
access to venture capital financing. 
 
Firm Age (+): 
Firm age refers to the date of incorporation or registration. In this present study, firm age is 
hypothesized to be positively and significantly related to access to venture capital financing. 
Most empirical studies find a positive relation between firm age and the probability of 
obtaining finance (Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2001). There is some 
evidence in the literature that younger firms grow more quickly; see for example Jovanovich 
(1982), Coad et al. (2014) and Haltiwanger et al. (2013). They may also find it more 
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challenging to secure external finance because of the lack of track records and the lack of 
security guarantees which they are required to provide. 
 
Firm Size: 
Smaller firms may have more potential for growth, but their access to external finance may 
also be more constrained: see for example Rahaman (2011), Du and Girma (2012), and Kim et 
al. (2016). Evidence from most empirical studies show that firm size is a significant factor that 
influences their ability to obtain external finance (Abor & Biekpe, 2005; Berger and Udell, 
1998; Coleman, 2004; Coleman and Cohn, 2000). Pendula (2011) showed that small firms are 
more credit constrained than large firms’ due to their inability to provide financial information 
requested by the financial institutions for screening and in most cases, they lack audited 
financial statements. Vos et al. (2004) argue that more prominent SMEs have more alternative 
sources of funds because they usually have superior track records to convince prospective 
creditors and investors for loan approval. We test the hypothesis that firm size is positively 
correlated to access to venture capital financing. 
 
Legal Status: 
 The legal or ownership structure of a business is anticipated to affect its ability to obtain 
external financing (Binks & Ennew, 1997; Meritte, 1998; Barlow & Robson, 1999). SME 
owners/managers may face difficulties when attempting to obtain finance as financial providers 
and investors are more likely to prefer to finance incorporated firms. Mac a Bhaird and Lucy, 
(2006) pointed out that ownership structure of SMEs is negatively connected to external equity 
and positively related to internal equity. In this study, the legal status of an SME 
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owner/manager’s firm is hypothesized to be positively and significantly correlated to access to 
venture capital financing. 
 
Sector: (+) 
SMEs operate in different sectors such as manufacturing, construction, wholesale and retailing, 
agriculture, and services. Several studies proved that factors linked to the industry or sector in 
which a firm operates also explain its capital structure and financial decisions 
(Mackay&Philips, 2005; Michaels, Chittenden & Poutziouris, 1999). Abor (2007) 
demonstrated that SMEs in the agricultural industry had robust capital and asset structures 
while those in the wholesale and retail industry showed the weakest asset structures as well as 
debt ratios. We test the hypothesis that SME managers operating in the 
manufacturing/construction sector are positively and significantly correlated to obtaining 
venture capital financing.  
 
Location: (+) 
Most studies have found that SME managers in the urban areas are more likely to obtain credit 
than those of SMEs located in rural areas. Ahmed and Hamid (2011) found that firms situated 
in metropolitan cities have a higher probability of obtaining credit compared to those in the 
rural areas.  Sorenson and Stuart (2001) also found that VC firms are more likely to find 
entrepreneurs located within a short geographical distance from where they are based. In this 
study, geographical location of the firm is also hypothesized to be positively and significantly 
correlated to SME managers’ ability to obtain venture capital financing. 
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Business plan: (+) 
A business plan is one of the most critical factors in deciding financial assistance by most banks 
as it is considered the critical document needed to assess the success or prospect of an 
applicant’s project. Delmar and Shane (2003) found a positive correlation between venture 
capital financing outcomes and a business plan. In this study, we test the hypothesis that there 
is a positive and significant correlation between SME owners’ business plans and their ability 
to access venture capital financing. 
 
Social Networking: (+) 
 Kenia, Atieno (2009) pointed out that linkages with financial institutions enable enterprises to 
access financial services. Networks with creditors, contacts with other enterprises and business 
groups also help to promote access to financial services (Atieno, 2009). Sengupta’s (2011) 
study shows that investors not only rely on a firm’s creditworthiness to finance venture capital 
or give a referral to someone else, but trustworthiness also plays an important role. We test the 
hypothesis that an SME owner/manager’s social networking is positive and significantly 
related to his or ability to obtain venture capital financing. 
 
Interest rate Charge: (-) 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) claimed interest rate is likely to affect the supply of venture capital. 
If interest rates rise, the attraction for Venture Capitalists to invest in VC funds declines, and 
this therefore will decrease the willingness of VC investors to supply VC funds. Amonoo et al. 
(2003) also indicated that there is a negative relationship between interest rates and demand 
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for loans. This study hypothesizes that high-interest charges are negatively and significantly 
related to the SME owner/manager’s ability to access venture capital financing. 
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Chapter 4 
Results and Findings 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 provides the descriptive statistics of the survey data, panel data and the empirical 
results. Section 4.2 presents the SME firms’ characteristics and socio-economic profiles of the 
respondents (i.e., SME owners/managers). Section 4.3 discusses the propensity score matching 
and difference-in-difference estimation results on the effects of venture capital funding on 
SMEs’ growth in Ghana. Section 4.4 discusses the results of the macroeconomic and 
institutional determinants of venture capital investment activity based on static panel data. 
Section 4.5 presents the results of the factors that influence SME managers’ accessibility to 
venture capital financing based on the logistic regression model. 
 
4.2 Profile of Respondents 
4.2.1 Sample Distribution 
The study sample was selected based on the purposive sampling technique from a list of SMEs 
who are members of the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) located in the Accra and Tema 
Metropolitan Areas in the Greater Accra Region. A large proportion of the sample was obtained 
from Accra which is the capital city, 73.8% respondents were from Accra, and 26.2% were 
from Tema. The sample size was based on Cochrane’s (1999) sample size calculation (See 
Appendix A). During the survey development process, contacts were made to 600 respondents 
who were willing to participate in the survey, and 400 responses were received, but 15 
responses were discarded due to incomplete responses. Thus, our response rate was estimated 
at 67.0%. The useable questionnaires consist of 385 responses, 65 (16.9%) VC-backed SMEs 
and 320 (83.1%) Non-VC backed SMEs. We could not obtain a balanced sample size for the 
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VC- backed SMEs and Non-VC backed SMEs. Ideally, we would wish to have obtained a 
sample distribution of equal proportion. However, Smith (1997) argued that the ultimate goal 
of matching in observation data is to come up with a control group that has zero comparison 
bias, not just similar numbers. The author gives an example where matching is more efficient 
than multiple regression when the treated group N1(39) is much smaller than the control group 
N0 (5053). Further, we take the example of Rosenbaum and Robin (1985). In a Danish study 
to evaluate the impact of prenatal exposure to an organic acid on the psychological 
development of children, the treated group took 221 exposed children and the control group 
7027 unexposed children. 
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 Table 4.1: Sample distribution by geographical area   
Source: Survey data based on the author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VC-backed SMEs          Non-VC backed SMEs         Total 
Study Area Count= 65                     Count = 320 Count = 385   
Accra   43(66.2%) 241(75.3%)   284(73.8%) 
Tema   22(33.8.8%) 79(24.7%) 101(26.2%) 
Total           65(100%) 320(100%) 385(100%)                             
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The geographical distribution of the respondents in Table 4.1 shows that the sample SMEs are 
in two metropolises (Accra-Tema) in the Greater Accra region which are both commercial and 
industrial centres where most SMEs are located. The larger proportion of respondents are from 
Accra with 284 SMEs (73.8%) comprising 43 (66.2%) VC-backed SMEs and 241 (75.3%) 
Non-VC backed SMEs.  The SMEs in Tema consist of 101 (26.2%) comprising 22 (33.8%) 
VC-backed SMEs and 79 (24.7%) Non-VC backed SMEs. 
4.2.2 Firms’ Characteristics 
The surveyed SMEs have a wide range of business experience based on the number of years 
the firm has been operating since its incorporation at the time of the survey. The size of the 
firm is represented by the total number of employees. Table 4.2 shows 6 (9.2%) VC-backed 
SME managers have 2-3 years of experience compared to 62 (19.4%) Non-VC backed SME 
managers. Furthermore, 40 (61.5%) VC-backed SME managers have 3-4 years of working 
experience, while 219 (68.4%) Non-VC- backed SME managers have 3-4 years of working 
experience. 19 (29.29%) VC- backed SME managers have 5-6 years of working experience, 
while 39 (12.2%) Non-VC backed SMEs managers have 5-6 years of working experience. A 
chi-square of 13.947 at the 1% significance level suggests that there is a significant difference 
between the working experience of VC-backed SME managers and Non-VC backed managers. 
Table 4.2 also shows 32 (49.2%) VC-backed SMEs are small-sized enterprises compared to 
234 (73.1%) Non-VC backed SMEs. Furthermore, 33 (50.8%) VC-backed SMEs are medium-
sized enterprises compared to 86 (26.9%) Non-VC backed SMEs. A chi-square of 14.444 at 
the 1% significance level suggests that VC-backed SMEs and Non-VC backed SMEs are 
significantly different in terms of size. In other words, venture-backed SMEs measured by the 
number of employees are significantly different from those of non-venture-backed SMEs. 
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Table 4.2: SMEs firm-size and experience 
SME owners 
Experience 
(years) 
VC-backed 
SMEs 
Non-VC 
backed SMEs 
Total t-test 
 Count =65                      Count=320                     Count=385                 2=13.947*** 
 
2-3 years                           6 (9.2%)                     62 (19.4%)                      68 (17%)  
3-4 years 40 (61.5%) 219 (68.4%) 259 (67.3%)  
5-6 years 19 (29.2.9%) 39 (12.2%)                    58 (15.1%)         
Firm Size VC-backed 
SMEs 
Non-VC 
backed SMEs 
Total t-test 
 Count= (65) Count= (320) Count= (385 2 = 14.444*** 
 
6-29 Employees 32 (49.2%) 234 (73.1%) 266 (69.1%)  
30-99 Employees 33 (50.8%) 86 (26.9%) 119 (30.9%)  
Expected Count 65 (100%) 320 (100%) 385 (100%)  
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 4.3: Sector in which surveyed SMEs operate 
Sector VC backed 
SMEs 
Non-VC 
backed SMEs 
Total T-test 
 Count=65 Count=350 Count=385 2 =2.018 
Manufacturing/Construction 10(15.4%) 57(17.8%) 67(17.4%)  
Wholesale/Retail trade 20(30.8%) 105(32.8%) 125(32.5%)  
Agriculture 19(29.29%) 103(32.2%) 122(31.7%)  
Service 16(24.6%) 55(17.2%) 71(18.4%)  
Expected Count 65(100%) 320(100%) 385(100%)  
Source: Survey data based on the author’s calculation. 
Notes *, **, *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.3 shows 15.4% of the VC-backed SMEs operate in the manufacturing/construction 
sector compared to 17.8% of the Non-VC backed SMEs. Furthermore, 30.8% of the VC-backed 
SMEs operate in the Wholesale/Retail trade sector compared to 32.8% of Non-VC backed 
SMEs, followed by 29.2% VC-backed SMEs in the Agricultural sector, compared to 32.2% of 
Non-VC backed SMEs. According to our survey report, 24.6%VC-backed SMEs are engaged 
in the Service sector compared to 17.2% of Non-VC backed SMEs. The Chi-squared test of 
2.018 at the 10% significance level shows significant difference in relationship between VC-
backed SMEs and Non-VC backed SMEs in the industry or sector in which they operate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
Table 4.4: Profile of SME owners 
Owners’ Profile VC-backed SMEs Non-VC backed SMEs All t-test 
Owners’ Gender Count=65 Count=320 Count=385  
Male 
Female 
58 (89.2%) 
7 (10.8%) 
210 (65.6%) 
110 (34.4%) 
268 (69.6%) 
117 (30.4%) 
2 = 14.231*** 
 
Owners’ Age     
25-30   0 (0%) 8 (2.5%) 8 (2.5%)   2 = 13.295*** 
 
31-39 5 (7.7%) 42 (13.1%) 47 (12.2%)  
40-49 33 (50.8%) 202 (63.1%) 235 (61.0%)  
50-59 27 (41.5%)   68 (21.3%) 95 (24.7%) 
 
 
Educational Attainment                     
Primary education or less 0 (0.0%) 11 (3.43%) 11 (3.43%) 2   = 8.221*** 
 
Secondary education 5 (7.7%) 260(81.25%) 265 (68.83%)  
Post-Secondary 
education 
60 (92.3%) 49 (15.31%) 109 (28.31%)  
Income     
$12,000 1 (1.5%) 37 (11.6%) 38 (9.9%) 
 
2 = 54.825 
 
$18,000 7 (10.8%) 103 (32.2%) 110 (28.6%)  
$20,000 26 (40.0%) 143 (44.7%) 169 (43.9%)  
$50,000 or More 20 (30.8%) 26 (8.1%) 46 (11.9%) 
 
 
Total 65 (100) 320 (100) 385 (100)  
Source: Survey data based on the author’s calculation 
Notes *, **, *** denote 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.4 shows 7 (10.8%) of VC-backed SMEs are female compared to 58 (89.2%) of VC-
backed SMEs, while 110 (34.4%) of Non-VC backed SMEs are females compared to 210 
(65.6%) of Non-VC backed SMEs. The Chi-squared test of 14.231 is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. 
The age of the respondents’ ranges from 25-59 years old and the mean age of the sample 
respondent is 32 years old. When grouped into different age categories, more than half (50.8%) 
of VC-backed SMEs owners fall into the 40-49 years old category, while the majority (63.1%) 
of Non-VC backed SMEs owners are in the 40-49 years old category. The mean ages of the 
VC-backed SME owners and Non-VC backed SME owners are different. The chi-squared test 
of 13.295 is statistically significant at the 1% level and shows a significant correlation in the 
age of the SME owners/managers. The annual income of SME owners is divided into four 
levels (see Table 4.4).  
Furthermore, in terms of educational attainment, Table 4.4 shows that 11 (3.43%) of Non-VC 
backed SMEs owners have Primary education or less, while none of the VC-backed SMEs 
owners have any education. A total of 260 (81.25%) Non-VC backed SMEs owners have 
Secondary education compared to 5(7.7%) VC-backed SMEs owners with Secondary 
education. The table also shows that 49 (15.31%) Non-VC backed SMEs owners have Post-
Secondary education while 60 (92.3%) VC-backed SMEs owners have Post-Secondary 
education. The chi-squared test of 8.221 is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Table 4.4 shows only 1 (1.5%) VC-backed SME owner earned an income level of $12,000 per 
annum, compared to 37 (11.6%) Non-VC backed SME owners.  The mean annual income of 
the VC-backed SME owners is $35,076 while the mean annual income of the Non-VC backed 
SME owners is $25,968.  
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Finally, in terms of working experience, Table 4.2 reports 6 (9.2%) VC-backed SME owners 
have 2-3 years of working experience, while 62 (19.4%) Non-VC backed SME owners have 
2-3 years of working experience. The result also shows 40 (61.5%) VC- backed SME owners 
have 4-5 years of working experience and 219 (68.4%) Non-VC backed SME owners have 3-
4 years of working experience. Further, 19 (29.29%) VC-backed SME owners have 5-6 years 
of working experience, while 39 (12.2%) Non-VC backed SME owners have 5-6 years of 
working experience. On the average, VC-backed SMEs owners have 3.2 years of working 
experience compared to an average of 2.9 years of working experience of the Non-VC backed 
SME Owners. The chi-square test of 13.947 at the 1% significance level shows that working 
experience between VC-backed SMEs and Non-VC backed SMEs is significantly different. 
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4.3 Impact of Venture Capital Financing on SMEs’ Growth in Ghana. 
To examine the effect of VC financing on SMEs’ growth in Ghana, data was gathered in Accra 
and Tema Metropolises between June and September 2016, in the Greater Accra Region of 
Ghana. The survey respondents were mainly SME owners who operate in the Accra-Tema 
Metropolitan Areas. To use matching methods, consideration was given to collecting data from 
SMEs owners who receive VC funding (treated groups) and those that do not receive VC 
funding (control groups). The essence of the impact assessment is to compare the outcomes of 
VC-backed SMEs - the treated group with the control group - Non-VC backed SMEs. The 
treated group is the target group and selection of the target group is based on the venture capital 
funds received. The control group includes Non-VC backed SMEs who did not receive any 
form of VC funding. Describing the control group as those who had never received VC 
financing, at the time of the survey, but would have received VC financing later under a time-
invariant condition offers a better measurement for the impact estimator (Sianesi, 2004). The 
comparison is between the VC-backed SMEs and the Non-VC backed SMEs who did not 
receive VC funding but would have received it in the next period. Furthermore, the study 
sample includes SME owners who qualified for venture capital financing. This method 
selection of respondents maximises the possibility of collecting data that shows accessibility 
to venture capital is highly associated with the observed factors. Given the self-selection bias 
that is likely to affect our sample, the observed bias due to self-selection can be controlled by 
using the available observed factors.  However, selection bias is possible in the venture capital 
financing programme due to unobserved factors. For example, SME managers with political 
connections or religious affiliations are likely to receive preferential treatment in getting 
venture capital funding. This unobserved factor not only biases the prediction of obtaining 
venture capital financing but also leads to bias in the impact evaluation of the venture capital 
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scheme on the SMEs’ outcomes such as sales and employment growth. Since such SMEs can 
earn additional income that significantly improves their sales or employment levels, this 
unobserved bias should be netted out in a programme impact evaluation. Treatment of the 
unobserved bias in venture capital financing evaluation is beyond non-experiment data, 
especially cross-sectional data. Due to individual heterogeneity and time-varying effects, one 
cannot construct the counterfactual for the treatment object to yield an unbiased comparison. 
Nevertheless, minimising the bias from unobserved factors can be attained by using before-
treatment variables of interest data in a cross-sectional data study (Lee, 2005). 
To measure the sales and employment impact of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth, 
this section uses annual sales and number of employees in a one-year period before the impact 
assessment to test if there is a relationship between the before-treatment outcome and factors 
that are unobserved based on factors observed. The unobserved factors can be controlled by 
using the pre-treatment outcome as the observed explanatory variable in the model, based on 
the assumption that the unobserved factor is a time-invariant effect on the outcome (Mosley, 
1997). Hence, the pre-treatment data of SMEs’ annual sales and number of employees are used 
in the estimation of impact to control for unobserved bias. 
4.3.1 Estimation Strategies 
The PSM method is used to obtain the coefficient of the average effect of treatment in the 
treated venture capital financing of SMEs. 𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑀         
𝐴𝑇𝑇 is given as 
𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑀         
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = E(Y1|X, D=1)- Ex(Y0|X0|X, D=0)                                                             (4.1) 
Where Y is the outcome of interest, i.e., SMEs’ annual sales and the number of employees 
(measured in thousands of dollars and number of persons respectively). 
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D is programme participation; D = 1 if an SME is a programme participant; 0 otherwise. X is 
a vector of predictor of the observed factors plus the SMEs owners’ features (such as age, 
gender, ethnicity, whether married, education), and the firms’ characteristics (firm age, firm 
size, legal status, and sector). Also, the pre-treatment SMEs’ annual sales and the number of 
employees in 2013 are also involved in the predictor to elucidate the programme impact 
estimator for each outcome of interest. The choice of the predictors to control for individual 
heterogeneity follows the rules that the variable should concurrently impact the programme 
participation and the outcome (Caliendo & Kopeninig, 2008). The predictors are chosen from 
the variables that are significant in determining participation in venture capital financing. Once 
these conditions are satisfied, a different estimate can be obtained from different matching 
procedures. 
This study employed a logit regression model using observable variables that include SME 
owners’ characteristics such as gender, age, marital status and education as well as firm 
characteristics (i.e., firm age, firm size and legal status) and pre-treatment variables (i.e., annual 
sales for 2013, and the number of employees for 2013) to compute our propensity score. We 
estimate the propensity score matching using logit regression because it is more convenient 
and efficient (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). However, both logit and probit models give similar 
results. The dependent variable is regressed on the covariates that influence the participation 
and outcome in the venture capital financing program. Thus, the propensity score matching is 
estimated based on the probability of the respondents participating in the venture capital 
financing program. According to Setboonsarang et al. (2008), if a variable impacts on 
participation but not the outcome, it is unnecessary to control for differences concerning the 
variable in the treatment against the control groups. Similarly, if the variable impacts on the 
outcome but not the treatment prospect, it is unnecessary to control for the variable as the 
outcome will not significantly vary in treatment against the control groups. Variables that 
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impact neither the treatment nor outcome are also insignificant. As a result, only those variables 
that impact on both the treatment and outcome are essential for the matching and are used in 
the logit model for the estimation of the propensity score.  
We compute the propensity score for participant and non-participant SMEs. The dependent 
variable is a binary variable that takes on a value of one if the SMEs are venture capital funded, 
zero otherwise. Table 4.5 shows the propensity score estimation by logistic regression.  The 
propensity score is calculated based on the likelihood of participation in the venture capital 
financing programme. Different distribution of the propensity scores obtained from the selected 
covariates as documented in Table 4.5 and the balancing test for the group are carried out to 
ensure that the mean propensity score is not different for the treated and control groups in each 
block.  This guarantees that a good comparison is built for the selected covariates since the 
balancing property is satisfied, common support is well-defined and used for purposes of 
matching purposes. Finally, the nearest neighbour matching (NNM) and Kernel matching 
(KM) algorithms are used to estimate the average treated effect on treated (ATT) on venture 
capital financing on SMEs’ outcomes regarding sales and employment growth. The estimated 
results for VC financing on SMEs’ growth are presented and discussed in the next section. 
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4.4 Empirical Results  
4.4.1 Impact of Venture Capital financing on SMEs’ growth. 
As a preliminary check on our data collected, we performed multiple regression and our results 
are shown in Table 4.5 
Table 4.5: Estimated Results of Our Multiple Regression Model 
Firm Growth Coeff. Std. Err             t      P>|t| 
Treatment .6788102*** .0619958 10.95 0.000*** 
gender -.0502238   .046758 -1.07 0.283 
Age .0161385 .0355879      0.45    0.650 
M. status -.128995** .0529119     -2.44    0.015 
Education .0734091** . 0352976      2.08    0.038 
Experience -.0186866   .0444261     -0.42    0.674 
Income -.0211083 .0225494     -0.94    0.350 
Ownership . .0174569 .0455213      0.38    0.702 
F. Age .0467718 .0447736      1.04    0.297 
F. Size .1083379** .052774 2.05 0.041    
Locaton .0101417 .0551772 0.18   0.854   
Cons 
 
F= 
 
Pseudo R2= 
 
Ajusted R2 
 
Observations 
.0502614   
 
0.0000 
 
0.3652 
 
0.3465 
 
385 
.1772269 0.28 0.777 
Notes: *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. 
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The results of our estimation show that there is positive and significant relationship between 
SMEs’ growth and venture capital financing. This finding is consistent with past studies 
(Peneder, 2010; Engel, 2003). Married is negative and significantly related to SMEs’ growth 
and VC financing. This may probably be because married individuals are less risk tolerant than 
singles (Hartog et al., 2000). Education has a positive and significant relationship with the 
SMEs’ growth and venture capital financing. This is probably because highly qualified 
owners/managers of SMEs are more efficient in their work and moreover, providers of funds 
have more confidence in those with higher academic qualifications than those with lower levels 
of qualification (Berger and Udell, 2006). This is probably because well-educated 
entrepreneurs have the managerial skills in terms of planning, marketing, and production and 
therefore reflecting on firm performance. Firm size of the SMEs is positive and significantly 
related to SMEs’ growth and venture capital financing. Firm size has also been widely 
recognized as a significant determinant of accessibility to financing. Most empirical studies 
find a positive relation between firm size and the probability of obtaining finance (Akoten, 
Sawada, and Otsuka, 2006; Rodriguez et al., 2001). There is enough evidence from most 
empirical studies which shows that firm size is a significant factor that influences their ability 
to obtain external finance (Abor & Biekpe, 2005; Berger and Udell, 1998; Coleman, 2004; 
Coleman and Cohn, 2000).  
The next step was to determine the propensity score of our VC participation in the venture 
financing program using logit regression mode. The results of the logit model for propensity 
scores are reported in table 4.6. The estimated coefficients show that the probability of 
participation is significantly influenced by four explanatory variables. The coefficient for 
gender is negative and significant at the 5% level, and age is positive and significant at the 5% 
level. Further, income and legal status are positive and significant at the 1% level, respectively. 
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The results of our propensity score estimation indicate that the p-value is significant at the 1% 
level, log-likelihood is -115.59337, pseudo R2 value is 0.3387 and LR-chi-squared is 118.41 
with a p-value of 0.000 at the 1% significance level, which means our model is well-fitted.  
The pseudo R2 value shows how well the covariates explain the participation probability. A 
low pseudo R2 value means that SME participants do not have many distinct characteristics 
overall and thus finding a good match between participant and non-participant SMEs becomes 
easier. After matching, there should not be any systematic differences in the distribution of 
covariates between both treated and control groups, and hence, the pseudo R2 value should be 
very low (Caliendo and Kopeining, 2005). 
The results of our logit regression as showed in table 5.4 indicate that four variables are 
significantly related to SMEs’ participation in venture capital financing program. These four 
variables are gender, age, income and legal status of the firm. As indicated in the above table, 
there is negative and significant relationship between gender and SME owners/managers’ 
participation in venture capital financing program. This may probably be because females are 
less likely to participate in venture capital financing program as compared to the male 
counterpart. This is because empirical evidence has shown that women-led businesses are risk 
averse as compared to men-led businesses(Chaganti, 1986, Crosen and Gneezy,2009; Byrnes 
et al.,1999) Also female entrepreneurs are less likely to raise capital from external sources 
(Robben and Walken,2002). Other likely reasons may include the small size of most women-
owned firms (Riding and Swift, 1990), lack of financial sophistication (Brush, 1992) and 
possible discrimination (Brush, 1992). 
 The age variable is also seen to be positive and significantly related to SME owners/managers’ 
participation in venture capital financing program. This may probably be because, younger 
SME owners/managers are more likely to participate in venture capital financing program as 
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compared their older counterparts. This is because younger owners are considered to be less 
risk averse than older owners so they are more willing to raise capital from external sources 
(Coleman, 2004b; Vos et al., 2007). The income variable is positively and significantly related 
to venture capital financing.  This may be because the low-wealthier entrepreneurs are less 
likely to acquire external financing as compared to wealthier entrepreneurs (Lofstrom and 
Bates 2013).   
The legal status variable is also positively related to SME owners/managers’ participation in a 
VC financing program. This is because incorporated firms are more likely to receive external 
financing from banks and other financial institutions because they may be perceived as formal 
and credible (Cassar, 2004).  
The other variables such as marital status, education, experience, firm size, firm age, 
sector/industry have no significant effect on SME owners/managers’ participation in a VC 
financing program. This contradicts the findings from past empirical studies which indicate a 
correlation between entrepreneurs’ education and their ability to obtain external financing 
(Becker 1964, Bates 1990, Robinson & Sexton 1994, Cressey 1996, Chandler & Hanks, 1998, 
Baum & Silverman, 2004). It is also inconsistent with the conclusion of MacMillan et al., 
(1985) who indicated that the entrepreneur’s qualities eventually influence the investment 
decision, especially a thorough familiarity with the industry/market, leadership capability and 
ability to assess and manage risks. 
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Table 4.6: Logit Results of SMEs’ Programme Participation 
 
Notes *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively 
 
 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error t-test P-value 
Gender -.8985429* .5228816 -1.72 0.086 
Age .4795455* .2798241 1.71 0.087 
Marital Status -.5572087 .4465129 -1.25 0.212 
Education .4922107 .4170498 1.18 0.238 
Experience .3170132 .4167145 0.76 0.447 
Income .8609693*** .1876839 4.59 0.000 
Legal Status 2.430341*** .5839555 4.16 0.000 
Firm Age .1291241 .3932986 0.33 0.743 
Firm Size .2939372 .3843375 0.76 0.444 
Sector .2003227 .1848419 1.08 0.278 
Pre-sales 2013 2.24e-07 1.40e-07 1.60 0.109 
Pre-employment 
2013 
.0274642 .0229396 1.20 0.231 
Constant -10.96319 1.976734 -5.55 0.000 
LR-Chi (2) 118.41    
Pseudo R2 0.3387    
Log-likelihood -115.59337    
P-Value 0.0000    
Number of 
Observations 
385    
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We then compute the distribution of the propensity score for each SME included in the treated 
and control groups to identify the existence of common support. 
Before we implement the matching of the treated and control groups, we undertook three 
significant tasks. We first estimated the predicted values of programme participation 
(propensity scores) for all participant and non-participant SMEs. Second, to satisfy the overlap 
assumption, we imposed a common support condition on the propensity score distributions of 
the SMEs with and without programme participation (i.e., venture capital financing).  
Third, we discarded observations whose predicted propensity scores fell outside the range of 
the common support region. The estimated propensity scores differed between 0.024 and 0.92 
for SME participants (treated groups) and between 0.025 and 0.88 for SME non-participants 
(control groups). The relevance of the propensity score estimation is to balance the distributions 
of significant variables in both treated and control groups, and not to get a precise prediction 
of selection into treatment. 
Based on the logit model results, propensity scores are estimated, and the specification is 
balanced based on the balancing test. The region of common support is [0.02401465, 
.92121572] (see Appendix C).  
Next, we check for the balancing of propensity score and covariates. To check the 
characteristics of the treatment and control group after the matching procedure, we conduct 
two types of balancing tests (see Appendix C). If the covariates are similar after matching, then 
the matched comparison group can be considered as counterfactual (Lee, 2008). For this 
reason, two types of balancing tests are used in this study to analyze the matching quality, 
particularly, the joint significance and pseudo R2, and the t-test. The results of the t-test (See 
Appendix C) show that the differences in all covariates became insignificant after the matching 
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procedure, which indicates that the characteristics of the control group are sufficiently similar 
after matching.  
Furthermore, the result shows the pseudo-R-squared values reduced from 0.338 to 0.080 after 
the matching. The balancing tests confirmed that there is no systematic difference among the 
covariates used for matching between the treated group and after-matching control groups. The 
results demonstrate that the matching process can balance the characteristics of the treated and 
comparable control groups.  
Finally, we chose different matching algorithms to estimate the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT). In other words, we applied matching algorithm methods to estimate the effects 
of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth (outcomes). Four different algorithm methods 
can be used to estimate the ATT, namely, the nearest neighbour matching method, the radius 
matching method, the kernel matching method, and the stratification matching method. We 
chose the nearest neighbor matching and kernel matching methods to estimate the ATT. The 
estimates of the average treatment effect of the venture capital financing programme 
participation on the treated (ATT) are summarized in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 for the two outcomes 
using nearest neighbour matching, and kernel matching routines.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169 
 
Table 4.7: Estimation of Average Treatment Effects on Treated (ATT) on Annual Sales 
and Employment (Nearest Neighbour Matching) 
Outcome 
Variables 
Treated Control ATTR Std. Err         t 
Annual Sales 65   34   0.011 0.017 0.648                  
Employment 65   34 0.054 0.015                      3.591*** 
Notes *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
Column 1 in Table 4.7 specifies the outcome variables of interest in the propensity score 
function and the second and third columns report the treated and control variables used in the 
matching process.  The fourth column shows the ATT for annual sales or employment by the 
nearest neighbour matching, while the fifth and sixth columns display the standard error and 
p-value, respectively.  The result shows VC backed SME participation in the venture capital 
financing programme impact on their annual sales with the nearest neighbourhood matching 
method (t=0.684) but is not statistically significant. The average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) on annual sales for VC backed SMEs increased by 1.1 percent.  
The VC backed SMEs’ participation in the venture capital financing programme has a 
significant impact on employment with the nearest neighbourhood matching method (t=3.591) 
at the 1% significant level. The average effect on the treated (ATT) on employment for VC -
backed SMEs rose by 5.4 percent. This implies that the number of employees of VC- backed 
SMEs increased by 5.4 percent. 
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Table 4.8: Estimation of the Average Treatment Effects on Treated (ATT) Annual Sales 
and Employment (Kernel Matching) 
Outcome 
Variables 
Treated Control ATTR Std. Err         t 
Annual Sales 65   184 0.012              0.014                 0.841                                      
Employment 65   184 0.050                 0.012                                4.258***            
Notes *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels 
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Table 4.8 shows VC-backed SMEs’ participation in venture capital financing has no significant 
impact on SMEs’ annual sales with the Kernel matching method (t=0.841). Column 2 in Table 
4.8 shows the treated group (65) and column 3 shows the control group (184). Column 4 depicts 
the average treated effects of the treated (0.012), and column 6 indicates the t-test (0.841).  The 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) on annual sales for VC-backed SMEs increased 
by 1.2 percent. 
 The result of VC-backed SMEs’ participation in the venture capital financing programme on 
employment with the Kernel matching method is (t=4.258) statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) on employment for VC-backed SMEs 
is 5.0 percent and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This implies that the number 
of employees in SMEs, which received venture capital financing increased by 5.0 percent. 
Although the propensity score matching method is a useful technique to control for bias due to 
unobserved factors in impact assessment, the results must be interpreted with care as shown in 
the deliberation between Dehejia (2005) and Smith and Todd (2005) mainly with matching 
constructed on cross-sectional data. Firstly, unmeasured characteristics or time effects cannot 
be controlled by cross-sectional data. Secondly, bias-related errors with cross-sectional 
matching estimates may be large, without a good set of predictors or if treated and control 
SMEs are not strictly comparable, for instance, SMEs located in different markets (Smith and 
Todds,2005). Hence, it is suggested that methods that control for unobserved bias such as the 
DiD method based on panel data are used if data are available. Given the availability of a panel 
dataset to control for unobserved bias, to measure the impact of venture capital financing on 
SMEs’ growth, the DiD model is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
 
173 
 
4.5 SMEs’ effect estimation with the standard difference-in-difference models 
To reduce any bias estimation and to control for the unobservable heterogeneities, which may 
impact our results based on the PSM method, this study evaluates the impact on SMEs’ growth 
by combining a standard difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation technique based on 
equation (4.2). The standard DiD is used to determine the effect of venture capital financing 
on SMEs’ growth regarding annual sales and employment growth. The treatment variable 
which is venture capital financing program participation is of the binary form where SME 
owners’ participation in the program (i.e., SMEs receiving venture capital financing) takes on 
the value 1 or 0 otherwise. The model estimated is a logarithmic function where the outcome 
variable is the standard logarithm of the SMEs’ growth measurement such as annual sales and 
number of employees making the calculations not sensitive to distant observations on the 
dependent variables (Wooldridge, 2007). Consequently, the coefficient (γ) of the treatment 
variable, if multiplied by 100, measures the estimated average percentage change in the firms’ 
outcomes (annual sales and number of employees) concerning the treatment variable 
(Wooldridge, 2007; p.2002).  
The following equation gives the standard DiD model: 
Yit = β0 + δ0d2t + B1Pi + γMit + εit                                                                                                                   (4.2) 
Where Yit  is the SMEs’ outcome investigated (SMEs’ annual sales and number of employees) 
for SME i at period t; d2t is a time dummy variable which is equivalent to one for t=2 (post-
treatment  period) and zero for t=1 (pre-treatment period); the dummy variable for both treated 
and control groups is Pi and takes a value of one if the SME owner i belongs to the treatment 
group and zero otherwise; an interaction term of the product of d2t is Mit and Pi, which shows 
the  participation in the programme  is equal to one  if SME owner I, received venture capital 
and the observation happens in the second period (i.e., received the venture capital funding), 
 
 
 
174 
 
and zero otherwise; δ0 represents time effect suffered by both treatment and control groups; Bi 
represents the possible time-invariant difference of the total means between the two groups; γ 
is the principal parameter of interest which measures the average programme effect on 
receiving venture capital financing; εit  is the idiosyncratic error expected to be independent 
and identically assigned over SMEs and time, with  zero at each period.  
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Table 4.9: Impact of Venture Capital on SMEs’ Growth Using Standard DiD estimation. 
 
 Notes: The figures represent the average log of annual sales and number of employees, 
respectively; Standard errors are numbers in parentheses; ***, **, * denote the 1%, 5%, and 
10% significance levels, respectively. 
    
                      VC-backed SMEs (N=65)                     Non-VC backed SMEs (N=184)         DiD 
 Year     Year     Difference Year Year Difference Impact 
estimator 
 2013 
(1) 
2015 
(2) 
(2012-2015) 
(3) 
2012 
(4) 
2015 
(5) 
(2012-
2015) 
(6) 
 
(7) 
Outcome 
variable(Yit) 
YB.13              YB.15             D1= YB.13-
YB.15                 
YN.13                      YN.15                  D2=YN.13-
YN.15          
   γ sdd 
=D1-D2 
Log of 
annual 
sales 
5.739 
(.0767) 
5.823 
(.0758) 
0.0841*** 
(.0074) 
5.439 
(.0464) 
5.508 
(.0477) 
 
0.0690*** 
(.0036) 
0.0150** 
(.0077) 
        
Log of 
number of 
employees 
1.253 
(.0252) 
1.400 
(.0222) 
.1475*** 
(.0092) 
1.139 
(.0115) 
1.249 
(.0102) 
1.104* ** 
(.0042) 
.0371*** 
(.0090) 
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Table 4.9 shows the result of the impact of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth, 
measured by the annual sales and number of employees, has dramatically improved for the VC-
backed SMEs (treated group) between 2013 and 2015 (see column 3 in table 4.8). For instance, 
the average annual sales for the VC-backed SMEs (treated group) increased by almost 8.4% 
over the three years and are significant at the 1% level. Likewise, the average number of 
employees for the VC-backed SMEs (treated group) during the same period increased by 
14.7% and is significant at the 1% level. It is important to note that the significant increase in 
annual sales and the number of employees for the VC-backed SMEs can be attributed to a 
combination of time influence and impact of the venture capital injection. To separate the true 
programme impact on the VC-backed SMEs, the potential time trend must be controlled for.  
The average changes in outcome for the Non-VC backed SMEs (control group) between 2013-
2015 are taken to estimate the time trend suffered by the VC-backed group (column 6 in table 
4.8). After netting out the average increases between the treated and control group (column 7 
in Table 4.8), the standard DiD estimates suggests that the average annual sales for VC-backed 
SMEs increase by 1.5% as a direct result of SMEs’ participation in the programme and is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. Similarly, the standard DiD estimates for VC-backed 
SMEs on the number of employees increase by 3.7%, based on the participation in the venture 
capital financing programme. The impact of the programme on the VC-backed SMEs is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 % level (column 7 in table 4.8). Based on the 
standard DiD estimation, the impact of the venture capital financing programme on the 
participants’ annual sales and the number of employees is positive and significant. The results 
show that VC-backed SMEs are likely to improve their annual sales and employment growth, 
and this is consistent with similar empirical studies by Peneder (2010), Alemany & Marti 
(2005), Belke et al. (2004) and Engel (2003).  
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Peneder (2010) sampled 166 firms with and 663 firms without venture capital financing in 
Austria between 1996 and 2005 using 2-stage propensity score matching, Pender established 
that sales growth is faster in VC-backed firms compared to Non-VC backed firms. Alemany 
and Marti (2005) also examined 323 VC backed firms in Spain between the period 1989 and 
1998, and found that VC-funded firms exhibit faster growth in sales, gross margin, total assets, 
intangible assets and corporate tax, and as well, growth in employment increased by 30.5%. 
Belke et al., (2004) who used dynamic panel data in 20 OECD countries found that Venture 
Capital has a positive and significant impact on sales and employment. Similarly, Engel (2003) 
studied 1000 start-up firms in Germany based on propensity score matching and found that 
surviving VC-funded firms realize higher growth rates compared to surviving Non-VC funded 
firms. 
In summary, the results of our study using both the PSM and DiD estimation models revealed 
that VC-backed SMEs perform better regarding sales and the number of employees, partly due 
to the access by programme participation entrepreneurs to venture capital funding to grow their 
businesses. The treated groups matched with the control group, which exhibited more 
improvement in output as validated by our results. We can conclude, that venture capital 
financing of SMEs at the early growth stage greatly enhanced their growth regarding annual 
sales and number of employees hired. 
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4.6 Descriptive Statistics and Empirical Results on Determinants of Venture Capital 
Investment Activity. 
4.6.1 Descriptive Statistics of panel data 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the models. 
Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic and institutional variables 
Variables Observations Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum 
GFCF 150 22.99514 8.51943 0 54.46886 
GDP growth rate 150 5.099922 3.64063 -17.66895 14.046 
Interest rate 150 14.75892 8.784081 0 46.01 
Unemployment 150 9.466122 8.111279 0 37.59 
Market 
Capitalisation 
150 19.7748 43.06532 0 253.91 
Stock Traded 150 5.638633 22.64991 0 136 
Inflation rate 150 178.0555 1993.886 -2.39871 24411.03 
Capital gains tax 150 25.59215 24.93519 0 95.67 
Scientific & 
Technical Journal 
150 780.3524 1846.579 0 9679.1 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
150 466.463 71.81108 237.5111 624.6778 
Dummy: Ghana 150 0.93333 0.2502795 0 1 
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Table 4.10 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables used 
in this study. The number of observations for our panel data was 150. The average GCFC was 
22.99%, with a maximum of 54.46 and a minimum of 0. This indicates that the level of venture 
capital investments in these countries is likely to be low. This is because venture capital 
financing is in its infant stage in most of the African countries. 
The average GDP growth rate was 5.09%, with a minimum of -17.67 and maximum of 14.04. 
The average GDP growth rate of 5.09% indicates that higher economic growth is likely to 
increase venture capital investment activity. This is consistent with past studies of Gompers et 
al. (2008) and Bonini and Alkan (2009) who argued that higher GDP growth rate plays a 
significant role in attracting venture capital investment.  
The average interest rate was 14.75%, while the maximum was 46.06 and minimum of 0. The 
average interest rate of 14.75% shows a higher interest rate reduces the attractiveness of risky 
capital. This is consistent with previous studies of Gompers et al (2008) and Felix et al. (2007).  
The average unemployment rate was 9.46 %, with a maximum of 37.59 and minimum of 0. 
The average unemployment rate of 9.46 % shows an increased unemployment rate in all the 
countries has a positive and significant effect on venture capital investment activity. This is 
consistent with past studies of Sherlter (2003) and Black and Gilson (1998) who argued that 
labour market rigidities have significant and positive impact on venture capital investments.  
The average market capitalization was 19.77%, while the maximum was 253.91 and the 
minimum 0. The average stock traded as a percentage of GDP was 5.65%, with a maximum of 
136 and a minimum of 0. The average market capitalization of 19.77% and average stock traded 
as a percentage of GDP of 5.65 % show a decrease in stock market liquidity. This is inconsistent 
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with the findings of Jeng and Wells (2000) and Gompers and Lerner (1989) who argued that 
the liquidity of the stock market has a positive and significant impact on venture capital 
investments. This is probably because most financial markets in Sub-Saharan African region 
are less developed. 
The average inflation rate was 178%, with a maximum value of 24411.03 and a minimum value 
of -2.39. The average inflation rate of 178% shows that an increase in inflation rate has a 
negative and significant correlation with venture capital investments. This is consistent with 
the findings of Elsiefy (2013) who argued that a higher inflation rate has a negative and 
significant impact on venture capital investments especially at start-up and early stage of 
investments.  
The average capital gains tax was 25.59%, with a maximum value of 95.67 and a minimum 
value of 0. The average capital gains tax of 25.59% shows that an increase in capital gains tax 
has a negative and significant impact on venture capital investments. This is inconsistent with 
findings of Gompers et al. (2008) and Groh and Lichtenstein (2009) who argued that lower 
corporate tax on average are strong incentive for investors.  
The average scientific and technical journal articles used as a proxy for R&D expenditure was 
780.3%, with a maximum value of 9679.1 and a minimum value of 0.  This shows that an 
increase in R&D expenditures has a positive and significant impact on venture capital 
investment activity. This is consistent with past studies of Gompers and Lerner (1998) and 
Scherlter (2003) who argued that R&D expenditures have a positive and significant correlation 
with venture capital investments intensity. The average index of economic freedom was 
466.6%, with a maximum value of 624.6778 and a minimum value of 237.5111. This indicates 
that the quality of institutions in the region affects venture capital investment activity. This is 
consistent with past studies of Cumming et al. (2006) and La Porte et al. (1998) who argued 
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that the quality of a country’s legal system has a significant and positive association with 
venture capital market development. One possible reason may be that the institutions in Sub-
Saharan African region are weak. 
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As a preliminary assessment of our data, we performed time series and cross sectional data 
analysis. Tables 4.11 and 4.12 show the results of our estimation. 
Table 4.11: Estimation of Result of Time Series  
Notes: *,**,*** represent 10%,5%,1% respectively 
 
GFCF Coeff. Std. Err             t        P>|t| 
GDP growth rate .4495664*** .1002294 4.49 0.000 
Interest rate .3449384*** .037886 9.10 0.000 
Unemployment rate .377114*** .03672 10.27 0.000 
Market Capitalization as of GDP -.0281333 .0249646   -1.13 0.260 
Stock Traded as of GDP .0600899 .053532 1.12 0.262 
InflationCPI -.0002125   .0037334 -0.06 0.955   
Profit Capital Gains Tax -.0083685 .0163637 -0.51 0.609    
Scientific& technical journals -.0012172*** .0002732 -4.46 0.000 
Index .0228417*** .0060571 3.77 0.000   
Cons 
 
F= 
 
Wald Chi 
 
Log likelihood 
 
Observations 
2.822587 
 
0.0000 
 
358.14 
 
-483.6928 
 
150 
2.943553 0.96 0.338 
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Five of the explanatory variables namely GDP growth, interest rate, unemployment rate, 
scientific and technical journals and index of economic freedom which represent the quality of 
institutions are significantly related to venture capital investments activity. The coefficient for 
the GDP growth variable is positive and significantly related to VC investment activity. This 
implies that there is a positive and significant correlation between economic growth and 
venture capital investments activity. This is consistent with the findings of past studies 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Felix et al., 2007and La porte et al., 2004). The coefficient for the 
interest rate variable is positive and significantly related to venture capital investment activity. 
The result is consistent with previous studies (Felix et al., 2007), which confirmed a positive 
and significant relationship between long term interest rate and venture capital development. 
The coefficient for the unemployment rate variable is positive and significant. This implies that 
unemployment is significantly related to venture capital investment activity. This is consistent 
with the findings of Felix et al. (2007) who found a positive relationship between 
unemployment rate and venture capital investments activity in Europe. This may probably be 
due to the high unemployment rate in Ghana, which is likely to motivate self-employment, 
which also triggers the demand for and supply of venture capital financing.  
The coefficient of Scientific & Technical journals, which is a proxy for research and 
development expenditure is negative and significant. This finding is inconsistent with past 
studies (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Schertler, 2003) which showed a significant relationship 
between research and development expenditure and venture capital investments activity. This 
is probably because less emphasis is placed on research and development expenditure in 
Ghana. The coefficient for the index variable is positive and significant. This implies there is a 
positive and significant correlation between the quality of institutions and venture capital 
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investments activity. This finding is consistent with previous studies (La porte et al.1997/1998; 
Cumming et al., 2006), which highlighted that the quality of a country’s legal institutions is 
significantly correlated to investments. The four other variables namely market capitalization, 
stock traded as a percentage of GDP, inflation rate and capital gains taxes are insignificant. 
These results are inconsistent with past studies which revealed that market capitalization and 
stock traded, inflation rates and capital gains taxes are significantly related to venture capital 
investments activity (Jeng and Wells, 2000; Felix el al., 2007, Poterba, 1989, Gompers and 
Lerner, 1998). This may be because the stock market in Ghana is not well developed compared 
to the stock markets in Europe or the US. 
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Table 4.12: Estimation Results of our Cross Sectional Analysis  
GFCF Coeff.       Std. Err           t       P>|t| 
GDP growth rate .7706644 .9380449 0.82    0.449 
Interest rate .2329417 .3066833 0.76    0.482 
Unemployment .0358821 .2655165 0.14    0.898 
Market Capitalization as of GDP .0328637 .1997208 0.16    0.876 
Stock Traded as of GDP .2021404 .5142422 0.39    0.710 
Inflation CPI -.0060872   .0104942 -0.58    0.587 
Profit Capital Gains Tax -.0301403 .1199405 -0.25    0.812 
Scientific and technical journals -.0048674   .0050194 -0.97    0.377   
  Index .0294343 .034203 0.86    0.429   
cons 
 
F= 
 
R-squared-  
 
Adjusted R2-  
 
Observations- 
 
 
 
-.5733705 
 
0.2053 
 
0.7954 
 
0.4270 
 
15 
12.66708 -0.05    0.966    
Notes: *,**,*** represents 10%,5%,1% respectively 
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Our estimated results show nine explanatory variables are insignificantly related to venture 
capital investments activity. Further, Table 4.2 shows six estimated variables are positive and 
insignificant while three are negative and insignificant. Our results are inconsistent with past 
studies (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000, Felix et al., 2007, Puri and Hellman, 
2001). Further, our F-test is statistically insignificant at 0.2053, which implies our model is not 
well fitted. This implies that cross sectional data analysis is not suitable for our research study.  
 
4.6.2 Empirical Models  
This section explores the underlying relation between venture capital investment activity and 
the influence of macroeconomic and institutional factors by comparing 15 selected countries 
in Sub-Sahara Africa from 2006-2015. These countries are Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
The macroeconomic and institutional factors include GDP growth rate, stock market 
capitalization, the stock traded as a percentage of GDP, unemployment rate, interest rate, 
inflation rate, profits, capital gains taxes, scientific and technical journal articles, a dummy 
variable which denotes 1 if VCI occurs in Ghana, otherwise zero and index of economic 
freedom are annual data obtained from the World bank database and Heritage Foundation. The 
panel data covers a period of ten years from 2006-2015. Many studies have examined the 
determinants of venture capital investment activity in the finance literature. Some investigate 
only the macroeconomic factors; while others assess both macroeconomic and institutional 
factors. (For example, Gompers and Lerner, 1998; Jeng and Wells, 2000; Scherlter, 2003; 
Romain and de La Potterie, 2004; Felix et al.2007; Cherif and Gazdar, 2011). 
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The present study used the panel data method to estimate the determinants of venture capital 
investment activity in 15 selected countries in Sub-Sahara Africa including Ghana. The 
equation to be estimated is as follows: 
GFCFit= α0 + βGDPit + β2INTit + β3UMPit +β4MCAPit + β5STOit + β6INFit + β7CAPit+ β8SJTit 
+ β9IEFit+μi+λt+DVit+uit                                                                                                  (4.3)                
Where the subscript i represents the individual countries (i=1….15), and the subscript 
represents the tenth year (t=1…...10) μi the unobservable heterogeneity (individual effects) 
which is specific for each country, λt is the parameters of time dummy variables, and uit is the 
error term. 
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Table 4.13: Dependent and Explanatory Variables used in Our Panel Data Analysis 
Variable Variable Name Variable Description Unit Measurement 
GFCF Gross fixed capital 
formation 
The dependent variables (proxy 
venture capital investment activity). 
US dollars($) 
GDP Gross domestic product Gross domestic product growth rate 
is the level of economic activity in a 
country. 
Percentage ( % ) 
INT Interest rate Long-term interest rate (cost of 
borrowing) 
Percentage (%) 
UMP Unemployment rate Measures the rigidities of the labour 
market 
Percentage (%) 
INF Inflation rate Measures changes in the consumer 
price index 
Percentage (%) 
MCAP Market Capitalization Stock market capitalization as a 
percentage of GDP 
% of GDP 
STO Stock Traded Valued Listed companies on a country’s 
stock exchange as percentage of 
GDP 
% of GDP (%) 
STJ Scientific and 
Technical Journal 
Articles 
Proxy for industrial and academic 
research expenditure 
US dollars($) 
IEF Index of Economic 
Freedom 
The aggregate of some ten indices 
developed by the Heritage 
Foundation to measure institutional 
quality). 
Numeric value 
DV Dummy: Ghana Dummy variable for Ghana(it takes 
the value 1, if VCI occurred in 
Ghana otherwise zero. 
Numeric value 
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Before the estimation of our panel data regression, diagnostic tests were conducted to enhance 
the robustness of the findings. First, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was used to test for 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. VIF is used in panel data to detect 
collinearity among predictors that may affect our result estimation. 
The VIF indicates whether a predictor has a strong linear relationship with other predictors in 
the model.  The largest VIF should not be greater than 10, and the average VIF should not be 
much bigger than 1(Field, 2005). If VIF is above 10, this means there is multicollinearity in 
the model (White, 1980). The VIF mean of 3.38 in our model shows the model does not suffer 
from multicollinearity (see Appendix D). Similarly, we need to test if heteroscedasticity exists 
and the Breusch-Pagan test is applied to ascertain if heteroscedasticity is present in our model. 
It shows a chi-square of 0.15 and is insignificant at p= 0.7002 level, which means that 
heteroscedasticity is absent in our model (See Appendix D).   
Finally, we conduct a test for serial correlation, to ascertain if there is a serial correlation in our 
model. This is because serial correlation in a panel data model causes the results to be 
inefficient. This study used Wooldridge’s serial correlation test (Wooldridge, 2002). Our 
results show that the variables used in our models are not serially correlated (see Appendix D). 
To estimate the determinants of venture capital investment activity in Ghana, three different 
models are tested to determine which model is appropriate for our panel data analysis. The 
models are OLS pooled regression (the Common Constant Method) the Random Effects Model 
and the Fixed Effects Model. 
To choose between Pools OLS, Fixed Effects, and Random Effects Models, we used the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, proposed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) to 
determine whether to use the Pools OLS or the alternative or Random Effects models. Our 
results show that the LM test is highly significant at the 1% level (see Appendix D). The LM 
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test tests for random individual effects against the null of the pooled model based on the 
multiplier (LM) principle (Gujaranti, 2003). Therefore, it rejects the null hypothesis, 
suggesting that the Random Effects Models are more appropriate. Tables 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 
show the results of our estimates for the Pools OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models, 
respectively.  
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Table 4.14: Estimated Results of the Pooled OLS Model. 
Variables     
GFCF Coefficients Std. Err t P>|t| 
GDP Growth .6120669*** .1785271 3.43 0.001 
Interest rate -.0176498 .0790667 -0.22 0.824 
Unemployment rate .2822357*** .0881228 3.20 0.002 
Market Capitalization -.0595119 .045498 -1.31   0.193 
Stock Traded Value .1384496 .0919277 1.51 0.134 
Inflation rate -.0004267 .000315 -1.35 0.178 
Taxes -.029226 .030289 -0.96 0.336 
Scientific &Technical 
Journal Articles. 
-.0015106** .0005398 -2.80 0.006 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
.0323416*** .0099866 3.24 0.002 
Dummy: Ghana -1.086947 2.73251 -0.40 0.691 
Constant 5.788122 5.758601 1.01 0.317 
R2 0.2918    
F 0.0000    
Number of 
Observations 
150    
Notes *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively 
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Table 4.15: Estimated Results of the Fixed Effects Model. 
Variables     
GFCF Coefficients Std. Err t P>|t| 
GDP Growth .4288602 ***   .1330366      3.22    0.002 
Interest rate -.1532752      .1185033     -1.29 0.198 
Unemployment rate -.0925857      .1127908     -0.82 0.413 
Market Capitalization .0051648    .0397347      0.13    0.897 
Stock Traded Value -.0037214       .0785746     -0.05 0.962 
Inflation rate -.0001492       .0002352     -0.63 0.527 
Taxes -.004833        .026849     -0.18 0.857 
Scientific &Technical 
Journal Articles. 
.0003798    .0005236      0.73    0.470 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
.0195785    .0149973      1.31    0.194 
Dummy: Ghana     
Constant 14.58297* 7.959133      1.83    0.069 
R2 0.1317    
F 0.0321    
Number of 
Observations 
150    
Notes *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively 
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Table 4.16: Estimated Results of the Random Effects Model. 
Variables     
GFCF Coefficients Std. Err t P>|t| 
GDP Growth .4564711 ***   .1353746      3.37    0.001 
Interest rate -.0992326      .1026596     -0.97 0.334 
Unemployment rate .0097665  ***     .1035966      0.09 0.001 
Market Capitalization -.005741          .0392179 -0.15 0.884 
Stock Traded Value .0129245    .0776397      0.17    0.868 
Inflation rate -.0001764      .0002399     -0.74 0.462 
Taxes -.0075184  **     .0266367     -0.28 0.008 
Scientific &Technical 
Journal Articles. 
-.0000562      .0005036     -0.11 0.911 
Index of Economic 
Freedom 
.0276566 **   .0125769      2.20    0.028 
Dummy: Ghana -1.638033      6.057931     -0.27 0.787 
Constant 10.97548    9.302344      1.18    0.238 
R2 0.1191    
F 0.0259    
Number of 
Observations 
150    
Notes *, **, *** represents 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. 
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The Hausman test (1978) is used to choose between the Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
models statistically. The purpose of this common test in the literature is to check for strict 
homogeneity. The Hausman test works to facilitate the differences between the two 
approaches by examining for correlation between the independent variables and the 
individual random effects. The result of the Hausman specification test indicates the p-value 
of a 0.0614 insignificance level. Hence, the random effects model is accepted for our model 
estimation. 
The results of our random effects estimate in table 4.16, shows four out of ten independent 
variables have significant effects on venture capital funds raised including GDP growth rate, 
and index of economic freedom. 
The coefficient of GDP growth is positive and significant at the 1% level.  This indicates there 
is a positive and significant relation between GDP growth rate and venture capital funds raised. 
This implies that GDP growth is a contributing factor to venture capital investment activity. 
The result is consistent with the findings of Mayer (2010), Felix et al. (2007), Romain and La 
Potterie (2004) and Gompers and Lerner (1998) who established that there is a positive and 
significant relation between GDP growth and venture capital investments. The authors 
concluded that GDP growth has effects on venture capital investment activity.   
However, it contradicts the findings of Jeng and Wells (2000) and Marti and Balboa (2004) 
who did not find any significant relation between GDP growth and venture capital. Jeng and 
Wells (2000) examined VC/PE firms in 21 OECD countries between 1986-1995 using panel 
data and established that GDP growth and market capitalization did not influence venture 
capital activity. Similarly, Marti and Balboa (2004) studied PE/VC firms in 16 OECD countries 
between the period 1991-1999 and found no significant influence of GDP growth on venture 
capital fund raising activity. Jeng and Wells argued that GDP growth rate and market 
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capitalization are part of IPO activity which is considered a significant determinant of venture 
capital. This is probably because an active stock market provides liquidity and exit for venture 
capital firms.  
The coefficient of the unemployment rate, which is a proxy for labour market rigidities is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. This implies that the unemployment rate can be 
attributed to increase in VC investments activity. According to economic theory, the production 
of goods and services essentially has two factors: Labour and Capital (Rodriguez, 2015). 
Labour and capital are elasticity of substitution in the production function, this enables firms 
to vigorously switch labour with capital as the price of investments goods falls (Karabarbounis 
and Neiman, 2014).  Thus, according to production theory, labour and capital are perfect 
substitutes (Miller, 2008). Hence, from our results the higher unemployment rate may be 
positive and significantly related to higher investments because firms may choose to substitute 
or replace labour demand for capital-intensive projects. This will trigger decrease in the 
demand for labour and increase venture capital investment activity.        
However, it contradicts the findings of Jeng and Wells (2000) who found a negative correlation 
between labour market rigidities and venture capital activities in their study of venture capital 
investments in 21 countries for the period 1986-1995. The authors found negative and 
significant correlation at the early stage of investments. This is because labour market 
regulation subdued venture capital growth in Europe particularly in sectors with high labour 
volatility (Bozkaya and Kerr, 2011). 
The coefficient for the capital gains tax is positive and significant. This implies that there is a 
significant relationship between capital gains tax and venture capital funds raised. This in line 
with the findings of Poterba (1989 and Gompers and Lerner (1998) who claimed a decrease in 
capital gains tax is likely to increase commitment to venture capital funds raised. The findings 
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support our results that a reduction in capital gains taxes increases venture capital investment 
activity. On the contrary, interest rate, market capitalization, stock traded value as a percentage 
of GDP, inflation, scientific, and technical journal articles and index of economic freedom do 
not have any significant influence on venture capital funds raised. 
The coefficient of index of economic freedom is positive and significant at the 5% level.  This 
indicates that there is a positive and significant relation between index of economic freedom 
and venture capital investments activity in Ghana. This is consistent with similar findings by 
Cherif and Gadzar (2011), La Porte et al. (1987) and Cumming et al. (2006) who argued that 
the quality of institutions are related to investments flows in a country. 
Overall, the results show that GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, capital gains taxes and 
index of economic freedom play a significant role in determining venture capital investments 
activity in Ghana. The improvements in economic activity, unemployment rate, which 
represent the rigidities of the labour market, taxes and institutional quality promote venture 
capital development.  
However, our findings do not identify any evidence of inflation rate, stock market 
development, and technical journal articles  as drivers of venture capital development as past 
studies showed (Gomper and Lerner, 1998b; Black and Gilson, 1998; Cherif and Gardaz, 2011; 
Jeng and Wells, 2000).  
Our results are insignificant; this may probably be because the financial markets as well as 
research and development in Ghana are not well developed as compared to the developed 
countries. 
For instance, Gompers and Lerner (1998b) found a significant and positive relation between 
market capitalization and industrial and academic research (R&D expenditure) and venture 
 
 
 
197 
 
capital activity, Black and Gilson (1998) claimed there is a significant association between 
market capitalization through IPO activity and venture capital activity. Cherif and Gardaz 
(2011) revealed that market capitalization and index of economic freedom as an indicator of 
institutional quality have a significant effect on venture capital activity in Europe.   
However, Jeng and Wells (2000) argued that an active stock market is critical for a healthy 
venture capital market development. The coefficient for our dummy variable is negative and 
insignificantly related to venture capital investments activity. Thus, our dummy variable for 
Ghana is negative and insignificant. This may probably be because institutions (financial and 
legal) in Ghana, as in most developing countries, are not well developed (Agyeman, 2010). 
We conclude that there is a significant and positive relationship between GDP growth rate 
unemployment rates, capital gains taxes and the index of economic freedom which represent 
institutional quality and are the main drivers of venture capital investments activity in Ghana.  
 
4.7 Factors influencing SME Owners’ Accessibility to Venture Capital Financing:  
4.7.1 Logit Model Analysis 
This study employed the binary logistic regression to investigate the SME owners’ accessibility 
to venture capital financing using entrepreneurs’ characteristics, firms’ characteristics and 
macroeconomic factors as predictors. The binary logistic regression model was chosen because 
of the discrete nature of our data. The logistic regression model (equation 3.18) was used to 
investigate the factors that influence SME owners’ accessibility to venture capital, and the 
maximum likelihood estimation technique was used.    
The logistic regression model successfully predicts the likelihood of SME owners obtaining 
venture capital funding at 86.05%. The likelihood ratio test has a chi-square of 108.66 with 14 
degrees of freedom and rejects the null hypothesis that the parameter estimates for the model 
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are equivalent to zero, at the 1% significance level. It can be established that the explanatory 
power of the logistic model is satisfactory, and the model can be used to explain the likelihood 
of SME owners’ accessibility to venture capital. 
Table 4.14 shows that six explanatory variables used are significantly related to SME owners-
managers’ accessibility to venture capital financing. These six variables of gender, location, 
education, business plan, social networks and interest rate are significantly associated with 
venture capital accessibility, whereas the age of the SME owner, Age2, marital status, 
ownership, firm age, firm size, and sector are insignificantly associated with SME owners’ 
accessibility to venture capital. 
The results reveal that the coefficient ‘gender’ is negative and significant at the 5% level. This 
indicates that female SME owners are less likely to access venture capital financing than their 
male counterparts. One possible explanation is that past studies show that women on average 
are significantly more risk-averse than men financially and therefore are less likely to apply for 
venture capital financing compared to their male counterparts (Oslen and Cox, 2001; Bernasek 
and Shwiff, 2001). Further, the result supports the empirical evidence of Chaganti et al., (2005) 
that female-led businesses prefer internal financing to external financing. It is also consistent 
with the findings of Fay and William, (2003) and Nelson et al., (2009) that women 
entrepreneurs attempting to access venture capital are challenged by institutional gender 
discrimination and perceptions. 
The coefficient of location is positive and significant at the 1% level. This implies that SMEs 
which are located close to VC firms have a higher possibility of obtaining venture capital 
funding. The possible reason is that Venture Capitalists prefer to invest in businesses that are 
close in geographical proximity to enable them to have constant monitoring of their operations. 
Hence SMEs in urban areas closer to Venture Capital firms are more likely to attract venture 
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capitalists than in rural areas. This is consistent with the findings of Sorensen and Stuart (2001) 
who found that VC firms are more likely to fund entrepreneurs located a short geographical 
distance from where they are based.  Further, it is similar to the findings of Ahmed and Hamid 
(2011) who also found that firms located in metropolitan cities have a higher probability of 
obtaining finance as compared to others located in rural areas. 
The coefficient of education is positive and significant at the 5% level. This implies that SME 
owners’ education is correlated to the likelihood of obtaining Venture Capital funds from VCs. 
This is probably because VCs may invest their funds in young firms based on the education of 
founders. This result is consistent with similar findings of Parker (2004) who argued that SMEs 
owners’ access to external finance is linked to education and training since education and 
training are related to knowledge, skills and problem solving ability to explore opportunities. 
The coefficient for a business plan is positive and significant at the 5% level. This shows that 
SME owners’ business plan is correlated to venture capital accessibility and implies that SME 
owners with a business plan are more likely receive venture capital funding. This result is 
consistent with similar findings by Delmar and Shane (2003) who find a positive association 
between a business plan and VC financing. This is probably because as suggested by the 
authors, a business plan assists in validating entrepreneurs’ business operational activities and 
reduces the possibility of failure. 
The coefficient of social networking is negative and significant at the 5% level. This indicates 
a correlation between SME owners’ social networking and venture capital accessibility. It 
implies that SME owners with social ties are more likely to receive venture capital financing. 
Our result is consistent with several empirical studies that found VCs tend to invest in firms 
where they know the entrepreneur directly or indirectly (Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Shane and 
Stuart, 2002). This is probably because VCs may want to deal with entrepreneurs that they are 
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familiar with.  As argued by Shane and Stuart (2002) entrepreneurs with social capital 
involving pre-existing direct or indirect relationships with VC investors have a higher prospect 
of receiving VC funding at the early stage of their business. Hence social networks play a 
significant role in entrepreneurs’ ability to obtain VC funding. 
The coefficient of high-interest rate is negative and significant at the 1% level. This indicates 
that SMEs are less likely to get access to venture capital financing when interest rates are high. 
According to Gompers and Lerner (1998) the interest rate is likely to affect the supply of and 
demand for venture capital funds. If the interest rate rises, the attraction of venture capital funds 
for venture capitalists to invest in deteriorates and this therefore will decrease their willingness 
to supply venture capital funds. Further, evidence from past studies shows that interest rates 
are positively and significantly related to venture capital investments (Felix et al., 2007; 
Romain and de La Potterrie, 2004). The results confirm the findings of Amonoo et al. (2003) 
which suggest that a higher interest rate is negatively and statistically significant to the demand 
for credit. 
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Table 4.17: Logit estimates for SME owners’ accessibility to venture capital financing 
Independent Variable    Estimated Coeff.       Std. Error      Odd Ratio       Marginal Effect(dx/dy) 
Gender -.8588254**            .4830545            .4236594              -.0476682 
Age                                     -.3317653                 .4726642 .7176557           -.0209067 
Age2                                    -.7602783                .6106193 .4675363                        -.0569185 
Married -.157789                  .3962052 .8540299           -.0102803 
Education   2.339068 **             1.103653 10.37157            .1473999 
Experience   .440814                  .3720854 1.553972           .0277786 
Ownership                            .0353616                 1.706577  1.035994             .0022186 
Firm Age                              .1917017                 .3185617 1.211309            .0120804 
Firm Size .6357036                .3485501   1.88835            .0446335 
Sector     .0400552               .1612129 1.040868           .0025241 
Location                               -.5785014 **           .3624483 .5607381                          -.0389361 
Business Plan                         2.367198 **         1.703067            10.66746          .1346078   
Networking                            -2.126738 **        1.124207            .1192256       -.1340196 
Interest rate Charge               -1.546586 *            .3593936           .2129739         -.1312355 
Constant -5.464835                 
McFadded R-squared              0.3108 
Log Likelihood                        -120.47297   
LR Statistics                             108.66 
 
Number of Observations            385 
 
Notes: *, **, *** denotes 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
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Table 4.17 indicates that the coefficients for the rest of the explanatory variables: Age, Age2, 
Experience, Marital Status, Ownership type, Firm Age, Firm Size, and Sector are insignificant 
and have no influence on SME owners’ accessibility to venture capital funding. 
According to Train (1986) and Greene (2003), the estimated logistic regression coefficients 
attained by maximum likelihood approximation do not generate direct economic interpretation. 
The sign of an estimated coefficient only provides the direction of the result of that explanatory 
variable on the likelihood of success (i.e., an observation at value one). To deal with this 
shortcoming, marginal effects, the change in the predicted possibility connected with variations 
in the explanatory variables are computed (Greene, 2003). 
The marginal effects for the regressors of the logit model are shown in Table 4.15. For instance, 
the marginal effect of gender shows that on average one additional male-led SME owner 
obtaining venture capital funding will decrease the likelihood of a female-led SME owner 
obtaining venture capital funding by 4.7 percent. The marginal effect of location shows that on 
average a one percent surge in the location of SME owners in an urban area will increase the 
owners’ probability of obtaining venture capital funding by 3.8 percent. The marginal effect of 
SME owners’ experience shows that on average, a one percent increase in owners’ education 
will increase the possibility of receiving VC funding by 14.7 percent. Similarly, the marginal 
effect of SME owners with business plans indicates that on average a one percent increase in 
SME owners having a business plan will improve their possibility of obtaining VC funding by 
13.4%. Additionally, for the marginal effect of SMEs owners with social networks, on average 
a one percent increase in social networks will improve the possibility of receiving VC funding 
by 13.3 percent. 
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Further, the marginal effect of higher interest rates shows that on average, a one percent rise in 
the interest rate will reduce the chances of SME owners obtaining venture capital funding by 
13.1 percent.  
The empirical results from the logistic regression indicate that gender, geographical location, 
education, business plan, social networks and interest rate are the six main influences on SME 
owners’ accessibility to venture capital financing. For instance, the probability of female-led 
SME owners obtaining venture capital funding is lower compared to male-led SME owners, 
because female owners may be risk averse and therefore prefer to use internal financing rather 
than external financing or are discriminated against by venture capitalists. The results also 
suggest that SMEs which are geographically close to VC firms are more likely to attract venture 
capital investment funds from VCs than SMEs which are located remotely from VC firms since 
Venture Capitalists prefer to fund SMEs which are closer to their locality to monitor their 
activities (Sorensen and Staurt, 2001). Further, SMEs owners with higher education and 
training are more likely to obtain VC funding from VC investors (Gompers et al., 2006). Also, 
SME owners with social networks are more likely to access VC funding from VCs (Shane and 
Stuart, 2002).  
Finally, a higher interest rate implies that venture capitalists are unlikely to supply VC funds, 
and therefore the probability of SME owners obtaining venture capital financing is reduced 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1989; Felix et al., 2007). 
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4.8 Other Factors Influencing SME Owners’ Accessibility to Venture Capital Financing 
In this section, some qualitative information collected from the survey questionnaire which was 
used to investigate the effect of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth in Ghana, but was 
not analyzed in the empirical models, is discussed.  
Knowledge about Venture Capital Financing Programmes 
As table 4.18 shows, of the total number of 320 Non-VC backed SME respondents, 208 
reported that they did not know of the existence of Venture Capital financing programmes. 
Three key reasons were given for their lack of knowledge and one was the lack of 
understanding of the ‘Venture Capital Financing’ concept (65%). This was followed by 80 
respondents who cited inadequate promotion of venture capital financing by both the electronic 
and print media (25%), while 32 (10%) of the respondents cited the lack of awareness about 
the location of the venture capital firms’ offices (10%). 
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Table 4.18: Knowledge about the venture capital financing programmes. 
 
                                  Reasons 
Non-VC backed SMEs 
                 N=320 
Count % of N 
 
1. Lack of understanding of the Venture Capital 
Financing Concept 
 
208 
 
65% 
 
2. Inadequate promotion of the Venture Capital 
financing programme in the media 
 
80 
 
25% 
 
3. Lack of awareness about the location of the offices 
of Venture Capital firms 
 
32 
 
10% 
Total 320 100 
Notes N represents the number of responses 
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Main reasons for not accessing Venture Capital Financing 
According to the survey results, 75% (240) of the Non-VC backed SMEs respondents reported 
that they did not need to access Venture Capital Financing in the past two years. This confirms 
that demand for external financing determines household/firms’ access to external financing to 
a large extent.  
The result also shows that of 80 Non-VC backed SMEs owners who required Venture Capital 
Financing, 56 (17.5%) had applied for Venture Capital financing but were unsuccessful, and 
24 (7.5%) had resorted to other informal sources (i.e., friends and family members, micro-
finance).  
No need to access Venture Capital Financing 
Table 4.19 denotes the main explanations by Non-VC backed SMEs who do not need to access 
Venture Capital Financing. Approximately 20.83% of the 240 Non-VC backed SMEs said they 
did not need venture capital funding because they had adequate funds. In the same vein, 27.08% 
of respondents cited the fear of losing control rights over their businesses as the main reason 
for not accessing venture capital funding. Furthermore, 22.92% of the respondents said they 
would not access venture capital funding due to the complex application process, while 19.17% 
of the respondents also cited the lack of information for not accessing venture capital funding. 
Lastly, 10% of the respondents cited strict legal requirements as the main reason for their 
decision not to access Venture Capital Financing. 
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Table 4.19: SMEs which do not need to access venture capital financing. 
Reasons Non-VC backed SMEs 
            N=240 
Count % of N 
Have adequate funds 50 20.83 
Fear of losing control rights 65 27.08 
Due to complex application process 55 22.92 
Due to lack of information 46 19.17 
Due to strict legal requirements 24 10.00 
 Total 240 100 
Notes N represents the number of responses 
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Main reasons for some Non-VC backed SMEs’ rejection  
Table 4.20 shows the main reasons why the Non-VC backed SMEs’ applications for venture 
capital financing were unsuccessful or rejected from the respondents’ viewpoints. 
Approximately, 46.4% of the 56 Non-VC backed SMEs owners who applied for the venture 
capital financing, but were unsuccessful in obtaining the funds, reported that their applications 
were denied because they did not have any business plan. Similarly, 25% of the respondents 
claimed their application was denied because of inadequate financial record-keeping and 
21.4% considered that they were rejected because they did not meet the necessary legal 
requirements. A further 7.1% reported that their applications were rejected because they did 
not have links with government officials. 
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Table 4.20: Reasons for Non-VC backed SMEs’ refusal of venture capital financing. 
 
                    Reasons 
 
                  Non-VC backed SMEs 
                              N=56 
           Count         % of   N 
1. Lack of business plan 26 46.4% 
2. Inadequate financial record keeping 14 25% 
3. Do not meet basic legal requirements 12 21.4% 
4. No links with government officials 4 7.1% 
  Total 56 100 
Notes N represents the number of responses 
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Reasons for future applications for Venture Capital Financing 
 Non-VC backed SMEs respondents were asked to state whether in future they would 
consider applying for venture capital financing. From the total of 240 Non-VC backed SME 
respondents who did not apply for venture capital financing, 140 respondents signalled their 
intention to obtain venture capital financing in future (58.3%) while 70 of the respondents 
indicated that they would not consider obtaining it in future (26.2%). In addition, 30 of the 
respondents stated that they did not know whether they would consider obtaining venture 
capital financing in future (12.5%). 
We can conclude that more effort should be made by policymakers in the form of education to 
create awareness and understanding among potential SME entrepreneurs about the benefits of 
accessing venture capital funding. This will offer young entrepreneurs the opportunity to 
develop and grow their businesses to create more jobs and increase their sales revenue. 
Additional publicity and awareness should be generated through the electronic and print media. 
Seminars and workshops should be organized for business associations to promote the venture 
capital financing concept in Ghana for the benefit of all stakeholders. Finally, the government 
should create an enabling environment for entrepreneurs by ensuring macroeconomic stability 
and develop a vibrant financial market and institutional framework that will boost investments 
and enhance economic development. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
5.1 Introduction 
 The chapter summarizes the study. Section 5.2 presents a summary of the research 
background, research objectives, sample selection, data and methodology and main findings. 
Section 5.3 discusses implications of the research findings for academics, policymakers, and 
SME owners/managers. Section 5.4 presents the limitations of the study and Section 5.5 
provides recommendations for future research. 
 
5.2 Summary and Main Findings 
5.2.1 Background of the study and design 
The lack of access to finance has been recognized as a significant problem facing SMEs not 
only in Ghana (Aryeetey et al.1994; Mensah, 2004, Abor and Quartey, 2003) but globally 
(Kauffmann, 2005; Turner et al., 2008). According to extant literature, one key obstacle to 
SMEs’ growth in Ghana is inadequate financing (Kwanin, Nyantakyi & Kyereh, 2015; Ackah 
& Vuvor, 2011, Abor&Biekpe, 2006; Boapeah, 1993).  Consequently, various institutions, 
including the government, have established various initiatives to address the financing 
constraints that SMEs face. Specifically, the government has set up various institutions and 
funds, either alone, or with the support of donor agencies, aimed at addressing the problem of 
lack of finance for SMEs by providing start-up capital and other funding prospects, regularly 
at reduced rates. Some examples of the funds under these schemes include but are not limited 
to Youth Enterprise Schemes (YES), the Export Development and Agricultural Investment 
Fund (EDAIF), the Micro-finance and Small Loan Centre (MASLOC) and the Venture Capital 
Trust Fund (VCTF). The drive for the formation of these official schemes is to increase the 
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flow of finance and credit to SMEs in order to increase their operational capacities, so that they 
can increase productivity, and be internationally competitive. 
In Ghana, the VCTF was established with the purpose of offering investment capital for the 
promotion of SMEs. Furthermore, the VCTF provides for the development of the venture 
capital market in Ghana.  The establishment of the fund formed part of the government’s vision 
to establish a mechanism for making low-cost financing available to SMEs to support growth 
in the productive sectors of the Ghanaian economy and subsequently generate jobs and create 
wealth (Act 680, 2004). The VCTF offers credit and equity funding to suitable VC companies 
to assist SMEs which qualify for equity, quasi-equity and credit support.  
After more than a decade since the operationalization of the venture capital fund many wonder 
about the impact of the venture capital on SMEs’ development in Ghana and what challenges 
entrepreneurs face in accessing venture capital funding in Ghana. It is in the light of these 
questions that the researcher sought to undertake this research study.  
Objectives of this Study  
Research objective one empirically investigates the impact of VC financing on SMEs’ growth 
and development in Ghana. Precisely, this study measures the effects of VC financing on SMEs 
regarding growth in annual sales and employment. Using a combination of PSM-DiD 
estimation models, the results of the study showed that SME owners/managers who received 
venture capital funding achieved significant growth in annual sales and employment as 
compared to those who did not receive venture capital funding. This is consistent with the 
findings of Alemany and Marti (2005); Engel (2003) and Peneder (2010). 
Research objective two examines the determinants of venture capital investment activity in 
Ghana within the context of the Sub-Sahara Africa region. The empirical results based on the 
panel data model technique established that GDP growth rate, unemployment rate (labour 
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market rigidities) and capital gains taxes are significantly correlated to venture capital 
investment activity in the region. These findings conform to similar findings of Gompers and 
Lerner (1998); Felix et al. (2007); Poterba (1989) and Romain & La Portterie (2004). The study 
also revealed that the components of the index of economic freedom such as property rights, 
freedom from corruption, business freedom and investment freedom which denote institutional 
quality are significantly associated with venture capital investment activity. This is consistent 
with the findings of Cherif and Gazdar, (2011); La Porte et al., (1997/98); Cumming et al. 
(2006). 
Research objective three identifies and analyzes the factors that influence SME 
owners/managers’ accessibility to venture capital financing in Ghana. The results of our logit 
regression model show that the variables of gender, experience, geographical location, business 
plan, social networking and the interest rate charged are significantly associated with SME 
owners/managers’ ability to obtain venture capital financing from venture capital investors. 
These results are consistent with similar findings from Carter and Rosa (1998), Sorensen and 
Stuart (2001) and Gompers and Lerner (1998). 
Accordingly, the study findings will enrich the existing literature on venture capital financing 
in Ghana.  The focus of this study is on SMEs that represent more than 90% of all businesses 
in Ghana and play a significant role in the country’s economic development. Our results 
support the theoretical findings in the literature that venture capital financing leads to better 
firm performance; and that a country’s GDP growth rate, labour market inflexibility, and 
reduction in capital gains taxes and components of the index of economic freedom such as 
control of corruption, property rights, business and financial freedom have influence on venture 
capital investment activity. Finally, our results showed that factors such as the gender of SME 
owners/managers, experience, geographical location, business plan, social networking and the 
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interest rate charged are significantly associated with SMEs’ likelihood of obtaining venture 
capital funding in Ghana. 
This study was conducted in the Greater Accra region, the second most populous region after 
the Ashanti region where an estimated 16.3% of the total population of Ghana live and 40% of 
the country’s national income is generated (Farvatcque-Vitkovic,2008) and more importantly, 
more than 60% of the SMEs in the country operate (GSS,2011).  
Data from primary and secondary sources are used to explore the impact of venture capital 
financing on SMEs’ growth and to identify the determinants of venture capital investments as 
well as to assess the factors influencing entrepreneurs’ accessibility to venture capital 
financing.  
Primary data was collected through personal interviews with SME owners with structured 
questionnaires. Based on the purposive sampling technique, a total of 400 SMEs from Accra 
and Tema Metropolitan Areas in the Greater Accra region were surveyed between June and 
September 2016. In all, 400 responses were collected, and 15 were rejected due to the 
incomplete filling in of questionnaires. Thus, the response rate was 67%, and usable responses 
were 385 which consisted of 65 VC-backed SMEs and 320 Non-VC backed SMEs. Secondary 
data were obtained from the World Bank database and the Heritage Foundation over ten years 
from 2006-2015. 
The data was analyzed with descriptive statistics and regression analysis. The descriptive 
statistics included frequency analysis and test of independence (Chi-square test). PSM-DiD 
estimation models, panel data analysis (Fixed effects/Random effects) and binary logistic 
regression were used to investigate the impact of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth, 
determinants of venture capital investment activity and factors influencing SME 
owners/managers’ accessibility to venture capital financing in Ghana. 
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5.2.2 Overview of the Main Findings  
 The findings of this study provide a strong proof of the existence of a relationship between 
venture capital funding and SME growth regarding sales and employment growth. Our 
combined PSM-DiD estimation results reveal the statistically significant impact on annual 
sales and employment of venture-backed SMEs at 1.5 percent and 3.7 percent respectively.  
Our results conform to the findings by Davila et al. (2003), Peneder (2010) and Engel (2003).  
However, our results contradict the findings of Manigart & Hyfte, (1999); Bottazzi and Da Rin 
(2002) and Bürghel et al. (2000) who did not find a significant effect of venture capital 
financing on sales and employment growth. Manigart and Hyfte (1999) studied 187 Belgium 
firms and detected that firms that receive venture capital financing experience more significant 
growth regarding total assets and cash flows, but not the growth of sales revenue and 
employment. Using a sample of 511 VC-firms listed on Europe’s new stock market, Bottazzi 
and Da Rin (2002) showed that European VC-backed companies do not experience faster sales 
and employment growth than non-VC backed companies.  Bürghel et al. (2000) analyzed the 
growth of sales and employees of 500 start-ups localized in Germany and the UK but failed to 
detect any effect of VC financing. 
This is probably because VC-backed firms specialize in selecting the most promising ventures 
and provide value-added services to the firms they invest in. Thus, VC-backed SMEs are most 
likely to outperform Non-VC backed SMEs which are relatively well established at the same 
time, because VCs select or pick the most promising start-up firms, and provide value added 
services such as marketing and management support, business advisory services and assist in 
the recruitment of qualified personnel, provide access to market and suppliers and other 
business related services, such as the provision of professional advice to management team, as 
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well as sitting on a company’s board to work closely with the management team (Timmons 
and Bygrave,1986; Hellman and Puri,2002; Gorman and Sahlman,1989). 
Concerning determinants of venture capital investment activity, our findings revealed that GDP 
growth, unemployment rate, and capital gains taxes are positively associated with venture 
capital investment activity regarding the macroeconomic factors. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Mayer (2010; Gompers and Lerner (1998), Felix et al. (2007) and Romain and 
La Portterie (2004). However, it contradicts the findings of Jeng and Wells (2000) and Marti 
& Balboa (2004) who found no significant effect of GDP growth on venture capital investment 
activity. Jeng and Wells (2000) argued that GDP growth and a vibrant stock market provide 
liquidity and exits for Venture Capitalists during IPOs. 
On institutional determinants of venture capital investment activity, our findings indicate that 
components of the index of economic freedom, which represent the quality of institutions, are 
significantly associated with venture capital investment activity. This is consistent with the 
results of Cherif and Gazdar (2011) who examined the determinants of institutional venture 
capital investment using the index of economic freedom as an indicator of institutional quality. 
The authors found that institutional environment plays an essential role in determining the 
investment of European venture capital. The legal environment strongly influences the size and 
liquidity of a country’s capital market and local firms’ ability to receive outside funding (La 
Porte et al., 1997 and 1998). Glaeser et al. (2001) and Djankov et al. (2003, 2005) suggested 
that parties in common law countries find it easier to enforce their rights from the commercial 
contract. Cumming et al., (2006) found that the quality of a country’s legal structures is even 
more strongly connected to facilitating VC backed IPO exits than the size of a country’s stock 
market. The authors found that differences in legal origin and accounting standards across 
countries have a significant impact on the governance of investment in the VC market. 
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We estimated the factors that determine SME owners/managers’ likelihood of obtaining VC 
funding. Our results show that gender, experience, geographical location, business plan, social 
networking and interest rate charge have a significant influence on SMEs obtaining venture 
capital funding. Whereas SME owner-managers’ age, marital status, educational attainment, 
firm size, firm age, legal status, and sector have no significant influence on SMEs obtaining 
venture capital funding.   
The findings show that the variable gender is associated with accessibility to venture capital 
financing which is consistent with similar findings of Coleman and Robb (2012), Verhuel & 
Thurik (2001), Green et al. (2000) and Carter and Rosa (1998). Similarly, studies by Bennet 
and Dann (2000), Chaganti et al. (1995) and Haynes & Haynes (1999) show that female SME 
owners/managers prefer to use internal financing rather than external equity compared to male 
SME owners/managers. This implies that women-led businesses are less likely to access VC 
funding than men-led businesses.  
Furthermore, the finding shows that there is an association between entrepreneurs’ experience 
and access to venture capital financing. This result is consistent with past studies that revealed 
a correlation between the experience of entrepreneurs and access to external financing 
(Gompers et al., 2006; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004; Hsu, 2007). This may probably be because 
there are significant differences between experienced entrepreneurs’ access to financing 
compared to novice entrepreneurs (Gompers et al., 2006). Experienced entrepreneurs received 
venture capital funding at an earlier stage of their company’s growth. A study by Kaplan and 
Stromberg (2004) noted that the contractual provisions of venture capital financing contracts 
showed that experienced entrepreneurs received more favourable terms than novice 
entrepreneurs. Further, Hsu (2007) investigated 149 early stage start-up firms and found that 
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entrepreneurs’ past firm-founding experience increased both the likelihood of obtaining VC 
investments through a direct connection and the valuation of the start-up by VCIs. 
Our findings also show a strong association between the entrepreneurs’ geographical location 
and access to VC funding. SMEs that are located close to venture capital firms have a higher 
likelihood of obtaining venture capital (Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). Ahmed and Hamid (2011) 
also found that firms located in metropolitan cities have a higher probability of obtaining 
finance compared to firms located in rural areas.  
The results also revealed that there is an association between an entrepreneur’s business plan 
and his or her ability to obtain venture capital financing. Our result is consistent with the 
findings of Delmar and Shane (2003) who found a positive correlation between VC funding 
outcomes and business planning.  This is probably because business plans assist in validating 
entrepreneurs’ businesses and reduce the possibility of failure. According to the authors, 
business plans assist founders to make decisions, hasten new product development and reduce 
the likelihood of business failure. Thus, business plan activity reduces the risks of dissolution 
of the start-up, while it has a positive effect on product development (Delmar and Shane, 2004). 
Our findings also indicate an association between SME owner-managers’ social networking 
and venture capital accessibility. Our result is consistent with numerous empirical studies that 
show that VCs tend to invest in firms where they know the entrepreneur directly or indirectly 
(Fried and Hisrich,1994; Shane &Stuart, 2002; Starr & MacMillan, 1990).  This may be 
because venture capital investors receive so many business applications for funding, and social 
networks play a significant role in influencing which applications will receive favourable 
venture capital funding (Fried and Hirsch,1994). As noted by Shane and Stuart (2002) 
entrepreneurs with social capital involving pre-existing direct or indirect associations with 
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venture capital investors have a higher likelihood of receiving funding at the start-up stage of 
their business. 
Lastly, our results show a significant association between lending interest rate charge and SME 
owner-managers’ ability to obtain VC funding. Our result is consistent with the findings of 
Romain and La Potterie (2004) who found a significant correlation between long-term interest 
rate and private equity in 16 OECD countries. Our result is consistent with the findings of 
Bawuah et al., (2014) who established that the majority of SMEs resort to the use of equity 
financing for their operation due to the high-interest rate. Further, our results indicate that there 
is a strong correlation between interest rate and venture capital investment activity. This 
confirms Gompers and Lerner’s (1998) suggestion that the interest rate is likely to affect the 
supply of and demand for venture capital funds. If the interest rate rises, venture capitalists’ 
attraction towards investment in venture capital funds deteriorates and this therefore will 
decrease their willingness to supply venture capital funds.  
However, the results of our study show that the age of the owner, marital status, education, 
firm age, firm size, and sector did not have any significant effect on SMEs’ access to venture 
capital financing. This contradicts the findings from past literature which indicate a correlation 
between entrepreneurs’ education and their ability to obtain external financing (Becker 1964, 
Bates 1990, Robinson & Sexton 1994, Cressey 1996, Chandler & Hanks, 1998, Baum & 
Silverman, 2004). It is also inconsistent with the conclusion of MacMillan et al., (1985) who 
indicated that the entrepreneur’s qualities eventually influence the investment decision, 
especially a thorough familiarity with the industry/market, leadership capability and ability to 
assess and manage risks.  
There are several possible reasons for these contradictory results. For example, many SME 
owners/managers are older people who are less likely to access external financing than younger 
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SME owners/managers (Vos et al., 2007). Similarly, many of the SME owners/managers are 
married and are less risk tolerant (Hortog et al., 2000). Further, many of the SME 
owners/managers in Ghana have a low level of education and skill training (Aryeetety et 
al.1994) and are less likely to obtain external financing. Lastly, many of the SMEs are in the 
wholesale/retail and service sector with a weak assets structure and are therefore less likely to 
obtain external financing (Abor,2007). 
 
5.3 Implications of the Findings 
The findings of this study have significant ramifications for researchers or academia, 
entrepreneurs, and policymakers. Firstly, for researchers or academia, the findings will assist 
them to gain better knowledge about factors that underpin VC financing decisions and will be 
of benefit regarding understanding of their impact on small businesses. The findings of this 
study showed that SMEs which receive VC financing experience better performance regarding 
sales and employment growth as suggested by Alemany & Marti (2005) and Peneder (2010). 
This is probably because, in addition to the VC funds they also receive value added services 
such as technical expertise, networks and marketing/management support from venture 
capitalists (Gompers and Lerner, 1989). The value-added services in addition to the funds VC-
backed SMEs received create synergies on their business performance in terms of increase in 
sales revenue and growth in employment.  
Secondly, for entrepreneurs, the findings indicate that potential entrepreneurs could take 
advantage of the venture capital to explore innovative ideas and make business proposals to 
seek funding from venture capitalists in order to build ventures and thus turn their innovative 
ideas to marketable products and services. Further, our finding reveals that potential 
entrepreneurs need to consider the geographical location when establishing their businesses, 
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since the findings of our study showed that venture capitalists are likely to invest in businesses 
that are close in proximity to where they are located so that they can monitor their operations.  
Thirdly, for policymakers, it proposes the need for a better macroeconomic and institutional 
environment to be created through the formulation and implementation of suitable policies and 
a regulatory framework, such as increasing GDP growth, and promoting  the  protection of 
property rights to facilitate the development of a dynamic venture industry, in order to promote 
the growth of the SME sector in Ghana. Both entrepreneurs and government stand to benefit 
from long-term enterprise growth if better-co-ordinated support is offered to the SME sector. 
This is because the sector will be able to generate more jobs and create wealth and thereby 
improve government revenues by way of taxes (Agyapong, 2010).  
Fourthly, educational programmes through the media both print and electronic and other 
outreach programmes should be organized to educate and inform potential SME owners about 
the use of venture capital funding as an alternative source of finance. This will offer accurate 
and updated information about venture capital financing to potential SME owners who intend 
to or in future want to obtain venture capital funding to manage their businesses. 
Further, the venture capital centres must be decentralized in all the regions and districts in 
Ghana to make them accessible to potential SME owners to ease the burden and cost of coming 
all the way to the capital city to access funding from the VCFS. Our results showed that location 
of a business entity influences its ability to obtain venture capital funding. Sorensen and Stuart 
(2010) suggested that VCs are willing to provide venture capital funds to businesses that are 
closer to their sites in order to supervise or monitor their activities. This study perceived that 
most SMEs in Ghana are not able to access venture capital funding because of their remoteness 
from venture capital firms. Indeed, the majority of SMEs in Ghana are in the rural areas, hence 
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by decentralizing the venture capital financing scheme in Ghana, these rural SMEs can access 
these VC fund managers. 
Lastly, policymakers should institute gender-sensitive programmes that encourage more 
women to use venture capital to finance their business operations since women are in the 
majority within the SME sector. The government should offer special incentives to women-led 
businesses by giving them some percentage holdings in venture capital funding programmes. 
For instance, in a government venture capital support programme, it may be decided to reserve 
15% -20% of funds solely for women-led businesses to access to develop their businesses. The 
government can also provide tax incentives for Venture Capitalists who invest their funds in 
women-led businesses.  Also, through technical and managerial training and education, more 
women would come to understand and appreciate the use of venture capital to improve and 
grow their businesses.  
 
5.4 Research Limitations 
This study has some limitations with regard to the scope of the study, data and estimation 
techniques.  The scope of the study is limited to only one region in Ghana, even though data 
used in this study is obtained from SMEs covering different areas within the region. Hence one 
should exercise caution when interpreting our findings and should confine them to our study 
sample. 
The data and information collected for the study were restricted to SMEs in the urban areas of 
Accra and Tema, as well as to SMEs who applied for venture capital funding at the time of the 
survey since the majority of the SMEs under study are in the urban centres. SMEs who applied 
for venture capital financing, but were denied or rejected were also not included in our model 
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due to inadequate information. The findings, therefore, are limited to SMEs in the urban cities 
which received venture capital funding.  
Further, our study suffers from a sample distribution problem, which is caused by the 
availability of data. It is not surprising that a study of this nature on a topic such as the impact 
of venture capital financing on SMEs’ growth and development in a developing country like 
Ghana could pose such a problem. Even though it is ideal to have a balanced sample 
distribution, our sample size was unbalanced regarding the matched treatment group of 65 VC-
backed SMEs as comparable to the control group of 320 Non-VC backed SMEs. This is 
because many of our VC backed SMEs are unwilling to share primary information, especially 
about disclosure of financial information.  Nevertheless, Smith (1997) gives an example where 
matching is more efficient than multiple regression when the treated group, i.e., N1 (39) is much 
smaller than the control group, i.e., N0 (5053). The author argued that the ultimate goal of 
matching in observation data is to come up with a control group that has a zero comparison 
group bias, not just similar numbers across the control group and treated groups. 
The researcher combined PSM and DiD estimation methods to determine the effect of venture 
capital financing on SMEs’ growth. PSM is used to match all programme participants with 
non-participants with the identical likelihood of participating in the programme based on 
observable characteristics (see Dehejia & Wahba 2002; Baker 2000; Rosenbaum and Rubin 
1983). The possibility of adopting this matching method originates from the approximation of 
propensity score (participation probability), which is responsive to specifications assumed 
(Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). Thus, impact assessment may be inconsistent due to different 
specifications used for the propensity score. Nonetheless, PSM-DiD offers the best alternative 
to deal with the issues of selection bias and endogeneity in a non-experimental study of this 
nature. 
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The researcher compared the treatment and control groups for the impact evaluation and used 
the outcomes (such as Sales and Employment growth) of the control group to approximate the 
counterfactual outcomes of venture capital for non-programme participants. In a situation 
where the control group does not offer a precise comparison group to the treatment group, the 
trustworthiness of the impact estimation results will be diminished, mostly in models, which 
use cross-sectional data.  
Furthermore, the estimated outcomes such as sales and employment growth are likely to be 
affected by unforeseen circumstances such as fire outbreaks, flooding or burglary (business 
disruptions). This might lessen the accuracy of our impact estimations. As such, this research 
does not consider the influence of business disruptions on venture capital funding on SMEs’ 
growth. This is a result of a lack of data linked to a business disruption in both the before and 
after-programme periods during our survey. Again, the study only demonstrates a significant 
impact of venture capital funding on SMEs’ growth in a cross-sectional model, while the long-
term effect is not included because many of the SMEs are young.  Hence, a longitudinal data 
analysis of our study may show different results. 
Finally, due to lack of financial resources and time constraints, the study could not be carried 
out in the whole of the country, but was limited to the Greater Accra region of Ghana. 
 
 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
We recommend that future investigation can be conducted by using a dynamic panel dataset 
estimation technique to evaluate the long-term effect of venture capital financing on SMEs’ 
growth. The use of dynamic panel data analysis will significantly improve the estimation 
results of the impact of venture capital financing on SMEs’ development in future studies. A 
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dynamic panel data analysis will be able to capture accurately the dynamics of SMEs’ 
performance before and after receiving venture capital financing. This is because the dynamic 
panel data method can capture the dynamic effects on SMEs’ performance prior to and after 
the policy intervention, such as the variation in SMEs’ performance after receiving venture 
capital funding (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
Future research can also be conducted based on a case study to assess the impact of the venture 
capital market on Ghana’s economy. This is because, through case studies, much detailed 
information can be collected which other research designs would not easily obtain.  Thus, the 
study on the impact of the venture capital market on Ghana’s economy will increase the validity 
and reliability of the findings.  
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Appendix -A 
Sample Size Calculation 
The study sample size is determined by the Cochrane (2007) formula used in most primary 
data collections: 
 Formula is:                                         𝑛 =
𝑍2𝑝𝑞
𝑒2
                    
 Where:       
            n   is sample size 
            𝑍2 is the abscissa of the normal curve that cut off an area at the tail 
            e   is the desired level of precision 
            p   is the estimated proportion of an attribute that is present in the population 
            q   is 1-p 
This study chooses a level of confidence at 95% (or ±5% precision) and assumes p = 0.5, 
q = 0.5. Therefore, according to the above formula, the total sample size will be 385 SME 
owners/managers. The study distributed questionnaires to 600 respondents to obtain 
sufficient and completed responses for the analysis. 
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Appendix -B 
 Questionnaire 
Code No. _______ 
 
An empirical analysis of Venture Capital Financing on SMEs Growth and Development in 
Ghana. 
Instructions: For each question with boxes provided, please tick your answer(s); otherwise, 
please follow the instructions given to answer the questions. Only summary measures and 
conclusions from this survey will be reported. There are 5 sections, you only need to answer 
the relevant parts, please follow the guidelines. Your participation is voluntary, and all of 
your answers will be kept confidential. 
 
Section 1. 
 
This section asks all respondents about their sources of credit in general 
 
Q1 What is the main problem confronting your business over the past 2 years? (You may 
choose more than one) 
 Finding customers (1) 
 Competition (2) 
 Cost of production and/or labour (3) 
 Access to finance (4) 
 Non-availability of skilled staff or experience personnel (5) 
 Government regulation (6) 
 Electricity supply (7) 
 Others (please specify)                                                           (8) 
 
 
Q2 Did you have any difficulty in obtaining loans in the last 2 years? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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Q3 If No in Q2, why not?  (You may tick more than one) 
 Enough Savings/Have other source of funds (1) 
 Get direct government assistance (2) 
 Afraid to borrow (3) 
 Have personal inheritance (4) 
 Do not qualify (5) 
 Information processing is time consuming and difficult (6) 
 Do not need to borrow (7) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                  (8) 
 
Q4 If yes in Q2, what are the reason(s)? (You may tick more than one) 
 Scared of high interest rate (1) 
 Do not have adequate documents (2) 
 Do not have adequate collateral (3) 
 Do not have relations with credit officials (4) 
 Business performance was not good (5) 
 Unstable income repayment (6) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                           (7) 
 
Q5 Which source(s) of credit did you obtain? (You may tick more than one)          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formal finance                    Informal finance                       
 
 
Commercial banks    Private money lenders  
Rural banks  Friends/relatives                 
Development bank  Trade creditors  
Micro finance institutions             
Credit Unions    
Government support schemes    
Financial services NGOs      
Others                   
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Q6.What was the percentage share from each source? (The sum of these sources of financing 
add up to 100%)           
Formal finance                    Informal finance                       
Commercial banks    Private money lenders  
Rural banks  Friends/relatives                 
Development banks  Trade creditors   
Micro finance institutions             
Credit Unions    
Government support schemes    
Financial services NGOs      
Others                   
 
 
Q7 Did any of your loans in question Q6 require collateral(s)? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q8 If Yes, what type of collateral(s)? (You can tick more than one) 
 Land title certificate (1) 
 Housing (2) 
 Equipment capital (3) 
 Personal belongings (such as (car, gold, stocks, etc.) (4) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                           (5) 
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Q9 Please circle the number (from 1 to 5) best describing the extent to which your business has 
utilized personalities, networks, and connections in 2015 operation where 1 indicates "very 
little" and 5 indicates "Very extensive" NA means Not Applicable.                
 
 Very 
little 
 Average Very 
extensive 
NA 
Commercial bank officials      
Rural bank officials  
 
    
Government officials          
Suppliers (e.g. input 
suppliers, material suppliers)   
     
Customers      
Social Organization or 
NGOs 
     
Business Associates        
Others           
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SECTION 1(PART II) 
 
 
 
Q10 Did you borrow any loan in 2015? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q11 If yes, how many credit suppliers did you approach during 2015? 
 1-2 (1) 
 3-4 (2) 
 5-6 (3) 
 More than 7 (4) 
 Others (please specify) 
 
Q12 What percentage of your loan applications were successful during 2015? 
 Above 80% (1) 
 60%-80% (2) 
 40%-60% (3) 
 20%-40% (4) 
 Less than 20% (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                            (6) 
 
Q13 What was the total amount of your loan(s) in 2015? 
 
Q14 What was the purpose(s) of your loan? (You may choose more than one) 
 As start-up capital (1) 
 Working capital, cash flow (2) 
 Purchase equipment/vehicles (3) 
 Buying land/building (4) 
Accessibility to Credit in 2015 
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 Improve building (5) 
 Research and development (6) 
 Business expansion/growth (7) 
 Training/Staff development (8) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                  (9) 
 
Q15 How many percent did the loan(s) meet your capital needs? 
 Above 80% (1) 
 60%-80% (2) 
 40%-60% (3) 
 20%-40% (4) 
 Less than 20% (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                 (6) 
 
Q16 Which types of formal or/and informal finance(s) did you borrow from in 2015? (You can 
tick more than one)                     
 
 
Formal finance                    Informal finance                       
 
 
Commercial banks    Private money lenders  
Rural banks  Friends/relatives                 
Development banks  Trade creditors  
Micro finance institutions             
Credit Unions    
Government support schemes    
Financial services NGOs      
Others                   
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Q17 What was the interest rate you paid for the loan in 2015?                    (Per 
year)                                              
 
Q18 What type of ownership would you consider your business? 
 Household business establishment (1) 
 Private (sole proprietorship) (2) 
 Collective/Cooperative (3) 
 Limited liability company (4) 
 Joint stock company with state capital (5) 
 Joint stock company without state capital (6) 
 Joint venture with foreign capital (7) 
 
Q19 What was your main business activity in 2015? 
 Agriculture (1) 
 Industry (2) 
 Services (3) 
 Trade (4) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                              (5) 
 
Q20 Given a choice, which type of borrowing would you prefer? 
 Formal lenders (1) 
 Informal lenders (2) 
 
Q21 How would you rate your access to credit in the last 2 years? 
 Difficult (1) 
 Neutral (2) 
 Easy (3) 
 Uncertain (4) 
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Q22  The following factors are important to” my business in choosing creditors”; please circle 
the suitable number from 1 to 5 where 1 indicates “strongly disagree” and 5 indicates “strongly 
agree”.               Strongly disagree                    Neutral                       Strongly agree           
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 Neutral  Strongly 
agree 
No collateral      
Lower interest rate      
                                                            
Immediate loan release/faster processing           
     
Having a borrowing relationship with the 
creditor 
     
No/less complicated lending procedure         
Better lending terms        
Others (please specify)      
 
                                                                                                                                       
Q23 Did you apply for venture capital financing in the last 2 years? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
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SECTION 2. 
 
 
Q1 How did you get to know about venture capital financing? (You may choose more than 
one). 
 Newspaper publication (1) 
 Radio (2) 
 Internet (3) 
 Business Associates (4) 
 Government Agencies (5) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                                                 (6) 
 
Q2 Did you get approval for your venture capital application from the venture capitalists? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q3 If No in Q.2, what were the reasons your application for venture capital was rejected? (You 
can choose more than one) 
 No credit history (1) 
 Inadequate financial records (2) 
 Lack of quality management team (3) 
 Poor business plan (4) 
 No links with government officials (5) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                                                 (6) 
 
Q4 If yes in Q.2 do you think any of the following factor(s) played a role in securing the venture 
capital financing for your business? (You may tick more than one) 
 Economic outlook (1) 
 Quality of business plan (2) 
 Quality of management team (3) 
 Work experience (4) 
 Prospect of the business (5) 
This section is for all respondents who use Venture capital in their business 
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 Quality of products/services (6) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                                     (7) 
 
Q5 How long did it take you to access venture capital financing for your business? 
 less than 1year (1) 
 1-2years (2) 
 2-3years (3) 
 3-4years (4) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                                     (5) 
 
Q6 What was the estimated amount that your business was able to raise from the venture capital 
firm?                                                            
Q7 How many percent did the funds raised (s) meet your capital needs? 
 Above 80% (1) 
 60%-80% (2) 
 40%-60% (3) 
 20%-40% (4) 
 Less than 20% (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                 (6) 
 
Q8 At what stage was venture capital first used in your business? 
 Seed (1) 
 Start-up (2) 
 Early Stage (3) 
 Later Stage (4) 
 Maturity Stage (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                             (6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 
 
Q9 How many times did you apply for venture capital financing for your business? 
 Once (1) 
 Twice (2) 
 Thrice (3) 
 Four times (4) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                     (5) 
 
Q10 How far is your business location from where you sourced the Venture Capital institution? 
 1-5 kilometers (1) 
 6-10 kilometers (2) 
 11-15 kilometers (3) 
 16-20 kilometers (4) 
 More than 20 kilometers (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                                   (6) 
 
Q11 Did you receive any form assistance from any person(s) in accessing venture capital 
financing for your business? (You may choose more than one) 
 Friends (1) 
 Relatives or Family members (2) 
 Business Associates or Partners (3) 
 Government Officials (4) 
 Social Organization/NGOs (5) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                                                    (6) 
 
Q12 It is much easier to access venture capital financing for your firm or business than other 
financing such as bank loans, from money lenders and trade credit. 
 I strongly agree (1) 
 I agree (2) 
 I disagree (3) 
 I strongly disagree (4) 
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Q13 In what way(s), has the infusion of venture capital financing affected your business 
growth? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
Q14 The infusion of venture capital financing has contributed to the improvement in your 
business growth in what ways? (You may choose more than one). 
 Value added service (1) 
 Quality of management (2) 
 Oversight over financial management (3) 
 Change in marketing strategy (4) 
 Improved innovation and product quality (5) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                                                         (6) 
 
Q15 How would you describe the effect of venture capital financing on your profit margin? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
Q16 How would you describe the effect of venture capital financing on your annual sales? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
Q17 How would you describe the effect of venture capital financing on your total assets? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
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 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
Q18 How would you describe the effect of venture capital financing on the number of 
employees? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
Q19 What were your estimated amounts of annual sales, revenue and profit margin as well as 
the workforce between 2014 and 2015?      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before Venture 
Capital (2014)     
 After Venture Capital 
(2015)           
 
Annual Sales ($)     
Total revenue ($)                         
Profit Margin (%) approximate     
Full time workers                         
Part time workers     
Permanent workers     
Temporary workers     
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Q20 What was the estimated value of total assets for the business between 2014 and 2015?    
 
 
Q21 How would you rank the following factors/ conditions which determine venture capital 
investments activity? 1= strongly agree            2=partially agree          3=moderately agree              
4= partially disagree                 5=strongly disagree 
 
Q22 In your opinion, what role can policy makers play in addressing the challenges and/or 
obstacles your business faces in accessing venture capital financing? (you may tick more than 
one) 
 Government must improve macro-economic environment (1) 
 Legal and regulatory framework must be improved (2) 
 Ensure a vibrate stock market (3) 
 Discourage bribery and corruption (4) 
 Education and training for skilled professionals (5) 
 Provide more financial resources (6) 
 Tax incentives (7) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                   (8) 
 
 
Q23 In your opinion, what is/are the challenge(s) and/or obstacle(s) facing your business in 
accessing venture capital financing? (You may tick more than one) 
 Before Venture 
Capital (2014)     
 After Venture 
Capital (2015           
 
Building ($)     
Machinery & Equipment ($)     
Furniture and Office Equipment ($)     
Commercial Vehicles (lorries, vans, cars, 
etc.) 
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 Lack of good corporate governance practice (1) 
 Weak stock market (2) 
 Unstable macro-economic environment (3) 
 Bureaucracy (4) 
 Lack of expertise or Service professionals (5) 
 Bribery and Corruption (6) 
 Weak legal and regulatory framework (7) 
 
 1 2   3 4 5  
Gross domestic product 
(GDP %) 
        
Interest rate 
(%)                                    
        
Unemployment rate (%)  
 
       
Size and liquidity of the 
stock market 
($)                                   
        
Labour market rigidity  
 
       
Taxation (capital gains tax)  
 
       
Research and Development 
Expenditure 
        
Bribery and 
Corruption                                    
 
        
Protection of property 
rights 
 
 
       
Rule of law  
 
       
Political Stability  
 
       
Human Capital 
Development 
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  Lack of tax incentives (8) 
 Lack of general public knowledge about the venture capital industry (9) 
 Inadequate finance or limited sources of capital (10) 
 Inadequate exit options (11) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                                              (12) 
 
Q24 How would you rate the performance of the venture capital industry currently? 
 Excellent (1) 
 Very good (2) 
 Average (3) 
 Good (4) 
 Poor (5) 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 3 
 
Q1 Why did you not apply for venture capital financing for your business? 
 Have adequate funds (1) 
 Fear of losing control rights/ownership right (2) 
 Due to complex application process (3) 
 Due to lack of information about venture capital financing (4) 
 Due to strict legal requirements (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                        (6) 
 
Q2 What is your preferred source of credit? (You may choose more than one) 
 Bank loan/Overdraft (1) 
 Borrow from friends/relatives (2) 
 Trade credit from business partners or suppliers (3) 
This section is for all respondents who DO NOT use venture capital in their business 
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 Private money lenders (4) 
 Leasing/factoring (5) 
 Others,(please specify)                                                                                            (6) 
 
Q3 Why do you prefer that source of credit to venture capital for your business? 
 It is easy to acquire (1) 
 The risk is less as compared to venture capital (2) 
 To avoid interference in the running of the business (3) 
 The process is complex (4) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                                         (5) 
 
Q4 How long does it take you to access credit from your source? 
 1-2 weeks (1) 
 3-4 weeks (2) 
 5-6 weeks (3) 
 7-8 weeks (4) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                 (5) 
 
Q5 What was the main source of capital when starting your business? 
 Personal savings (1) 
 Friends and family members (2) 
 Commercial bank loan (3) 
 Private money lenders (4) 
 Micro-finance institutions (5) 
 Social Organizations/NGOs (6) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                (7) 
 
Q6 What percentage of credit you requested did you receive? 
 100% (1) 
 80-90% (2) 
 50-70% (3) 
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 Less than 50% (4) 
 20-30% (5) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                              (6) 
 
Q7 How many times did you apply for the credit facility? 
 Once (1) 
 Twice (2) 
 Thrice (3) 
 Four times (4) 
 Five times (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                          (6) 
 
Q8 What were the estimated amounts of your business annual sales, total revenue and profit  
margin as well as number of workforce between 2014 and 2015?        
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (2014)       (2015)            
 
Annual Sales ($) 
    
 
Total revenue ($)                     
    
Profit Margin (%) 
approximate 
    
 
Full time workers                     
    
 
Part time workers 
    
 
Permanent workers 
    
 
Temporary workers 
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Q9 What is the estimated value of assets for your business between 2014 and 2015? 
 
 
Q10 How would you describe the growth of your business? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
Q11 How would you describe your profit margin in 2015 as compared to 2014? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
Q12 How would you describe your total asset in 2015 as compared to 2014? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
 
 
Assets 
  
(2014)     
  
(2015           
 
Building ($)     
Machinery & 
Equipment ($) 
    
Furniture and Office 
Equipment ($) 
    
Commercial Vehicles 
(lorries, vans, cars, etc.) 
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Q13 How would you describe the number of persons employed in 2015 as compared to 2014? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
 
Q14 In future, would you consider venture capital infusion as an option in your business? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 I don't know (3) 
 
 
SECTION 4. 
Characteristics of business (For all Respondents) 
 
Q1 What type of ownership would you consider your business? 
 Household business establishment (1) 
 Private(sole proprietorship) (2) 
 Co-operative Society (3) 
 Limited liability company (4) 
 Joint Stock Company with State capital (5) 
 Joint Stock Company without State capital (6) 
 Joint Stock Company with foreign capital (7) 
 State Enterprise (8) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                                                 (9) 
 
Q2 How long have you been operating your business? 
 Less than 1 year (1) 
 1-2 years (2) 
 3-4 years (3) 
 5-6 years (4) 
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 More than 6 years (5) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                                               (6) 
 
Q3 Where is your business located? 
 Accra Metropolis (1) 
 Tema Metropolis (2) 
 Suburb of Accra (3) 
 Rural district in Accra (4) 
 Others,(please specify)                                                                   (5) 
 
Q4 Is your business a registered company? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q5 If you answered No in Q4, why is your business not registered? 
 Registration process is too cumbersome (1) 
 High cost of registration fees (2) 
 To avoid payment of taxes (3) 
 Do not know how to go about registration process (4) 
 It takes too long to get business registered (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                                  (6) 
 
Q6 If yes, when was the business incorporated.................................................................. 
Q7 What type of business activity are you engaged in? 
 Wood, furniture and other wood products (1) 
 Chemicals, pharmaceutical and health products (2) 
 Food products and beverages (3) 
 Foot-wear, textiles, jewelry and wearing apparel (4) 
 Books and stationery (5) 
 Fabricated metals products and machinery (6) 
 Others (please specify) (7) 
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Q8 What sector or industry is your business operating in? 
 Manufacturing/Construction (1) 
 Wholesale or retail trade (2) 
 Agricultural/Forestry/fishing (3) 
 Services (4) 
 Merchandising (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                               (6) 
 
 
Q9 How would you classify your business? 
 Micro enterprise (1) 
 Small sized enterprise (2) 
 Medium sized enterprise (3) 
 Large enterprise (4) 
 
Q10 What was the total number of employees in your business in 2015? 
 1-5 persons (1) 
 6-9 persons (2) 
 10-29 persons (3) 
 30-99 persons (4) 
 100-150 persons (5) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                 (6) 
 
Q11 Compared to 2014, what was the status of your business’s total sales revenue in 2015? 
 Increased (1) 
 Decreased (2) 
 Stagnated (3) 
 I don't know (4) 
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Q12 Compared to 2014, what was the estimated value of the total assets of your business in 
2015? 
 $10,000 (1) 
 $100,000 (2) 
 $1,000,000 (3) 
 More than $1,000,000 (4) 
 Others, (please specify)                                                                              (5) 
 
Q13 Compared to 2014, what was the estimated profit margin of your business in 2015? 
 $5,000-$9,000 (1) 
 $10,000-$14,000 (2) 
 $15,000-$19,000 (3) 
 $20,000-$29,000 (4) 
 $30,000-$49,000 (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                              (6) 
 
Q14 Compared to 2014, what were your business total sales in 2015? 
 $20,000-$50,000 (1) 
 $100,00-$99,999 (2) 
 $1,000,000-$1,999,999 (3) 
 $2,000,000-$2,999,999 (4) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                               (5) 
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SECTION 5. 
Socio-demographics characteristics (For all Respondents) 
 
Q1 Your gender? 
 Male (1) 
 Female (2) 
Q2 Your age group? 
 25 years (1) 
 30 years (2) 
 31-39 years (3) 
 40-49 years (4) 
 50-59 years (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                        ( 6) 
 
Q3 Your marital status? 
 Single/Never married (1) 
 Married (2) 
 De facto relationship (3) 
 Divorced (4) 
 
Q4 Your educational level? 
 No formal education (1) 
 Primary School (2) 
 Junior High Scholl (3) 
 Senior High School (4) 
 Technical/ Vocational School (5) 
 Diploma (6) 
 Bachelor degree (7) 
 Post-graduate(Master/PhD (8) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                             (9) 
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Q5 What is your ethnicity? 
 African (1) 
 Asian (2) 
 White/European (3) 
 Arabian (4) 
 Latino (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                     (6) 
 
Q6 What is your current position in the business? 
 Owner/Manager/CEO (1) 
 Chief finance officer (2) 
 Marketing officer (3) 
 Chief Accountant (4) 
 Human Resource manager (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                 (6) 
 
Q7 How long have you been in your current position? 
 Less than 1 year (1) 
 1-2 years (2) 
 2-3 years (3) 
 4-5 years (4) 
 6-7 years (5) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                   (6) 
 
Q8 How many members are there in your household?                                                 
 
Q9 How many income earners are there in your household                                    Persons) 
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Q10 Is your business the main source of income for your household? 
 Yes (1) 
 No (2) 
 
Q11 If No, what is the main source of your household income? 
 Salary from paid jobs (1) 
 Pension (2) 
 Other members' business (3) 
 Returns from investments (e.g. Property, Stocks, Bonds, Gold, etc.) (4) 
 Others (please specify)                                                       (5) 
 
Q12 What is your annual income? 
 $12,000 (1) 
 $15,000 (2) 
 $20,000 (3) 
 $25,000 (4) 
 $50,000 (5) 
 More than $50,000 (6) 
 Others (please specify)                                                 (7) 
 
Q13 Have you taken any of the following professional training courses? (You can tick more 
than one) 
 Business management skills (1) 
 Leadership skills (2) 
 Accounting and/or financial management (3) 
 Human resource management (4) 
 Marketing (5) 
 Company and tax law (6) 
 Others (please specify)                                                                       (7) 
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Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated. Thank you for your time and if you have further 
comments about Venture Capital Financing SMEs, please feel free to comment in the space provided 
below. Once again, we assure you that your identity will remain STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. 
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Appendix-C 
C1. Results of Propensity Score Estimation and Region of common support. 
 
 
 
 
 
The region of common support is [.02401465, .92121572]
Note: the common support option has been selected
                                                                              
       _cons    -10.96319   1.976734    -5.55   0.000    -14.83752   -7.088867
NoofEmp~2013     .0274642   .0229396     1.20   0.231    -.0174965    .0724249
annuals~2013     2.24e-07   1.40e-07     1.60   0.109    -5.00e-08    4.97e-07
      Sector     .2003227   .1848419     1.08   0.278    -.1619608    .5626062
    FirmSize     .2939372   .3843375     0.76   0.444    -.4593504    1.047225
     FirmAge     .1291241   .3932986     0.33   0.743    -.6417269    .8999752
 LegalStatus     2.430341   .5839555     4.16   0.000      1.28581    3.574873
      Income     .8609693   .1876839     4.59   0.000     .4931156    1.228823
  Experience     .3170132   .4167145     0.76   0.447    -.4997322    1.133759
   Education     .4922107   .4170498     1.18   0.238    -.3251919    1.309613
MaritalSta~s    -.5572087   .4465129    -1.25   0.212    -1.432358    .3179404
         Age     .4795455   .2798241     1.71   0.087    -.0688996    1.027991
      Gender    -.8985429   .5228816    -1.72   0.086    -1.923372    .1262861
                                                                              
   Treatment        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -115.59337                       Pseudo R2       =     0.3387
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(12)     =     118.41
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        385
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -115.59337
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -115.59337
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -115.59403
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -115.69341
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -117.19957
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -127.21391
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -174.80079
Estimation of the propensity score 
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is not different for treated and controls in each blocks
This number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score
The final number of blocks is 5
****************************************************** 
Use option detail if you want more detailed output 
Step 1: Identification of the optimal number of blocks 
****************************************************** 
99%      .889792       .9212157       Kurtosis       3.089236
95%     .7040301       .8962067       Skewness       1.036887
90%     .6092909        .889792       Variance        .050457
75%     .3825963       .8657154
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .2246263
50%     .1737111                      Mean           .2558158
25%     .0765023       .0261671       Sum of Wgt.         249
10%     .0391975       .0249508       Obs                 249
 5%     .0324031       .0241127
 1%     .0249508       .0240147
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                 Estimated propensity score
in region of common support 
Description of the estimated propensity score 
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******************************************* 
End of the algorithm to estimate the pscore 
******************************************* 
Note: the common support option has been selected
     Total         184         65         249 
                                             
        .8           1          5           6 
        .6           7         14          21 
        .4          14         20          34 
        .2          43         12          55 
  .0240147         119         14         133 
                                             
of pscore            0          1       Total
  of block         Treatment
  Inferior  
and the number of controls for each block 
This table shows the inferior bound, the number of treated
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            C2-Quality matching -Balancing tests 
 
 * if B>25%, R outside [0.5; 2]
                                                                                   
 Matched     0.080     13.65    0.253     15.0      10.9      65.5*   1.61     18
 Unmatched   0.338    118.21    0.000     54.3      54.0     170.4*   0.49*    36
                                                                                   
 Sample      Ps R2   LR chi2   p>chi2   MeanBias   MedBias      B      R     %Var
                                                                                   
* if variance ratio outside [0.61; 1.64] for U and [0.61; 1.64] for M
                                                                                        
                                                                              
                       M    20.108   19.708      4.6    93.9     0.22  0.825    1.21
NoofEmployees2013      U    20.108   13.497     76.7             7.10  0.000    3.50*
                                                                              
                       M    1.3e+06   1.1e+06     11.1    80.8     0.57  0.570    1.27
annualsales2013        U    1.3e+06   5.8e+05     57.6             4.89  0.000    2.20*
                                                                              
                       M    2.6308   2.5846      4.6    67.8     0.25  0.804    0.89
Sector                 U    2.6308   2.4875     14.3             1.07  0.285    1.10
                                                                              
                       M    1.5077   1.4769      6.5    87.1     0.35  0.728    1.00
FirmSize               U    1.5077   1.2688     50.3             3.86  0.000    1.29
                                                                              
                       M         3   2.9385     10.5    81.8     0.65  0.519    1.40
FirmAge                U         3   2.6625     57.8             4.27  0.000    1.02
                                                                              
                       M         1   1.1077    -28.9    75.2    -2.78  0.006    0.00*
LegalStatus            U         1   .56563    116.5             6.64  0.000    0.00*
                                                                              
                       M    3.5077   3.5231     -1.6    98.3    -0.09  0.930    0.85
Income                 U    3.5077   2.5969     97.3             7.24  0.000    1.08
                                                                              
                       M       3.2   3.0769     21.4    54.7     1.30  0.194    1.53
Experience             U       3.2   2.9281     47.3             3.54  0.000    1.12
                                                                              
                       M    2.8923   2.7846     24.9     3.0     1.38  0.169    0.49*
Education              U    2.8923   2.7813     25.6             1.71  0.087    0.52*
                                                                              
                       M    1.7538   1.7077     10.7  -433.3     0.59  0.557    0.90
MaritalStatus          U    1.7538   1.7625     -2.0            -0.15  0.882    1.04
                                                                              
                       M    3.3385   3.1538     28.7    39.9     1.58  0.117    0.76
Age                    U    3.3385   3.0313     47.8             3.43  0.001    0.86
                                                                              
                       M    .10769   .21538    -26.8    54.4    -1.67  0.097       .
Gender                 U    .10769   .34375    -58.7            -3.83  0.000       .
                                                                                        
Variable          Matched   Treated Control    %bias  |bias|      t    p>|t|    V(C)
                Unmatched         Mean               %reduct       t-test       V(T)/
                                                                                        
>  Treatment) both
. pstest Gender Age MaritalStatus Education Experience Income LegalStatus FirmAge FirmSize Sector annualsales2013 NoofEmployees2013, _treated(
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Appendix- D 
 
D1. Summary of diagnostics tests for Panel data analysis 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier 
Test (LM)  
Reject/Not Reject H0 (Not rejected)  
 
chibar2(01) =   84.28 
Prob > chibar2 =   0.0000 
Variance Inflation Factor for 
multicollinearity 
Reject/Not Reject H0 (Not rejected) 
 
Mean VIF    =   3.38(<10) 
Breusch-Pagan Cook-Weisberg test 
Reject/ Not Rejected H0 reject at 1% 
chi2(1)         =     0.15 
Prob > chi2   =   0.7002 
Wooldridge test for Serial Correlation 
Reject/Not Rejected H0 
F (1, 14)   =     25.236 
Prob > F     =   0.0002 
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Appendix -E  
G1. Description of Variables used in the Logit Regression Model 
Variable Name                 Variable Type                    Variable Description    
Demographics 
  Gender                           
                                 
Gender of SME 
owner/manager  
  
 
Binary 
 
 
Gender of SME owner (1=female, 
0=male) 
Age (years) Continuous Age of SME owner/manager (in years) 
 Married Binary 1=Married, 0 otherwise 
Education Binary 1=Post-Secondary education, 
otherwise 0 
Experience(years) Continuous Number of working experience (in 
years) 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm age   (years) 
 
Continuous 
 
Date of incorporation to survey date 
Firm size    (persons)   Continuous Measured by number of employees 
 Location (distance) Binary 1=urban area, otherwise 0 
 Ownership    Binary 1=Incorporated, otherwise 0 
 Sector/Industry  Continuous Operational area of business 
 Socio-economics      
 Business plan 
 
Binary 
 
1= Has business plan, otherwise 0 
 Interest rate charge (%) Binary 1= high interest payment, otherwise 0 
Networking       Continuous 
 
 
 
Affiliated to networks such as 
government officials, 
Bankers, Investors, NGOs, etc. 
